Today On The Eric Metaxas Show, Eric talks with Roger Kimball about New York City, Islam, and why they argue the West is losing civilizational confidence. They discuss whether the Islam vs Islamism distinction holds up, why assimilation and shared values matter for a free society, and what is happening in Europe and England right now. Then they pivot to Iran, regime change predictions, and why they believe Trump is reshaping the global order from the border to energy to foreign policy.
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How Political Correctness Hijacked the Arts | Roger Kimball and Heather MacDonald


What gets to be called art â and who decides? In this wide-ranging Socrates Dialogues conversation, New Yorkâbased thinkers, writers, and art admirers Heather Mac Donald and Roger Kimball explore the definition of art and the history of the unmaking of beauty in modern contemporary art. Drawing on examples from Duchamp, Warhol, Serrano, Hirst, and others, the two discuss how the banal, the transgressive, and the political have reshaped the aesthetic experience of art, often robbing it of spiritual resonance.
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Populism, X: The Imperative of Freedom

It is curious how certain words accumulate a nimbus of positive associations while others, semantically just as innocuous, wind up shouldering a portfolio of bad feelings.
Consider the different careers of the terms âdemocracyâ and âpopulism.â
Do you know any responsible person who would admit to being opposed to democracy? No one who does not enjoy a large private income would risk it. But lots of people are willing to declare themselves anti-populist. The discrepancy is curious for several reasons.
It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
For one thing, it is a testament to the almost Darwinian hardiness of the word âdemocracy.â In the fierce struggle among ideas for survival, âdemocracyâ has not only survived but thrived. This is despite the fact that political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle through Cicero and down to modern times have been deeply suspicious of democracy. Aristotle thought democracy the worst form of government, all but inevitably leading to ochlocracy or mob rule, which is no rule.
In Federalist 10, James Madison famously warned that history had shown that democratic regimes have âin general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.â âTheoretic politicians,â he wroteâand it would be hard to find a more contemptuous deployment of the word âtheoreticââsuch politicians may have advocated democracy, but that is only because of their dangerous and utopian ignorance of human nature. It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
Nevertheless, nearly everyone wants to associate himself with the word âdemocracy.â Totalitarian regimes like to describe themselves as the âDemocratic Republicâ of wherever. Conservatives champion the advantages of âdemocratic capitalism.â Central planners of all stripes eagerly deploy programs advertised as enhancing or extending âdemocracy.â Even James Madison came down on the side of a subspecies of democracy, one filtered through the modulating influence of a large, diverse population and an elaborate scheme of representation that softened (Madison said âexcludedâ) the influence of âthe people in their collective capacity.â
âDemocracy,â in short, is a eulogistic word, what the practical philosopher Stephen Potter in another context apostrophized as an âOK word.â And it is worth noting, as Potter would have been quick to remind us, that the people pronouncing those eulogies delight in advertising themselves as, and are generally accepted as, âOK people.â Indeed, the class element and the element of moral approbationâof what some genius has summarized as âvirtue signalingââare key.
It is quite otherwise with âpopulism.â At first blush, this seems odd because the word âpopulismâ occupies a semantic space closely adjacent to âdemocracy.â âDemocracyâ means ârule by the demos,â the people. âPopulism,â according to The American Heritage Dictionary, describes âA political philosophy directed to the needs of the common people and advancing a more equitable distribution of wealth and powerââ that is, just the sorts of things that the people, were they to rule, would seek.
But the fact is that âpopulismâ is ambivalent at best. Sometimes, it is true, a charismatic figure can survive and even illuminate the label âpopulistâ like a personal halo. Bernie Sanders managed this trick among the eco-conscious, racially omnivorous, non-gender-stereotyping, anti-capitalist beneficiaries of capitalism who made up his core constituency.
But it was always my impression that in this case the term âpopulistâ was fielded less by Sanders or his followers than by his rivals and the media in an effort to fix him in the publicâs mind as one of the many lamentable examples of not-Hillary, who herself was presumed to be popular though not populist.
There are at least two sides to the negative association under which the term âpopulistâ struggles. On the one hand, there is the issue of demagoguery. Some commentators tell us that âpopulistâ and âdemagogueâ are essentially synonyms (though they rarely point out that demagogos simply meant âa popular leader,â e.g., Pericles). The association of demagoguery and populism describes what we might call the command-and-control aspect of populism. The populist leader is said to forsake reason and moderation in order to stir the dark, chthonic passions of a semi-literate and spiritually unelevated populace.
On the other hand, there is the issue of the fertile but unedifying soil of that populace upon which the demagogic leader works. Anyone who has looked at the commentary on Brexit, the campaign and early months of the Trump administration, or the recent French election will have noted this.
Consider, to take but one example, how often the word âangerâ and its cognates are deployed to evoke the psychological and moral failings of both the populist multitude and its putative leaders. In a remarkable, apocalyptic effusion published in the early hours of November 9, 2016, David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, warned that the Trump presidency represented âa rebellion against liberalism itself,â an âangry assaultâ on the civil rights of women, blacks, immigrants, homosexuals, and countless others. Later commentators warned about our âangry, cynical times,â the âraw, angry and aggrievedâ tone of Trumpâs rhetoric, the unchaperoned âangerâ of Americans who felt they âhad been left behind.â âTrumpâs Anger Could Lead Down a Dangerous Road,â quoth cnn. âInside Trumpâs Anger and Impatienceâand His Sudden Decision to Fire Comey,â The Washington Post. âHow Festering Anger at Comey Ended in His Firing,â The New York Times.
There are occasional acknowledgments that the diagnosed âangerâ may be understandable, even justified. But we are left with the unmistakeable impression that the phenomenon as a whole is something vicious and irrational. Anger âfesters.â It leads to âsudden,â i.e., impulsive decisions. The road it steers us toward could be âdangerous.â (Ah, how cheap is possibility: when we read that âcould beâ dangerous, do we also think, as we should, that it might just as well not be?)
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness. Like the foul-smelling wounds of Philoctetes, the stench is apparently incurable. Granted, there are plenty of historical reasons for the association between demagoguery and populism, as such names as the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Father Coughlin, and Huey Long remind us.
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness.
Still, I suspect that in the present context the apparently unbreakable association between populism and demagoguery has less to do with any natural affinity than with cunning rhetorical weaponization. âPopulism,â that is to say, is wielded less as a descriptive than as a delegitimizing term. Successfully charge someone with populist sympathies and you get, free and for nothing, both the imputation of demagoguery and what was famously derided as a âdeplorableâ and âirredeemableâ cohort. The element of existential depreciation is almost palpable.
So is the element of condescension. Inseparable from the diagnosis of populism is the implication not just of incompetence but also of a crudity that is part aesthetic and part moral. Hence the curiously visceral distaste expressed by elite opinion for signs of populist sympathy. When Hillary Clinton charged that half of Donald Trumpâs supporters were an âirredeemableâ âbasket of deplorables,â when Barack Obama castigated small-town Republican voters as âbitterâ folk who âcling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who arenât like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment,â what they expressed was not disagreement but condescending revulsion.
Ithink I first became aware that the charge of populist sympathies could have a powerful political, moral, and class delegitimizing effect when I was in London last June to cover the Brexit vote. Nearly everyone I met, from Tory ministers to taxi drivers, from tourists to tradesmen, was a Remainer. The higher up the income and class scale you went, the more likely it was that your interlocutor would be in favor of Britainâs remaining in the European Union. And the more pointed would be his disparagement of those arguing in favor of Brexit. The Brexiteers were said to be âangry,â yes, but also ignorant, fearful, xenophobic, and racist.
Except that they werenât, not the ones I met, anyway. For them, Brexit turned on a simple question: âWho rules?â Is the ultimate source of British sovereignty Parliament, as had been the case for centuries? Or is it Brussels, seat of the European Union?
The question of sovereignty, I believe, takes us to the heart of what in recent years has been touted and tarred as the populist project.
Consider Britain. Parliament answers to the British voters. The European Union answers toâwell, to itself. Indeed, it is worth pausing to remind ourselves how profoundly undemocratic is the European Union. Its commissioners are appointed, not elected. They cannot be turned out of office by voters. If the public votes contrary to the wishes of the E.U.âs commissars in a referendum, they are simply presented with another referendum until they vote the ârightâ way. The E.U.âs financial books have never been subject to a public audit. The corruption is just too widespread. Yet the E.U.âs agents wield extraordinary power over the everyday lives of their charges. A commissioner in Brussels can tell a property owner in Wales what sort of potatoes he may plant on his farm, how he must calculate the weight of the products he sells, and whom he must allow into his country. He can outlaw âracismâ and âxenophobiaââdefined as harboring âan aversionâ to people based on ârace, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic originâ and specify a penalty of âat leastâ two yearsâ imprisonment for infractions. He can âlawfully suppress,â as the London Telegraph reported, âpolitical criticism of its institutions and of leading figures,â thus rendering the commissars of the E.U. not only beyond the vote but also beyond criticism.
Itâs a little different in the United States. Iâll come to that below. At the moment, it is worth noting to what extent the metabolism of this political dispensation was anticipated by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous passages about âdemocratic despotismâ in Democracy in America. Unlike despotism of yore, Tocqueville noted, this modern allotrope does not tyrannize over manâit infantilizes him. And it does this by promulgating ever more cumbersome rules and regulations that reach into the interstices of everyday life to hamper initiative, stymie independence, stifle originality, homogenize individuality. This power, said Tocqueville, âextends its arms over society as a whole.â
It does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to oneâs acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.
Tocquevilleâs analysis has led many observers to conclude that the villain in this drama is the state. But the political philosopher James Burnham, writing in the early 1940s in The Managerial Revolution, saw that the real villain was not the state as such but the bureaucracy that maintained and managed it. It is easy to mock the apparatchiks who populate the machinery of government. Thus James H. Boren writes wickedly that âthe noblest of all of manâs struggles are those in which dedicated bureaucrats, armed with the spirit of dynamic inaction, have fought to protect the ramparts of creative nonresponsiveness from the onslaughts of mere citizens who have demanded action in their behalf.â But the comic potential of the morass should not blind us to the minatory nature of the phenomenon. Indeed, it presents a specimen case of the general truth that the preposterous and the malevolent often co-mingle. The shepherd of which Tocqueville wrote was really a flock of shepherds, a coterie of managers who, in the guise of doing the stateâs business, prosecuted their own advantage and gradually became a self-perpetuating elite that arrogated to itself power over the levers of society.
Anatomizing this sleight-of-hand is at the center of âJames Burnhamâs Managerial Elite,â Julius Kreinâs essay in the inaugural issue of American Affairs. âAlthough the managerial elite uses the state as an instrument to acquire power,â Krein notes, âthe real enemy is not the state but rather the managerial separation of political and economic power from the liberal social contract.â
This separation of the real power of society from the economy and political life renders the managerial elite all but untouchable. And this, as Burnham saw, was the property neither of liberalism nor of conservatism but rather of anterior forces that engulfed both. âThe contradiction of contemporary conservatism,â Krein writes,
is that it is an attempt to restore the culture and politics of bourgeois capitalism while accelerating the economy of managerialism. Because of its failure to recognize this contradiction, âmuch of conservative doctrine is, if not quite bankrupt, more and more obviously obsolescent,â as Burnham wrote in 1972. Since then it has only evolved from obsolescent to counterproductive. At this point, expanding âfree marketsâ no longer has anything to do with classical American capitalism. It is simply the further emancipation of the managerial elite from any obligations to the political community. Likewise, promoting democracy as an abstract, universalist principle only undermines the sovereignty of the American people by rejecting national interests as a legitimate ground of foreign policy.
Sovereignty, Burnham saw, was shifting from Parliaments to what he called âadministrative bureaus,â which increasingly are the seats of real power and, as such, âproclaim the rules, make the laws, issue the decrees.â As far back as the early 1940s, Burnham could write that â âLawsâ today in the United States . . . are not being made any longer by Congress, but by the nlrb, sec, icc, aaa, tva, ftc, fcc, the Office of Production Management (what a revealing title!), and the other leading âexecutive agencies.â â And note that Burnham wrote decades before the advent of the epa, hud, cfpb, fsoc, the Department of Education, and the rest of the administrative alphabet soup that governs us in the United States today.
Iam convinced that the issue of sovereignty, of what we might call the location of sovereignty, has played a large role in the rise of the phenomenon we describe as âpopulismâ in the United States as well as Europe. For one thing, the question of sovereignty, of who governs, stands behind the rebellion against the political correctness and moral meddlesomeness that are such conspicuous and disfiguring features of our increasingly bureaucratic society. The smothering, Tocquevillian blanket of regulatory excess has had a wide range of practical and economic effects, stifling entrepreneurship and making any sort of productive innovation difficult.
A reassertion of independence.
But perhaps its deepest effects are spiritual or psychological. The many assaults against free speech on college campuses, the demand for âsafe spacesâ and âtrigger warningsâ against verbal or fashion-inspired âmicro-aggressionsâ (Mexican hats, âoffensiveâ Halloween costumes, etc.) are part of this dictatorship of political correctness. In The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek said that one of the âmain pointsâ of his argument concerned âthe psychological change,â the âalteration of the character of the people,â that extensive government control brought in its wake. The alteration involves a process of softening, enervation, infantilization even: an exchange of the challenges of liberty and self-relianceâthe challenges, that is to say, of adulthoodâfor the coddling pleasures of dependence. Max Weber spoke in this context of âOrdnungsmenschen,â men who had become increasingly dependent on an order imposed upon them from above. Breaking with that drift becomes more and more difficult the more habituated to dependence a people becomes. In this sense, what has been described as a populist upsurge against political correctness is simply a reassertion of independence, a reclamation of what turns out to be a most uncommon virtue, common sense.
The issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debate over immigration: indeed, is any issue more central to the question Who governs? than who gets to decide a nationâs borders and how a country defines its first person plural: the âWeâ that makes us who we are as a people?
Throughout his campaign, Donald Trump promised to enforce Americaâs immigration laws, to end so-called âsanctuary cities,â which advertise themselves as safe havens for illegal aliens (though of course they do not call them âillegal aliensâ), and to sharpen vetting procedures for people wishing to immigrate to America from countries known as sponsors of terrorism.
The President sometimes overstated and not infrequently misstated his case. Semantic precision is not a Trumpian speciality. But political effectiveness may be. Behind the Sturm und Drang that greeted Trumpâs rhetoric on immigration, we can glimpse two very different concepts of the nation state and world order. One view sees the world as a collection of independent sovereign countries that, although interacting with one another, regard the care, safety, and prosperity of their own citizens as their first obligation. This is the traditional view of the nation state. It is also Donald Trumpâs view. It is what licenses his talk of putting âAmerica First,â a concept that, pace the anti-Trump media, has nothing to do with Charles Lindberghâs isolationist movement of the late 1930s and everything to do with fostering a healthy sense of national identity and purpose.
The alternative view regards the nation state with suspicion as an atavistic form of political and social organization. The nation state might still be a practical necessity, but, the argument goes, it is a regrettable necessity inasmuch as it retards mankindâs emancipation from the parochial bonds of place and local allegiance. Ideally, according to this view, we are citizens of the world, not particular countries, and our fundamental obligation is to all mankind.
This is the progressive view. It has many progenitors and antecedents. But none is more influential than âPerpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,â a brief essay that Immanuel Kant published in 1795 when he was seventy-one. The burden of the essay is to ask how perpetual peace might be obtained among states. The natural condition of mankind, Kant acknowledges, is war. But with the advent of âenlightened concepts of statecraft,â mankind, he suggests, may be able to transcend that unfortunate habit of making war and live in perpetual (ewigen) comity.
Kant lists various conditions for the initial establishment of peaceâthe eventual abolition of standing armies, for exampleâand a few conditions for its perpetuation: the extension of âuniversal hospitalityâ by nations was something that caught my eye. Ditto âworld citizenship.â âThe idea of . . . world citizenship,â he says at the end of the essay, âis no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace.â
It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant makes many observations along the way that will be balm to progressive hearts. He is against âthe accumulation of treasure,â for example, because wealth is âa hindrance to perpetual peace.â By the same token, he believes that forbidding the system of international credit that the British empire employed âmust be a preliminary article of perpetual peace.â Credit can be deployed to increase wealth, ergo it is suspect. Kant says that all states must be ârepublicanâ in organization. By that he means not that they must be democracies but only that the executive and legislative functions of the state be distinguished. (Indeed, he says that democracy, âproperly speaking,â is ânecessarily a despotismâ because in it the executive and legislative functions of governments are both vested in one entity, âthe people.â) He looks forward to the establishment of a âleague of nationsâ (Völkerbund), all of which would freely embrace a republican form of government.
It would be hard to overstate the influence of Kantâs essay. It stands behind such progressive exfoliations as Woodrow Wilsonâs âFourteen Points,â not least the final point that looked forward to the establishment of a League of Nations. You can feel its pulse beating in the singing phrases of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war. It is worth noting that among the initial fifteen signatories of that noble-sounding pact, along with the United States, France, and England, were Germany, Italy, and Japan. What does that tell us about the folly of trusting paper proclamations not backed up by the authority of physical force? It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kantâs essay also directly inspired the architects of the United Nations and, in our own day, the architects of the European Union and the battalions of transnational progressives who jettison democracy for the sake of a more-or-less nebulous (but not therefore un-coercive) ideal of world citizenship.
I would not care to wager on how many of the hysterics who congregated at airports across the country to protest Donald Trumpâs effort to make the citizens of this country safer were students of Kant. Doubtless very few. But all were his unwitting heirs. âUniversal hospitalityâ: how the protestors would have liked that! (Though to be fair to Kant, he did note that such hospitality âis not the right to be a permanent visitor.â) I have no doubt that the motivation of the protestors had many sources. But to the extent that it was based on a political ideal (and not just partisan posturing or a grubby bid for notoriety and power), the spirit of Kant was hovering there in the background.
Kant was not without a sense of humor. He begins his essay by noting that he took his title from a sign outside a Dutch pub. âPax Perpetuaâ read the sign, and below the lettering was the image of a graveyard. Perhaps the universal perpetuity of death is the only peace that mankind may really look forward to. Kant clearly wouldnât agree, but it was charming of him to acknowledge that the idea of a genuine perpetual peace for mankind might be regarded by many as nothing more than a âsweet dreamâ of philosophers.
What has been called the populist spirit aims to rouse us from that âsweet dreamââwhat James Madison might have called the âtheoreticâ reverie of the meddling class whose designs for our salvation always seem to involve the extension of their own power and prerogative. In this sense, the issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debates over the relative advantages and moral weather of âglobalismâ vs. ânationalismââa pair of terms almost as fraught as âdemocracyâ and âpopulismââas well as the correlative economic issues of underemployment and wage stagnation. âTheoreticâ politicians may advocate âglobalismâ as a necessary condition for free trade. But the spirit of local control tempers the cosmopolitan project of a borderless world with a recognition that the nation state has been the best guarantor not only of sovereignty but also of broadly shared prosperity. What we might call the ideology of free tradeâthe globalist aspiration to transcend the impediments of national identity and controlâis an abstraction that principally benefits its architects. As R. R. Reno, the editor of First Things, pointed out in a recent Op-Ed for The New York Times, âGlobalism poses a threat to the future of democracy because it disenfranchises the vast majority and empowers a technocratic elite.â
In the end, what James Burnham described as the âmanagerial revolutionâ is part of a larger progressive project. The aim of this project is partly to emancipate mankind from such traditional sources of self-definition as national identity, religious affiliation, and specific cultural rootedness, partly to perpetuate and aggrandize the apparatus that oversees the resulting dissolution. Burnham castigates this hypertrophied form of liberalism (what we might call âilliberal liberalismâ) as âan ideology of suicideâ that has insinuated itself into the center of Western culture. He acknowledges that the proposition may sound hyperbolic. âSuicide,â he notes, may seem âtoo emotive a term, too negative and âbad.â â But it is part of the pathology that Burnham describes that such objections are âmost often made most hotly by Westerners who hate their own civilization, readily excuse or even praise blows struck against it, and themselves lend a willing hand, frequently enough, to pulling it down.â The issue, Burnham saw, is that modern liberalism has equipped us with an ethic too abstract and empty to inspire real commitment. Modern liberalism, he writes,
does not offer ordinary men compelling motives for personal suffering, sacrifice, and death. There is no tragic dimension in its picture of the good life. Men become willing to endure, sacrifice, and die for God, for family, king, honor, country, from a sense of absolute duty or an exalted vision of the meaning of history. . . . And it is precisely these ideas and institutions that liberalism has criticized, attacked, and in part overthrown as superstitious, archaic, reactionary, and irrational. In their place liberalism proposes a set of pale and bloodless abstractionsâpale and bloodless for the very reason that they have no roots in the past, in deep feeling and in suffering. Except for mercenaries, saints, and neurotics, no one is willing to sacrifice and die for progressive education, medicare, humanity in the abstract, the United Nations, and a ten percent rise in Social Security payments.
In his view, the primary function of liberalism was to âpermit Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolution,â to view weakness, failure, even collapse not as a defeat but âas the transition to a new and higher order in which Mankind as a whole joins in a universal civilization that has risen above the parochial distinctions, divisions, and discriminations of the past.â
What has been called âpopulismâ is a visceral reaction against these forces of dissolution.
Around the time that Donald Trump took office, his chief strategist Steve Bannon said that his goal was to âdeconstruct the administrative state.â The phrase âadministrative stateââalso called âthe regulatory stateâ or âthe deep stateââhas lately floated into common parlance. In The Administrative Threat, the legal scholar Philip Hamburger describes it as âa state within a state,â a sort of parallel legal and political structure populated by unelected bureaucrats. This amorphous congeries of agencies and regulations has become, Hamburger argues, âthe dominant reality of American governance,â intruding everywhere into economic and social life.
What has been called âpopulismâ is a visceral reaction against forces of dissolution.
Article I of the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, just as Article III vests all judicial authority in the Court. The administrative state is a mechanism for circumventing both. As such, Hamburger argues, the administrative state operates outside the Constitution.
When the Constitution places all legislative powers in Congress, it gives Congress not only the power to make law but also the power to unmake it. And it thereby bars the executive from suspending or dispensing with the law. When the Constitution, moreover, places the judicial power in the courts and guarantees the due process of law, it precludes the executive from telling the courts not to apply the law, and prevents the courts from abandoning their own judgment about what the law requires.
Binding citizens not through Congressionally enacted statutes but through the edicts of the managerial bureaucracy, the administrative state is âall about the evasion of governance through law, including an evasion of constitutional processes and procedural rights.â Accordingly, Hamburger concludes, the encroaching activity of the administrative state represents âthe nationâs preeminent threat to civil liberties.â
Hamburger draws an analogy between the behavior of the administrative state and the behavior of such despotic monarchs as James I, Charles I, and James II. Instead of persuading Parliament to repeal or revise a statute, the British king simply evaded its force by decreeing that some or all of his subjects were not subject to its strictures. His power was absolute not merely in the sense that it was all but unlimited but also in the sense that it was independent or outside of the law. Students of Latin will recall the Ablative Absolute, a construction in which an ablative phrase is absolutum, âloosenedâ from or independent of the main clause of a sentence. Hamburger shows how the growth of the administrative state represents an extralegal ârevival of absolute powerâ in this sense, one that threatens to transform Constitutional rights and guarantees into mere âoptionsâ that the government bestows or withholds at its pleasure. âThe evasion,â he notes, âthereby changes the very nature of procedural rights. Such rights traditionally were assurances against the government. Now they are but one of the choices for government in its exercise of power. Though the government must respect these rights when it proceeds against Americans in court, it has the freedom to escape them by taking an administrative path.â
Just as British kings in the seventeenth century evaded Parliament through such expedients as the Star Chamber and the exercise of royal prerogatives and royal waiversâwhat John Adams castigated as âthose badges of domination called prerogativesââso the administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution and beyond the authority of Congress. Barack Obama decreed that certain politically unpalatable provisions of the Affordable Care Act not be enforced, and presto, they were not enforced, even though they were the law of the land. He instructed his Department of Justice to intervene to prevent Arizona and other states from enforcing certain aspects of immigration law. He even forced public institutions to accommodate self-declared âtransgenderâ persons in the toilets of their choice; he connived with lawsuits punishing bakers and Catholic hospitals and hobby shops who chose not to join this weekâs politically correct campaign for the sexually exotic. The Constitution may have vested all legislative power in Congress and entrusted all judicial power to the courts, but the administrative state sidesteps those requirements by erecting a parallel bureaucratic structure of enforcement and control.
The administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution.
âEighteenth-century Americans,â Hamburger notes, âassumed that a rule could have the obligation of law only if it came from the constitutionally established legislature elected by the people.â Today, Americans find their lives directed by a jumble of agencies far removed from the legislature and staffed by bureaucrats who make and enforce a vast network of rules that govern nearly every aspect of our lives.
One of the most disturbing aspects of Hamburgerâs analysis is the historical connection he exposes between the expansion of the franchise in the early twentieth century and the growth of administrative, that is to say, extra-legal, power. For the people in charge, equality of voting rights was one thing. They could live with that. But the tendency of newly enfranchised groupsâthe âbitter clingersâ and âdeplorablesâ of yoreâto reject progressive initiatives was something else again. As Woodrow Wilson noted sadly, âThe bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.â What to do?
The solution was to shift real power out of elected bodies and into the hands of the right sort of people, enlightened people, progressive people, people, that is to say, like Woodrow Wilson. Thus Wilson welcomed the advent of administrative power as a counterweight to encroaching democratization. And thus it was, as Hamburger points out, that we have seen a transfer of legislative power to the âknowledge class,â the managerial elite that James Burnham anatomized.
A closer look at the so-called âknowledge classâ shows that what it knows best is how to preserve and extend its own privileges. Its activities are swaddled in do-gooder rhetoric about serving the public, looking after âthe environment,â helping the disadvantaged, etc., but what they chiefly excel at is consolidating their own power.
In Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Edmund Burke criticized the Court of George III for circumventing Parliament and establishing by stealth what amounted to a new regime of royal prerogative and influence-peddling. It was not as patent as the swaggering courts of James I or Charles I. George and his courtiers maintained the appearance of parliamentary supremacy. But a closer look showed that the system was corrupt. âIt was soon discovered,â Burke wrote with sly understatement, âthat the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible.â That discovery stands behind the growth of the administrative state. Under the cloak of democratic institutions, its essentially undemocratic activities pursue an expansionist agenda that threatens liberty in the most comprehensive way, by circumventing the law.
At the same time, however, a growing recognition of the totalitarian goals of the administrative state has fed what many have called a populist uprising here and in Europe. âPopulistâ is one word for the phenomenon. An affirmation of sovereignty, underwritten by a passion for freedom, is another, possibly more accurate, phrase.
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Is America a Republic in Name Only?

Is the United States a one-party state? Surely not. Just look at the ballots the next time you vote. There are nearly always Republican as well as Democratic candidates, and often there are candidates from other parties as well (Green, Working Families, Libertarian, etc.).
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Is It Too Late to Save America?

Regular readers may recall how fond I am of a mot from the British diplomat, author and art collector Edgar Vincent, the first (and, as it happened, the last) Viscount dâAbernon: âAn Englishmanâs mind works best when it is almost too late.â
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Is the Epstein-Trump Story Just Russiagate 2.0? With Roger Kimball
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Is the Trump Phenomenon an Anomaly?

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Is This the End of the American Experiment?

So how did I do? Pretty poorly. Yesterday, I predicted that the GOP would hold the Senate and maybe pick up a seat or two. In particular, I said that I thought bizarro candidate James Talarico would lose to Ken Paxton in Texas and that Abdul El-Sayed would lose to Mike Rogers in Michigan. Wrong and wrong again.
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Is Trump Finished?

It has been amusing to behold the evolution of the anti-Trump narrative since the midterm elections.
âNow, finally, at last, we can purge the Republican Party of all MAGA elements and return to that semi-official second-class status we had gotten used to under one-and-a-half-party-Democratic rule.â
That last bit is my interpolation. But letâs face it, Republicans had existed in a state of political dhimmitude for decades.
Trump changed that, and it seems pretty clear that Republicans canât win without the support of his millions of voters, but forget about all that.
Now, at last, we can return to the well-pressed, clean-cut, no-mean-tweets status quo ante.
NPR, Mitt Romney, endless vistas of rice pudding.
Conservatives might not be able to get much accomplished, but at least they can rub up against one another, make deals, scratch each othersâ backs, and find a spare teat to which they can attach their parched lips.
Elon Muskâs ongoing Twitter dump that is exposing the mediaâs collusion with Democrats to steal the 2020 election and taint all things Trump seemed for about a nanosecond as if it might upset the avocado cart of anti-Trump complacency.
Yes, it seems likely that the ongoingrevelations put forward by Matt Taibbi and others will spark a certain amount of outrage on the right.
I suspect, however, that the scandalous revelations will have approximately zero effect on the congealing narrative.
I hope Iâm wrong.
But the winds of anti-Trump sentiment are ubiquitous among the credentialed class.
Not, by the way, that I believe that their hot-air machine is going to make a lot of difference to what happens.
That will be decided by that hugely inconvenient but apparently ineradicable group of people: the voters.
In the meantime, though, the little eructations of hysteria have been delicious to watch.
No sooner had Taibbiâs first Twitter thread spun out than Trump took to Truth Social, his new(ish) media platform, to issue this bulletin:
âSo, with the revelation of MASSIVE & WIDESPREAD FRAUD & DECEPTION in working closely with Big Tech Companies, the DNC, & the Democrat Party, do you throw the Presidential Election Results of 2020 OUT and declare the RIGHTFUL WINNER, or do you have a NEW ELECTION?â
Trump continued: âA Massive Fraud of this type and magnitude allows for the termination of all rules, regulations, and articles, even those found in the Constitution. Our great âFoundersâ did not want, and would not condone, False & Fraudulent Elections!â
Oh, how the punditocracy went crazy over that!
âDonald Trumpâs Call to âTerminateâ Constitution Sparks Fury,â screamed one typical headline.
Quoth this scribe, âDonald Trump has sparked a furious backlash after he called for the âterminationâ of parts of the Constitution to overturn the results of the 2020 election.â
What followed were the usual talking points.
Trumpâs claims about there being widespread fraud in the 2020 election were âbaseless,â readers were assured while a White House spokesman was wheeled out to emit the usual clichĂ©s about the Constitution being a âsacrosanct document that for over 200 years has guaranteed that freedom and the rule of law prevail in our great country,â etc., etc.
Responding to Trumpâs effusion, Elon Musk wrote on Twitter: âThe Constitution is greater than any President. End of story.â
That sounds pretty uplifting. Taken in isolation, I agree with it myself.
But have you run it by Woodrow Wilson, for example, or Barack Obama, or Joe Biden?
The terrible truth is that the left thinks the Constitution is âsacrosanctâ and natters on about âthe rule of lawâ only so long as such rhetoric can be used to further its own policies.
Absent that, itâs âmostly peaceful protests,â threats against Supreme Court justices, and the weaponization of the FBI, the IRS, and the surveillance apparatus of the deep state all the way down.
Nor is the response a matter of what Nigel Molesworth called the âtu quoqueâ strategy.
Sure, had anything remotely as serious as what Taibbiâs Twitter revelations are uncovering been discovered about Trump or about other Republications, it would be wall-to-wall, front-page apoplexy in The New York Times and the rest of the consulting-class press for weeks.
Just as in 2016, weâd be treated to round-the-clock denunciations, bulletins that the election was illegitimate, and demands that it be overturned.
But none of that comes near to what Trump actually said.
The ever-percipient Sarah Hoyt, writing at Instapundit, got it exactly right.
âWhat heâs saying,â Hoyt wrote, âis that we are PAST the rules, regulations and articles of the Constitution. Which we knew didnât we? This was a color revolution, which means a revolution that uses the countryâs rules and regulations against the country to install a usurping entity under the cover of law.â
Pay attention, now. Hoyt is on a roll. âBy definition, there isnât a way to remedy this situation within the law. Because the laws were subverted against us and themselves.â
If so, then what? Again, I think Hoyt gets it in one: âTrump isâas he always doesâtrying to get people to talk about things. Heâs not calling for war or revolution. He never did.â
This is true, though you wouldnât know it if you peeked in on the Liz CheneyâNancy Pelosi Jan. 6, 2021, circus.
Hoyt ends, as I will, with some sage advice: âPut you [sic] panties back on and stop twisting them. Heâs tryingâprobably stupidly and quixoticallyâto solve this without calling for kinetic solutions. Because if we tip into that pot, we might never come out again as a Constitutional Republic.â
There are forces that are eager to see the back of that form of âgovernment if you can keep it.â But the fomenters of that ambition arenât named Trump, even though you wouldnât know that by listening to the omniscient folks who are determined to run your life.
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Is Utilitarianism Useful?

To the extent that we see ourselves as moral creaturesâwhose lives are bounded by an ideal of freedomâutilitarianism presents itself as a version of nihilism. My hosts felt badly about the awfulness of the play.
To make up for the lack of drama on the stage, my friend posed the following dramatic thought experiment: Letâs pretend, he said, that some mad scientist has figured out a way to bring peace, prosperity, and general happiness to the whole world.
There was just one catch: This brave new world required the yearly sacrifice of one innocent person, chosen at random. Think of all the billions of people there are in the world.
Scads of innocent people die all the time.
Why not spread happiness and reduce the death toll at the same time?
Hard cheese on the appointed victim, of course. But he (or she) would at least have the consolation of dying for the good of society.
This is the sort of argument you might get from English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748â1832), the father of utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism defines the good as the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Utilitarianism, especially in its undoctrinaire forms, has a lot of appeal.
Most of us are at least intermittent utilitarians.
At least, we expect those running society to act on broadly utilitarian principles, to âmaximizeâ goods and services (read âhappinessâ) for as many people as possible.
It is interesting, then, that everyone to whom I have presented my friendâs thought experiment has recoiled.
Some people say, âThatâs just silly,â and change the subject.
Some say, âWhat a horrible idea,â and change the subject.
Hardly anyone says, âThat would be wrong because âŠâ and then supplies a reason.
I think that the uneasiness that most people feel about this utilitarian fantasy is a good thing.
I also think that the reluctance on the part of most people to provide a reason for their uneasiness is troubling.
For one thing, it suggests that, for many people, moral intuitions are unsupported by articulate moral principles.
It also suggests that by acting more or less like utilitarians in our daily lives, we are poorly equipped to challenge utilitarian proposals when they go too far.
Whatâs wrong with the utilitarian philosophy?
As its name implies, utilitarianism aims to be a useful, practical philosophy.
But German philosopher Gotthold Lessing (1729â81), musing about utilitarianism, was on to something important when he asked, âWhat is the use of use?â
That was not just wordplay.
Lessing understood that the idea of usefulness ultimately makes sense only when it is underwritten by some definite idea of the good.
X is useful for the project of doing Y.
If it is Z you are after, X may be a complete washout.
When we set about the practical tasks of everyday life, this question generally does not have much urgency because we know pretty well what good we are aiming at.
We want a cup of coffee and a roll, and we set about doing the things to realize that aim.
But when we step back to ponder larger moral issues, the question of the good for human life (as Aristotle might put it) suddenly snaps into the foreground.
Grammar may be of some help in clarifying what Lessing had in mind.
There is much that we do in life that takes place under the aegis of the âin order to.â
We exercise in order to stay healthy.
We go to the bank in order to withdraw money.
We go to the airport in order to travel somewhere.
But there is also much in life that we do not do in order to achieve a specific end but for the sake of some good.
The distinction between the âin order toâ and the âfor the sake ofâ is a distinction between the calculation of means and the acknowledgment of an ideal.
One important human ideal is freedom.
A central reason that the utilitarian fantasy with which we began is morally repugnant is that it requires the violation of freedom.
It therefore builds a fatal weakness into its very foundation.
The utilitarian promise works to the extent that we understand ourselves as creatures who behave in order to achieve certain ends.
To the extent that we see ourselves as moral creaturesâcreatures, that is to say, whose lives are bounded by an ideal of freedomâutilitarianism presents itself as a version of nihilism: a philosophy, as Nietzsche put it, for which the question âWhy?â has no answer.
âWhat is the use of use?â
That is one question the thoroughgoing utilitarian refuses to ask himself.
Entertained in earnest, that question reveals the limits of utilitarianism. The limit is reached where morality begins, which is why a utilitarian faced with our thought experiment can only endorse what it proposes or wring his hands in mute uneasiness.
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Itâs Always Chablis Weather

It is very hot here in New England at the end of July. It was hot a week or two ago in old England, too. I arrived in London via the Eurostar after a week clambering over rotting German gun emplacements and gazing out at the D-Day beaches in Normandy. Sobering.
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Itâs Always Time for Island Wine

This is a tricky column. Itâs still hot and humid where I am, which inclines me to tell you about some summer wines. But you wonât be reading this until the run-up to Thanksgiving, which means something robust and cocklewarming is in order. A fork in the road rises up before me. Which path should I take? Both! Why be an either-or sort of chap when both-and are available?
Letâs start in Sicily, on the slopes of Mount Etna, one of the worldâs most active volcanoes and, as it happens, a splendid igneous spot for growingâŠ
The husband and wife owners, Rori and Cinzia, along with their daughter Sandra, used their initials to name the enterprise, which is intensely up-to-date in being adamantly old-fashioned. Their wine is unfined (no egg or milk products added to remove suspended particulates), unfiltered and uses only natural yeasts in its fermentation.
SRC make a small suite of wines, red and white. The DOC Etna Rosso we shared was 90 percent Nerello Mascalese (the fancier sort of Nerello). Iâve seen the 2019 from the low $30s to $40 or so. Itâs a sociable wine, but also serious, with a complex, earthy nose; intense, diaphanous color; impressive legs from its abundant glycerine, and a complex taste full of tart, cheery and nameless but importunate minerals. We had it at 52°F â a proper cellar temperature â which made it especially refreshing and summery. Read more.











