Today On The Eric Metaxas Show, Eric talks with Roger Kimball about New York City, Islam, and why they argue the West is losing civilizational confidence. They discuss whether the Islam vs Islamism distinction holds up, why assimilation and shared values matter for a free society, and what is happening in Europe and England right now. Then they pivot to Iran, regime change predictions, and why they believe Trump is reshaping the global order from the border to energy to foreign policy.
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How Political Correctness Hijacked the Arts | Roger Kimball and Heather MacDonald


What gets to be called art — and who decides? In this wide-ranging Socrates Dialogues conversation, New York–based thinkers, writers, and art admirers Heather Mac Donald and Roger Kimball explore the definition of art and the history of the unmaking of beauty in modern contemporary art. Drawing on examples from Duchamp, Warhol, Serrano, Hirst, and others, the two discuss how the banal, the transgressive, and the political have reshaped the aesthetic experience of art, often robbing it of spiritual resonance.
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Populism, X: The Imperative of Freedom

It is curious how certain words accumulate a nimbus of positive associations while others, semantically just as innocuous, wind up shouldering a portfolio of bad feelings.
Consider the different careers of the terms “democracy” and “populism.”
Do you know any responsible person who would admit to being opposed to democracy? No one who does not enjoy a large private income would risk it. But lots of people are willing to declare themselves anti-populist. The discrepancy is curious for several reasons.
It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
For one thing, it is a testament to the almost Darwinian hardiness of the word “democracy.” In the fierce struggle among ideas for survival, “democracy” has not only survived but thrived. This is despite the fact that political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle through Cicero and down to modern times have been deeply suspicious of democracy. Aristotle thought democracy the worst form of government, all but inevitably leading to ochlocracy or mob rule, which is no rule.
In Federalist 10, James Madison famously warned that history had shown that democratic regimes have “in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” “Theoretic politicians,” he wrote—and it would be hard to find a more contemptuous deployment of the word “theoretic”—such politicians may have advocated democracy, but that is only because of their dangerous and utopian ignorance of human nature. It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
Nevertheless, nearly everyone wants to associate himself with the word “democracy.” Totalitarian regimes like to describe themselves as the “Democratic Republic” of wherever. Conservatives champion the advantages of “democratic capitalism.” Central planners of all stripes eagerly deploy programs advertised as enhancing or extending “democracy.” Even James Madison came down on the side of a subspecies of democracy, one filtered through the modulating influence of a large, diverse population and an elaborate scheme of representation that softened (Madison said “excluded”) the influence of “the people in their collective capacity.”
“Democracy,” in short, is a eulogistic word, what the practical philosopher Stephen Potter in another context apostrophized as an “OK word.” And it is worth noting, as Potter would have been quick to remind us, that the people pronouncing those eulogies delight in advertising themselves as, and are generally accepted as, “OK people.” Indeed, the class element and the element of moral approbation—of what some genius has summarized as “virtue signaling”—are key.
It is quite otherwise with “populism.” At first blush, this seems odd because the word “populism” occupies a semantic space closely adjacent to “democracy.” “Democracy” means “rule by the demos,” the people. “Populism,” according to The American Heritage Dictionary, describes “A political philosophy directed to the needs of the common people and advancing a more equitable distribution of wealth and power”— that is, just the sorts of things that the people, were they to rule, would seek.
But the fact is that “populism” is ambivalent at best. Sometimes, it is true, a charismatic figure can survive and even illuminate the label “populist” like a personal halo. Bernie Sanders managed this trick among the eco-conscious, racially omnivorous, non-gender-stereotyping, anti-capitalist beneficiaries of capitalism who made up his core constituency.
But it was always my impression that in this case the term “populist” was fielded less by Sanders or his followers than by his rivals and the media in an effort to fix him in the public’s mind as one of the many lamentable examples of not-Hillary, who herself was presumed to be popular though not populist.
There are at least two sides to the negative association under which the term “populist” struggles. On the one hand, there is the issue of demagoguery. Some commentators tell us that “populist” and “demagogue” are essentially synonyms (though they rarely point out that demagogos simply meant “a popular leader,” e.g., Pericles). The association of demagoguery and populism describes what we might call the command-and-control aspect of populism. The populist leader is said to forsake reason and moderation in order to stir the dark, chthonic passions of a semi-literate and spiritually unelevated populace.
On the other hand, there is the issue of the fertile but unedifying soil of that populace upon which the demagogic leader works. Anyone who has looked at the commentary on Brexit, the campaign and early months of the Trump administration, or the recent French election will have noted this.
Consider, to take but one example, how often the word “anger” and its cognates are deployed to evoke the psychological and moral failings of both the populist multitude and its putative leaders. In a remarkable, apocalyptic effusion published in the early hours of November 9, 2016, David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, warned that the Trump presidency represented “a rebellion against liberalism itself,” an “angry assault” on the civil rights of women, blacks, immigrants, homosexuals, and countless others. Later commentators warned about our “angry, cynical times,” the “raw, angry and aggrieved” tone of Trump’s rhetoric, the unchaperoned “anger” of Americans who felt they “had been left behind.” “Trump’s Anger Could Lead Down a Dangerous Road,” quoth cnn. “Inside Trump’s Anger and Impatience—and His Sudden Decision to Fire Comey,” The Washington Post. “How Festering Anger at Comey Ended in His Firing,” The New York Times.
There are occasional acknowledgments that the diagnosed “anger” may be understandable, even justified. But we are left with the unmistakeable impression that the phenomenon as a whole is something vicious and irrational. Anger “festers.” It leads to “sudden,” i.e., impulsive decisions. The road it steers us toward could be “dangerous.” (Ah, how cheap is possibility: when we read that “could be” dangerous, do we also think, as we should, that it might just as well not be?)
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness. Like the foul-smelling wounds of Philoctetes, the stench is apparently incurable. Granted, there are plenty of historical reasons for the association between demagoguery and populism, as such names as the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Father Coughlin, and Huey Long remind us.
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness.
Still, I suspect that in the present context the apparently unbreakable association between populism and demagoguery has less to do with any natural affinity than with cunning rhetorical weaponization. “Populism,” that is to say, is wielded less as a descriptive than as a delegitimizing term. Successfully charge someone with populist sympathies and you get, free and for nothing, both the imputation of demagoguery and what was famously derided as a “deplorable” and “irredeemable” cohort. The element of existential depreciation is almost palpable.
So is the element of condescension. Inseparable from the diagnosis of populism is the implication not just of incompetence but also of a crudity that is part aesthetic and part moral. Hence the curiously visceral distaste expressed by elite opinion for signs of populist sympathy. When Hillary Clinton charged that half of Donald Trump’s supporters were an “irredeemable” “basket of deplorables,” when Barack Obama castigated small-town Republican voters as “bitter” folk who “cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment,” what they expressed was not disagreement but condescending revulsion.
Ithink I first became aware that the charge of populist sympathies could have a powerful political, moral, and class delegitimizing effect when I was in London last June to cover the Brexit vote. Nearly everyone I met, from Tory ministers to taxi drivers, from tourists to tradesmen, was a Remainer. The higher up the income and class scale you went, the more likely it was that your interlocutor would be in favor of Britain’s remaining in the European Union. And the more pointed would be his disparagement of those arguing in favor of Brexit. The Brexiteers were said to be “angry,” yes, but also ignorant, fearful, xenophobic, and racist.
Except that they weren’t, not the ones I met, anyway. For them, Brexit turned on a simple question: “Who rules?” Is the ultimate source of British sovereignty Parliament, as had been the case for centuries? Or is it Brussels, seat of the European Union?
The question of sovereignty, I believe, takes us to the heart of what in recent years has been touted and tarred as the populist project.
Consider Britain. Parliament answers to the British voters. The European Union answers to—well, to itself. Indeed, it is worth pausing to remind ourselves how profoundly undemocratic is the European Union. Its commissioners are appointed, not elected. They cannot be turned out of office by voters. If the public votes contrary to the wishes of the E.U.’s commissars in a referendum, they are simply presented with another referendum until they vote the “right” way. The E.U.’s financial books have never been subject to a public audit. The corruption is just too widespread. Yet the E.U.’s agents wield extraordinary power over the everyday lives of their charges. A commissioner in Brussels can tell a property owner in Wales what sort of potatoes he may plant on his farm, how he must calculate the weight of the products he sells, and whom he must allow into his country. He can outlaw “racism” and “xenophobia”—defined as harboring “an aversion” to people based on “race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin” and specify a penalty of “at least” two years’ imprisonment for infractions. He can “lawfully suppress,” as the London Telegraph reported, “political criticism of its institutions and of leading figures,” thus rendering the commissars of the E.U. not only beyond the vote but also beyond criticism.
It’s a little different in the United States. I’ll come to that below. At the moment, it is worth noting to what extent the metabolism of this political dispensation was anticipated by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous passages about “democratic despotism” in Democracy in America. Unlike despotism of yore, Tocqueville noted, this modern allotrope does not tyrannize over man—it infantilizes him. And it does this by promulgating ever more cumbersome rules and regulations that reach into the interstices of everyday life to hamper initiative, stymie independence, stifle originality, homogenize individuality. This power, said Tocqueville, “extends its arms over society as a whole.”
It does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one’s acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.
Tocqueville’s analysis has led many observers to conclude that the villain in this drama is the state. But the political philosopher James Burnham, writing in the early 1940s in The Managerial Revolution, saw that the real villain was not the state as such but the bureaucracy that maintained and managed it. It is easy to mock the apparatchiks who populate the machinery of government. Thus James H. Boren writes wickedly that “the noblest of all of man’s struggles are those in which dedicated bureaucrats, armed with the spirit of dynamic inaction, have fought to protect the ramparts of creative nonresponsiveness from the onslaughts of mere citizens who have demanded action in their behalf.” But the comic potential of the morass should not blind us to the minatory nature of the phenomenon. Indeed, it presents a specimen case of the general truth that the preposterous and the malevolent often co-mingle. The shepherd of which Tocqueville wrote was really a flock of shepherds, a coterie of managers who, in the guise of doing the state’s business, prosecuted their own advantage and gradually became a self-perpetuating elite that arrogated to itself power over the levers of society.
Anatomizing this sleight-of-hand is at the center of “James Burnham’s Managerial Elite,” Julius Krein’s essay in the inaugural issue of American Affairs. “Although the managerial elite uses the state as an instrument to acquire power,” Krein notes, “the real enemy is not the state but rather the managerial separation of political and economic power from the liberal social contract.”
This separation of the real power of society from the economy and political life renders the managerial elite all but untouchable. And this, as Burnham saw, was the property neither of liberalism nor of conservatism but rather of anterior forces that engulfed both. “The contradiction of contemporary conservatism,” Krein writes,
is that it is an attempt to restore the culture and politics of bourgeois capitalism while accelerating the economy of managerialism. Because of its failure to recognize this contradiction, “much of conservative doctrine is, if not quite bankrupt, more and more obviously obsolescent,” as Burnham wrote in 1972. Since then it has only evolved from obsolescent to counterproductive. At this point, expanding “free markets” no longer has anything to do with classical American capitalism. It is simply the further emancipation of the managerial elite from any obligations to the political community. Likewise, promoting democracy as an abstract, universalist principle only undermines the sovereignty of the American people by rejecting national interests as a legitimate ground of foreign policy.
Sovereignty, Burnham saw, was shifting from Parliaments to what he called “administrative bureaus,” which increasingly are the seats of real power and, as such, “proclaim the rules, make the laws, issue the decrees.” As far back as the early 1940s, Burnham could write that “ ‘Laws’ today in the United States . . . are not being made any longer by Congress, but by the nlrb, sec, icc, aaa, tva, ftc, fcc, the Office of Production Management (what a revealing title!), and the other leading ‘executive agencies.’ ” And note that Burnham wrote decades before the advent of the epa, hud, cfpb, fsoc, the Department of Education, and the rest of the administrative alphabet soup that governs us in the United States today.
Iam convinced that the issue of sovereignty, of what we might call the location of sovereignty, has played a large role in the rise of the phenomenon we describe as “populism” in the United States as well as Europe. For one thing, the question of sovereignty, of who governs, stands behind the rebellion against the political correctness and moral meddlesomeness that are such conspicuous and disfiguring features of our increasingly bureaucratic society. The smothering, Tocquevillian blanket of regulatory excess has had a wide range of practical and economic effects, stifling entrepreneurship and making any sort of productive innovation difficult.
A reassertion of independence.
But perhaps its deepest effects are spiritual or psychological. The many assaults against free speech on college campuses, the demand for “safe spaces” and “trigger warnings” against verbal or fashion-inspired “micro-aggressions” (Mexican hats, “offensive” Halloween costumes, etc.) are part of this dictatorship of political correctness. In The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek said that one of the “main points” of his argument concerned “the psychological change,” the “alteration of the character of the people,” that extensive government control brought in its wake. The alteration involves a process of softening, enervation, infantilization even: an exchange of the challenges of liberty and self-reliance—the challenges, that is to say, of adulthood—for the coddling pleasures of dependence. Max Weber spoke in this context of “Ordnungsmenschen,” men who had become increasingly dependent on an order imposed upon them from above. Breaking with that drift becomes more and more difficult the more habituated to dependence a people becomes. In this sense, what has been described as a populist upsurge against political correctness is simply a reassertion of independence, a reclamation of what turns out to be a most uncommon virtue, common sense.
The issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debate over immigration: indeed, is any issue more central to the question Who governs? than who gets to decide a nation’s borders and how a country defines its first person plural: the “We” that makes us who we are as a people?
Throughout his campaign, Donald Trump promised to enforce America’s immigration laws, to end so-called “sanctuary cities,” which advertise themselves as safe havens for illegal aliens (though of course they do not call them “illegal aliens”), and to sharpen vetting procedures for people wishing to immigrate to America from countries known as sponsors of terrorism.
The President sometimes overstated and not infrequently misstated his case. Semantic precision is not a Trumpian speciality. But political effectiveness may be. Behind the Sturm und Drang that greeted Trump’s rhetoric on immigration, we can glimpse two very different concepts of the nation state and world order. One view sees the world as a collection of independent sovereign countries that, although interacting with one another, regard the care, safety, and prosperity of their own citizens as their first obligation. This is the traditional view of the nation state. It is also Donald Trump’s view. It is what licenses his talk of putting “America First,” a concept that, pace the anti-Trump media, has nothing to do with Charles Lindbergh’s isolationist movement of the late 1930s and everything to do with fostering a healthy sense of national identity and purpose.
The alternative view regards the nation state with suspicion as an atavistic form of political and social organization. The nation state might still be a practical necessity, but, the argument goes, it is a regrettable necessity inasmuch as it retards mankind’s emancipation from the parochial bonds of place and local allegiance. Ideally, according to this view, we are citizens of the world, not particular countries, and our fundamental obligation is to all mankind.
This is the progressive view. It has many progenitors and antecedents. But none is more influential than “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” a brief essay that Immanuel Kant published in 1795 when he was seventy-one. The burden of the essay is to ask how perpetual peace might be obtained among states. The natural condition of mankind, Kant acknowledges, is war. But with the advent of “enlightened concepts of statecraft,” mankind, he suggests, may be able to transcend that unfortunate habit of making war and live in perpetual (ewigen) comity.
Kant lists various conditions for the initial establishment of peace—the eventual abolition of standing armies, for example—and a few conditions for its perpetuation: the extension of “universal hospitality” by nations was something that caught my eye. Ditto “world citizenship.” “The idea of . . . world citizenship,” he says at the end of the essay, “is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace.”
It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant makes many observations along the way that will be balm to progressive hearts. He is against “the accumulation of treasure,” for example, because wealth is “a hindrance to perpetual peace.” By the same token, he believes that forbidding the system of international credit that the British empire employed “must be a preliminary article of perpetual peace.” Credit can be deployed to increase wealth, ergo it is suspect. Kant says that all states must be “republican” in organization. By that he means not that they must be democracies but only that the executive and legislative functions of the state be distinguished. (Indeed, he says that democracy, “properly speaking,” is “necessarily a despotism” because in it the executive and legislative functions of governments are both vested in one entity, “the people.”) He looks forward to the establishment of a “league of nations” (Völkerbund), all of which would freely embrace a republican form of government.
It would be hard to overstate the influence of Kant’s essay. It stands behind such progressive exfoliations as Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” not least the final point that looked forward to the establishment of a League of Nations. You can feel its pulse beating in the singing phrases of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war. It is worth noting that among the initial fifteen signatories of that noble-sounding pact, along with the United States, France, and England, were Germany, Italy, and Japan. What does that tell us about the folly of trusting paper proclamations not backed up by the authority of physical force? It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant’s essay also directly inspired the architects of the United Nations and, in our own day, the architects of the European Union and the battalions of transnational progressives who jettison democracy for the sake of a more-or-less nebulous (but not therefore un-coercive) ideal of world citizenship.
I would not care to wager on how many of the hysterics who congregated at airports across the country to protest Donald Trump’s effort to make the citizens of this country safer were students of Kant. Doubtless very few. But all were his unwitting heirs. “Universal hospitality”: how the protestors would have liked that! (Though to be fair to Kant, he did note that such hospitality “is not the right to be a permanent visitor.”) I have no doubt that the motivation of the protestors had many sources. But to the extent that it was based on a political ideal (and not just partisan posturing or a grubby bid for notoriety and power), the spirit of Kant was hovering there in the background.
Kant was not without a sense of humor. He begins his essay by noting that he took his title from a sign outside a Dutch pub. “Pax Perpetua” read the sign, and below the lettering was the image of a graveyard. Perhaps the universal perpetuity of death is the only peace that mankind may really look forward to. Kant clearly wouldn’t agree, but it was charming of him to acknowledge that the idea of a genuine perpetual peace for mankind might be regarded by many as nothing more than a “sweet dream” of philosophers.
What has been called the populist spirit aims to rouse us from that “sweet dream”—what James Madison might have called the “theoretic” reverie of the meddling class whose designs for our salvation always seem to involve the extension of their own power and prerogative. In this sense, the issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debates over the relative advantages and moral weather of “globalism” vs. “nationalism”—a pair of terms almost as fraught as “democracy” and “populism”—as well as the correlative economic issues of underemployment and wage stagnation. “Theoretic” politicians may advocate “globalism” as a necessary condition for free trade. But the spirit of local control tempers the cosmopolitan project of a borderless world with a recognition that the nation state has been the best guarantor not only of sovereignty but also of broadly shared prosperity. What we might call the ideology of free trade—the globalist aspiration to transcend the impediments of national identity and control—is an abstraction that principally benefits its architects. As R. R. Reno, the editor of First Things, pointed out in a recent Op-Ed for The New York Times, “Globalism poses a threat to the future of democracy because it disenfranchises the vast majority and empowers a technocratic elite.”
In the end, what James Burnham described as the “managerial revolution” is part of a larger progressive project. The aim of this project is partly to emancipate mankind from such traditional sources of self-definition as national identity, religious affiliation, and specific cultural rootedness, partly to perpetuate and aggrandize the apparatus that oversees the resulting dissolution. Burnham castigates this hypertrophied form of liberalism (what we might call “illiberal liberalism”) as “an ideology of suicide” that has insinuated itself into the center of Western culture. He acknowledges that the proposition may sound hyperbolic. “Suicide,” he notes, may seem “too emotive a term, too negative and ‘bad.’ ” But it is part of the pathology that Burnham describes that such objections are “most often made most hotly by Westerners who hate their own civilization, readily excuse or even praise blows struck against it, and themselves lend a willing hand, frequently enough, to pulling it down.” The issue, Burnham saw, is that modern liberalism has equipped us with an ethic too abstract and empty to inspire real commitment. Modern liberalism, he writes,
does not offer ordinary men compelling motives for personal suffering, sacrifice, and death. There is no tragic dimension in its picture of the good life. Men become willing to endure, sacrifice, and die for God, for family, king, honor, country, from a sense of absolute duty or an exalted vision of the meaning of history. . . . And it is precisely these ideas and institutions that liberalism has criticized, attacked, and in part overthrown as superstitious, archaic, reactionary, and irrational. In their place liberalism proposes a set of pale and bloodless abstractions—pale and bloodless for the very reason that they have no roots in the past, in deep feeling and in suffering. Except for mercenaries, saints, and neurotics, no one is willing to sacrifice and die for progressive education, medicare, humanity in the abstract, the United Nations, and a ten percent rise in Social Security payments.
In his view, the primary function of liberalism was to “permit Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolution,” to view weakness, failure, even collapse not as a defeat but “as the transition to a new and higher order in which Mankind as a whole joins in a universal civilization that has risen above the parochial distinctions, divisions, and discriminations of the past.”
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against these forces of dissolution.
Around the time that Donald Trump took office, his chief strategist Steve Bannon said that his goal was to “deconstruct the administrative state.” The phrase “administrative state”—also called “the regulatory state” or “the deep state”—has lately floated into common parlance. In The Administrative Threat, the legal scholar Philip Hamburger describes it as “a state within a state,” a sort of parallel legal and political structure populated by unelected bureaucrats. This amorphous congeries of agencies and regulations has become, Hamburger argues, “the dominant reality of American governance,” intruding everywhere into economic and social life.
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against forces of dissolution.
Article I of the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, just as Article III vests all judicial authority in the Court. The administrative state is a mechanism for circumventing both. As such, Hamburger argues, the administrative state operates outside the Constitution.
When the Constitution places all legislative powers in Congress, it gives Congress not only the power to make law but also the power to unmake it. And it thereby bars the executive from suspending or dispensing with the law. When the Constitution, moreover, places the judicial power in the courts and guarantees the due process of law, it precludes the executive from telling the courts not to apply the law, and prevents the courts from abandoning their own judgment about what the law requires.
Binding citizens not through Congressionally enacted statutes but through the edicts of the managerial bureaucracy, the administrative state is “all about the evasion of governance through law, including an evasion of constitutional processes and procedural rights.” Accordingly, Hamburger concludes, the encroaching activity of the administrative state represents “the nation’s preeminent threat to civil liberties.”
Hamburger draws an analogy between the behavior of the administrative state and the behavior of such despotic monarchs as James I, Charles I, and James II. Instead of persuading Parliament to repeal or revise a statute, the British king simply evaded its force by decreeing that some or all of his subjects were not subject to its strictures. His power was absolute not merely in the sense that it was all but unlimited but also in the sense that it was independent or outside of the law. Students of Latin will recall the Ablative Absolute, a construction in which an ablative phrase is absolutum, “loosened” from or independent of the main clause of a sentence. Hamburger shows how the growth of the administrative state represents an extralegal “revival of absolute power” in this sense, one that threatens to transform Constitutional rights and guarantees into mere “options” that the government bestows or withholds at its pleasure. “The evasion,” he notes, “thereby changes the very nature of procedural rights. Such rights traditionally were assurances against the government. Now they are but one of the choices for government in its exercise of power. Though the government must respect these rights when it proceeds against Americans in court, it has the freedom to escape them by taking an administrative path.”
Just as British kings in the seventeenth century evaded Parliament through such expedients as the Star Chamber and the exercise of royal prerogatives and royal waivers—what John Adams castigated as “those badges of domination called prerogatives”—so the administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution and beyond the authority of Congress. Barack Obama decreed that certain politically unpalatable provisions of the Affordable Care Act not be enforced, and presto, they were not enforced, even though they were the law of the land. He instructed his Department of Justice to intervene to prevent Arizona and other states from enforcing certain aspects of immigration law. He even forced public institutions to accommodate self-declared “transgender” persons in the toilets of their choice; he connived with lawsuits punishing bakers and Catholic hospitals and hobby shops who chose not to join this week’s politically correct campaign for the sexually exotic. The Constitution may have vested all legislative power in Congress and entrusted all judicial power to the courts, but the administrative state sidesteps those requirements by erecting a parallel bureaucratic structure of enforcement and control.
The administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution.
“Eighteenth-century Americans,” Hamburger notes, “assumed that a rule could have the obligation of law only if it came from the constitutionally established legislature elected by the people.” Today, Americans find their lives directed by a jumble of agencies far removed from the legislature and staffed by bureaucrats who make and enforce a vast network of rules that govern nearly every aspect of our lives.
One of the most disturbing aspects of Hamburger’s analysis is the historical connection he exposes between the expansion of the franchise in the early twentieth century and the growth of administrative, that is to say, extra-legal, power. For the people in charge, equality of voting rights was one thing. They could live with that. But the tendency of newly enfranchised groups—the “bitter clingers” and “deplorables” of yore—to reject progressive initiatives was something else again. As Woodrow Wilson noted sadly, “The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.” What to do?
The solution was to shift real power out of elected bodies and into the hands of the right sort of people, enlightened people, progressive people, people, that is to say, like Woodrow Wilson. Thus Wilson welcomed the advent of administrative power as a counterweight to encroaching democratization. And thus it was, as Hamburger points out, that we have seen a transfer of legislative power to the “knowledge class,” the managerial elite that James Burnham anatomized.
A closer look at the so-called “knowledge class” shows that what it knows best is how to preserve and extend its own privileges. Its activities are swaddled in do-gooder rhetoric about serving the public, looking after “the environment,” helping the disadvantaged, etc., but what they chiefly excel at is consolidating their own power.
In Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Edmund Burke criticized the Court of George III for circumventing Parliament and establishing by stealth what amounted to a new regime of royal prerogative and influence-peddling. It was not as patent as the swaggering courts of James I or Charles I. George and his courtiers maintained the appearance of parliamentary supremacy. But a closer look showed that the system was corrupt. “It was soon discovered,” Burke wrote with sly understatement, “that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible.” That discovery stands behind the growth of the administrative state. Under the cloak of democratic institutions, its essentially undemocratic activities pursue an expansionist agenda that threatens liberty in the most comprehensive way, by circumventing the law.
At the same time, however, a growing recognition of the totalitarian goals of the administrative state has fed what many have called a populist uprising here and in Europe. “Populist” is one word for the phenomenon. An affirmation of sovereignty, underwritten by a passion for freedom, is another, possibly more accurate, phrase.
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An American Remembrance of the Queen

I write as an American patriot who is also a confirmed Anglophile. So when I got the sad news this morning that the Queen’s health had taken so dangerous a turn that the palace had summoned her family to Balmoral, I steeled myself for bad news.
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Anatomy of a Failed Moral Panic

The left tried to reboot George Floyd–style chaos after an ICE shooting, but video evidence, public dissent, and firm federal response exposed the narrative as hollow agitprop.
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And My Final Prediction for the Midterms Is…

I’ll be weighing in again on the midterms early Wednesday. But since this is the season of prediction, prophecy, punditry and prognostication, I thought I would take my cards, which I have grasped here in my hand, and lay them on this virtual table.
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Annals of the Art World: Everything Old Is New Again

What is it about the word “art”?
Pronounce it, and the IQ of susceptible folk is instantly halved. (I’ve seen cases where it is diminished by 87 percent.) Normally sensible people who do not, as a rule, appreciate being made fools of stand idly by as someone tells them that a video of some charlatan climbing naked up a scaffolding while applying Vaseline to sensitive parts of his body is “the most important American artist of his generation.”
Instead of throwing something soft and rotting at such mountebanks, they nod solemnly and reach for their wallets. They are only too eager, when a stiffy arrives from the Museum of Modern Art or some similar establishment, to don the soup and fish and buzz round to the super exclusive evening event where scores of beautiful people line up to sip the shampoo (David Niven’s word for champagne) and admire a tank full of formaldehyde and a dead tiger shark. What is it about the word “art” that endows it with this mind- and character-wrecking property? Why does it induce incontinent gibbering, not to mention mind-boggling extravagance, among normally hard-headed souls? A full answer would take us deep into the pathology of our time. It has something to do with what I’ve called elsewhere the institutionalization of the avant-garde, the contradictory project whereby the tics and outré attitudes of the avant-garde go mainstream. The half-comic, half-contemptible result is that ordinary bourgeois adults find themselves in the embarrassing position of celebrating the juvenile, anti-bourgeois antics of people who detest them. Our misuse of the word “art” also has something to do with our age’s tendency to look to art for spiritual satisfactions traditionally afforded by religion. “After one has abandoned a belief in God,” Wallace Stevens observed, “poetry is that essence which takes its place as life’s redemption.” That, anyway, is the idea, though exactly what sort of “redemption” may be had from much that goes by the name of “art” today is another question. Consider the case of Millie Brown, the “English performance artist known for her work involving vomiting.” Yes, that’s right. This deep thinker drinks tinted milk and then regurgitates it over a canvas. That’s her claim to immortality. The Daily Mail in 2013 compared Millie Brown to Jackson Pollock. People—not art people—used to say contemptuously that their child of 5 could paint something indiscernible from a Jackson Pollock painting. Perhaps so. Ms. Brown has gone a step further: her creations are indiscernible from the “creations” of 1-year-olds, whose canvases are the products not of their hands but other organs. Perhaps the most risible—or is it the saddest?—part of this whole charade is the pretense that there is something novel about what Millie Brown has on offer. “I have an inherent desire to push my own boundaries within my art,” she says. But we’ve been there, we’ve done that. In 1961, Piero Manzoni produced 90 tin cans of his own excrement. Examples of this limited edition work occupy a proud place in several museums, including the Tate. (One tin sold for more than $200,000 at auction.) And then there was the student at the Ontario College of Art and Design who in 1996 pushed his own boundaries with an “art work” that consisted of him vomiting on paintings by others, a Piet Mondrian in New York and a Raoul Dufy at a museum in Ontario. The truth is that, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, there is nothing new or “challenging” about the “artists” who populate the trendy precincts of contemporary art. All their “shocking” moves were long ago pioneered by Marcel Duchamp and his fellow Dadaists. What these latter-day Dadaists have accomplished is simply the domestication and routinization of the avant-garde. They preserve the gestures but lack the spirit. They pretend to be “challenging” or “transgressing” conventional boundaries, but all such boundaries were long ago erased. They are today’s conventional taste. The only thing these “artists” challenge is our patience. It is a melancholy, not to say a tiresome, spectacle. What it says about our culture is partly depressing, partly anger-inducing. The really breath-taking feature of the thing is that these “artists” actually seem to believe they are brave aesthetic and existential pioneers. It’s contemptible, yes, but also quite sad.
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Another Progressive Fusillade Goes Awry

Is Chris Rufo our Br’er Rabbit?
In his tireless battle against critical race theory (CRT), the latest allotrope of vicious anti-white, polymorphously perverse Marxist ideology, Rufo has had signal success.
He has succeeded in bringing the truth about CRT to the public’s attention, and his work has inspired a significant backlash.
He has inspired legislation in more than a dozen states and even a presidential order (though not, of course, by the current president) to check this moral Trojan horse.
The Empire always strikes back, however.
The “woke” watchmen at the citadels of orthodoxy have begun to sit up, take notice, and sound the alarm about this patient and methodical gadfly buzzing about their efforts to subvert the wholesome, race-blind canons of liberal education as traditionally conceived.
Rufo’s critics face two huge hurdles.
One, CRT and allied ideologies are every bit as toxic as Rufo says.
To describe CRT is to discredit it, and Rufo describes it in patient, if not exactly loving, detail.
Two, those attacking Rufo seem to believe that by saying he represents an assault on “progressive” sentiment they have landed a damaging blow.
They don’t understand that, like Br’er Rabbit, he glories in being tossed into the Briar Patch of anti-progressive reaction.
The latest, inadvertently amusing, instance of this phenomenon, was vouchsafed us by a truly obtuse opinion piece in our former paper of record.
One of Rufo’s highest-profile interventions to date has been at New College in Sarasota, Florida.
That failing college attracted the attention of Gov. Ron DeSantis partly because it was floundering, hemorrhaging students and financial stability, partly because it was a safe haven for every toxic element of the CRT roadshow.
DeSantis brought in several new board members, including Rufo, and they instantly began shaking things up.
His statement that he wanted to help transform New College into “the Hillsdale of the South” was particularly galling to the woke mandarins in the media because Hillsdale, probably the best liberal arts college in the country, is calmly but conspicuously and determinedly non-woke.
Hillsdale is interested in education, not indoctrination.
That is its real tort: It refuses to be part of the “progressive” assault on independent thought and genuine learning.
The hilarity of The New York Times piece begins with its title: “This Is What the Right-Wing Takeover of a Progressive College Looks Like.”
We are meant to shudder at the phrase “Right-Wing.”
It’s true that most conservatives cower in the corner when accused of being “right-wing,” “racist,” “homophobic,” etc.
That cowardice is part of what’s wrong with contemporary conservatism.
But Rufo outflanked the machine by embracing the charge.
He linked to the NY Times column on Twitter and proudly assented to the charge.
“Yes, this is what the right-wing takeover of a progressive college looks like,” he said. “And we’re just getting started.”
Oh no, narrative disruption!
Rufo continued: “My critics believe that the ‘progressive college’ is the only natural and legitimate form of the university.
“But we won’t play that game. Conservative voters deserve conservative institutions. In a republic, the people, through their elected representatives, get to decide.”
What a novel idea!
I (almost) felt sorry for the NY Times columnist.
Reading her column was like watching a toddler having a meltdown.
There she was wailing and pounding her tiny fists on the floor, but nobody was paying her the slightest heed.
One curious trope that the woke punditocracy has put great store by is the belief in the dark magical powers of the adjective “Christian.”
A recent New Yorker piece on Hillsdale featured the word in its title, doubtless because the author or her editors were confident that their readers would recoil from the term.
Doubtless they are correct in that calculation.
But who still reads The New Yorker or The New York Times?
In the event, The New Yorker piece wasn’t as hostile as one might have expected.
It was less damning than curious.
That is, what we saw in that column was The New Yorker in its cultural anthropology guise, its reporter embedded among a far-off tribe and reporting on their strange customs and behavior for the sophisticates back home.
The New York Times, by contrast, was taut, angry, and hysterical.
The author begins with a sympathetic portrayal of some legacy professors at New College.
They tried to give Rufo and his wrecking balls the benefit of the doubt. They tried to work with them.
But it was no good.
“Rufo,” quoth this columnist, is “the ideological entrepreneur who made critical race theory a Republican boogeyman.”
Moreover, he was “open about his ambition to turn the quirky, LGBT-friendly liberal arts school into a public version of Hillsdale, a conservative Christian college in Michigan with close ties to both DeSantis and former President Donald Trump. He hoped the transformation would be proof of concept for his dream: a conservative takeover of higher education across the country.”
Imagine, he actually admits it!
And note again the deployment of the word “Christian” and the ultimate high-caliber weaponry, DeSantis and Trump.
I have no doubt that NY Times readers were reaching for their smelling salts or locally sourced vegan sedatives.
Indeed, the NY Times column is full of what St. Matthew called “fletus et stridor dentium”: “wailing and gnashing of teeth.”
The new board fired the college president and replaced her with—wait for it—a Republican!
Perhaps my favorite two sentences in the column follow immediately on that terrible revelation: “They fired its chief diversity officer and dismantled the diversity, equity and inclusion office. As I was writing this on Friday, several people sent me photographs of gender-neutral signage scraped off school bathrooms.”
But wait, you’re thinking, aren’t those good things?
Why should any college maintain such a thing as a “chief diversity officer” let alone an office of “diversity, equity, and inclusion”? Why?
And why should a public college—or for that matter, a private one—maintain “gender neutral” (by which, incidentally, she probably meant “transgender friendly”) bathrooms? Why?
At the center of this pathetic piece is an account of a long and unpleasant public board meeting at which a holdover board member and others stormed out.
Rufo himself had to Zoom in, we’re told, because he was in Hungary, “where he had a fellowship at a right-wing think tank closely tied to Viktor Orbán’s government. (This seemed fitting, since Orbán’s Hungary created the template for Rufo and DeSantis’s educational crusade.)”
Oh dear, oh dear. “A right-wing think tank.” Viktor Orbán: Can things get any worse?
The New York Times endeavored to stage a tragedy here. They succeeded only in producing a farce.
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At Columbia… That’s All, Folx!

Undoubtedly the best moment in the testimony of Minouche Shafik, the President Columbia University, before the House Committee on Education and the Workforce last week was elicited by Representative Jim Banks. Why, he wanted to know, was the word “folks” spelled “folx” throughout an official guidebook for the School of Social Work?
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At the Threshold or Turning Point

Reflecting on the breathtaking and unprecedented enormity of Alvin Bragg’s indictment of former President Donald Trump, a friend wrote me to say it reminded her of Martin Niemöller’s famous poem “First they came.”
“First they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out—because I was not a socialist.
“Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out—because I was not a trade unionist.
“Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—because I was not a Jew.
“Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”
How apposite those lines seem to our situation, all the more now that the Eastern District of New York has convicted Douglass Mackey of a felony for posting a satirical meme making fun of Hillary Clinton.
That episode, as I have said elsewhere, is yet more evidence that the United States has become a banana republic, a corrupt and despotic polity wherein the ruling party criminalizes dissent, and cows and intimidates anyone insufficiently obeisant to the dominant ideology.
Take note of that word “felony.”
Mackey now faces up to 10 years in prison for posting an image on social media suggesting that Hillary Clinton supporters avoid the long lines at the polls and vote by texting “Hillary” to a certain number.
It was a funny idea and one that no one, not even Democratic voters, could have taken seriously.
But the heavy hand of the Democratic machine came down hard on Mackey, accusing him of fomenting a “plot to disenfranchise black and women voters.”
The fact that Mackey was charged with, let alone convicted of, a felony is an outrage.
Tucker Carlson called it “the most shocking attack on freedom of speech in this country in our lifetime.”
Just as shocking is the “disparate impact” in the Democratic application of this coercive power of the state.
Mackey, a Trump supporter, is hauled up on a felony charge.
A performance artist called Kristina Wong posted a similar tweet, only hers supported Hillary: “Hey Trump supporters,” she tweeted, “skip poll lines and text in your vote.”
What happened to her?
Nothing.
At times like this, a good memory is imperative.
It’s seldom, the philosopher David Hume wrote, that freedom is lost all at once.
Usually, it’s a gradual process, a little bit chipped away here, some taken-for-granted liberties forgotten about there.
Eventually, the world we used to inhabit becomes unrecognizable.
Looking back, we can identify some signposts.
The sharp erosions of our freedoms during the COVID-19 pandemic will go down in the history books, or at least in the official manual of totalitarian crowd control.
How easily the entire population was cowed into submission.
People abandoned their businesses, cowered in their homes, wore pointless masks, and pretended to believe that liquor stores were more “essential” venues than houses of worship.
Amazing.
But it’s also important to remember the martyrs to the ideology of the deep state, the people who were chewed up and spit out as the regime went about the business of consolidating its power and its control over the climate of opinion.
An incomplete but representative list includes the following:
Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, Trump’s first national security adviser, who was set up and destroyed by the FBI in order to make room for the Russian collusion hoax.
John Eastman, a lawyer for Trump, who, even as I write, is in the process of being smeared and possibly disbarred because he dared to offer the former president legal advice.
Peter Navarro, a former Trump adviser, who, though he lived practically next door to the FBI building in Washington, was apprehended while boarding a plane. The G-Men slapped the 72-year-old man in handcuffs (and leg irons!) and threw him into a cell once occupied, they were careful to tell him, by John Hinckley, the lunatic who shot Ronald Reagan in 1981.
Then there are parents who object to schools’ force-feeding their children with the radical Marxist teachings of critical race theory, not to mention the latest forms of sexual exoticism.
For challenging those orthodoxies, Merrick Garland, attorney general of the United States, instructed the FBI to mobilize against parents who oppose critical race theory in public schools, after suggestions their protests might be “a form of domestic terrorism and hate crimes.”
To combat this fantasy crime, Garland called (pdf) for a “partnership among federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement to address threats against school administrators, board members, teachers and staff.”
It was all-in to crush the upstarts.
The list continues. Last June, Mark Houck, a minister and pro-life activist, was subject to one of those dawn raids the FBI now favors. Some two dozen FBI agents showed up, weapons drawn, and proceeded to pound on the front door of the house where Houck lives with his wife and seven children. His crime? Shouting at and allegedly shoving a pro-abortion escort who was hurling abuse at Houck’s child.
In his analysis of governmental paternalism, Alexis de Tocqueville noted, “Almost all the rulers who have tried to destroy freedom have at first attempted to preserve its forms.”
At first.
Once they have consolidated power, they or their successors dispense with the fiction and proceed with more patently despotic forms of coercion and control.
In the United States, I believe, we’re at the threshold of that transition.
Can we derail the progress of the totalitarian juggernaut?
Yes, but only if we’re willing to acknowledge and publicly object to the unfair treatment meted out to the regime’s opponents.
They came for a national security adviser, but that wasn’t me, so I did nothing.
They came for a presidential lawyer, but that wasn’t me, so I did nothing.
They came for a social media “influencer,” but it wasn’t me, so I did nothing.
They called concerned parents who confronted left-wing school boards “domestic terrorists,” but that wasn’t me, so I did nothing.
They came for a former president, but it wasn’t me, so I did nothing.
There are basically only two ways this can end.
Neither will be easy or pleasant. Only one will preserve our liberty and prerogatives as free citizens.
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Bad Luck and the Evanescence of Imperfection

One of the few websites I check in on almost every day is RealClearPolitics.
I do so in part because of the range of its links—the editors cull many of the best columns from all sides of the political debate, so it’s a handy way to stay au courant—and in part for its expanding subsections on books, science, religion, defense, and other cultural topics.
Over the past several years, under the rubric RealClearInvestigations, the site has also been publishing its own incisive and independent investigative reporting on a wide range of issues. Those stories tend to be hard hitting and meticulously researched.
Every election season, they scour the polls and sift through the dross in order to supply readers not only with the results of a representative sampling of individual polls—which, as I note in a forthcoming column elsewhere, are often little more than a form of fan fiction—but also with the valuable “RCP average,” a kind of polling gold standard that pundits and prognosticators eagerly anticipate.
Finally, RealClear provides a constantly evolving digest of the news of the day arranged according to a handful of topics and printed in a single column down the left side of its home page.
In just 30 seconds, you can glance at those headlines and come away with a sense of the national mood.
Things on Sunday, Oct. 2, are not too cheery.
Under the rubric “Biden Administration,” for example, we find “Biden Says ‘We Can Afford’ Student Debt Forgiveness After GOP Lawsuit,” and “Fed-Backed Censorship Machine Targeted 20 News Sites,” a story about the Election Integrity Partnership, a consortium of four private companies that, under the aegis of the government, are surveilling, reporting on, and censoring conservative social media sites that publish stories displeasing to the administration.
Then we come to the topic of “U.S. Economy.”
“Corporate Number Crunching Games Signal a Deteriorating Economy,” “Meta to Lay Off People for 1st Time,” “Fed’s Preferred Inflation Gauge Shows Price Surge Again Last Month,” and “Dow Ends Month Down Nearly 9%.”
Yikes.
There are other items on that list. None is what you would call upbeat.
This colloquy of gloom reminded me of a famous observation from the writer Robert Heinlein.
“Throughout history,” Heinlein wrote in 1973, “poverty is the normal condition of man.”
“Advances which permit this norm to be exceeded—here and there, now and then—are the work of an extremely small minority, frequently despised, often condemned, and almost always opposed by all right-thinking people.”
Then comes the kicker: “Whenever this tiny minority is kept from creating, or (as sometimes happens) is driven out of a society, the people then slip back into abject poverty.”
“This,” Heinlein added, “is known as ‘bad luck.’”
Of course, Heinlein was speaking ironically with that last bit.
The issue was not “bad luck” but virtue-fired stupidity.
All those “right-thinking people”—the people with the socially certified ideas, the kinder, gentler, mask-wearing, anti-fossil-fuel types—are on the ramparts, proudly toppling the atavistic instruments of their prosperity.
Very soon now, they will look around at the wreckage their good intentions have wrought and wonder who is to blame for the poverty, the chaos, the ruins that lay strewn where once, not so long ago, a vibrant civilization stood, supported by a mighty economy.
I am of two minds about this.
On the one hand, it’s an illustration of what the great philosopher Michael Oakeshott had in mind when he observed that “The evanescence of imperfection may be said to be the first item of the creed of the Rationalist.”
By “Rationalist,” I should add, Oakeshott meant more or less what we mean when we speak of “Progressives.”
All are utopians of one stripe or another.
Imperfection offends them.
They cannot understand why, since they have identified and castigated it, it still exists.
They conclude, wrongly, that it must be because people are insufficiently enlightened by the progressive creed.
Either that, or it must be because of people who perversely reject that creed.
So they divide people who disagree with them as either ignorant or evil.
The former must be managed, directed, uplifted.
The latter must be destroyed.
On the other hand, the situation Heinlein describes is not an unavoidable fate. It isn’t “bad luck.”
Just as our mastery of the techniques of scientific inquiry enables us to make reliable progress in plumbing the secrets of nature, so our understanding of how markets work gives us the tools to manage the economy effectively.
If, that is, we heed those lessons.
We have just pumped trillions of dollars into the economy, with the result that inflation is the worst it has been in nearly half a century.
Who could not have foreseen that result? (Milton Friedman certainly would have.)
We have willfully ignored the lessons of the market in order to indulge in all manner of utopian social engineering, with the result that economic growth has stalled and people are scared. Robert Heinlein issued a useful warning. I wonder whether we will heed it?
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Bad News Is Good News? The Left’s Premature Celebration Over Jobs Data

The left cheered a weak jobs report—until Trump fired the stats chief, touted native-born job gains, and doubled down on his America First economic overhaul.
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Beaujolais Is the Ideal Summer Wine

It is light, flowery, full of pleasing acidity and fruitiness, satisfying by itself and notably food friendly












