Today On The Eric Metaxas Show, Eric talks with Roger Kimball about New York City, Islam, and why they argue the West is losing civilizational confidence. They discuss whether the Islam vs Islamism distinction holds up, why assimilation and shared values matter for a free society, and what is happening in Europe and England right now. Then they pivot to Iran, regime change predictions, and why they believe Trump is reshaping the global order from the border to energy to foreign policy.
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How Political Correctness Hijacked the Arts | Roger Kimball and Heather MacDonald


What gets to be called art — and who decides? In this wide-ranging Socrates Dialogues conversation, New York–based thinkers, writers, and art admirers Heather Mac Donald and Roger Kimball explore the definition of art and the history of the unmaking of beauty in modern contemporary art. Drawing on examples from Duchamp, Warhol, Serrano, Hirst, and others, the two discuss how the banal, the transgressive, and the political have reshaped the aesthetic experience of art, often robbing it of spiritual resonance.
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Populism, X: The Imperative of Freedom

It is curious how certain words accumulate a nimbus of positive associations while others, semantically just as innocuous, wind up shouldering a portfolio of bad feelings.
Consider the different careers of the terms “democracy” and “populism.”
Do you know any responsible person who would admit to being opposed to democracy? No one who does not enjoy a large private income would risk it. But lots of people are willing to declare themselves anti-populist. The discrepancy is curious for several reasons.
It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
For one thing, it is a testament to the almost Darwinian hardiness of the word “democracy.” In the fierce struggle among ideas for survival, “democracy” has not only survived but thrived. This is despite the fact that political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle through Cicero and down to modern times have been deeply suspicious of democracy. Aristotle thought democracy the worst form of government, all but inevitably leading to ochlocracy or mob rule, which is no rule.
In Federalist 10, James Madison famously warned that history had shown that democratic regimes have “in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” “Theoretic politicians,” he wrote—and it would be hard to find a more contemptuous deployment of the word “theoretic”—such politicians may have advocated democracy, but that is only because of their dangerous and utopian ignorance of human nature. It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
Nevertheless, nearly everyone wants to associate himself with the word “democracy.” Totalitarian regimes like to describe themselves as the “Democratic Republic” of wherever. Conservatives champion the advantages of “democratic capitalism.” Central planners of all stripes eagerly deploy programs advertised as enhancing or extending “democracy.” Even James Madison came down on the side of a subspecies of democracy, one filtered through the modulating influence of a large, diverse population and an elaborate scheme of representation that softened (Madison said “excluded”) the influence of “the people in their collective capacity.”
“Democracy,” in short, is a eulogistic word, what the practical philosopher Stephen Potter in another context apostrophized as an “OK word.” And it is worth noting, as Potter would have been quick to remind us, that the people pronouncing those eulogies delight in advertising themselves as, and are generally accepted as, “OK people.” Indeed, the class element and the element of moral approbation—of what some genius has summarized as “virtue signaling”—are key.
It is quite otherwise with “populism.” At first blush, this seems odd because the word “populism” occupies a semantic space closely adjacent to “democracy.” “Democracy” means “rule by the demos,” the people. “Populism,” according to The American Heritage Dictionary, describes “A political philosophy directed to the needs of the common people and advancing a more equitable distribution of wealth and power”— that is, just the sorts of things that the people, were they to rule, would seek.
But the fact is that “populism” is ambivalent at best. Sometimes, it is true, a charismatic figure can survive and even illuminate the label “populist” like a personal halo. Bernie Sanders managed this trick among the eco-conscious, racially omnivorous, non-gender-stereotyping, anti-capitalist beneficiaries of capitalism who made up his core constituency.
But it was always my impression that in this case the term “populist” was fielded less by Sanders or his followers than by his rivals and the media in an effort to fix him in the public’s mind as one of the many lamentable examples of not-Hillary, who herself was presumed to be popular though not populist.
There are at least two sides to the negative association under which the term “populist” struggles. On the one hand, there is the issue of demagoguery. Some commentators tell us that “populist” and “demagogue” are essentially synonyms (though they rarely point out that demagogos simply meant “a popular leader,” e.g., Pericles). The association of demagoguery and populism describes what we might call the command-and-control aspect of populism. The populist leader is said to forsake reason and moderation in order to stir the dark, chthonic passions of a semi-literate and spiritually unelevated populace.
On the other hand, there is the issue of the fertile but unedifying soil of that populace upon which the demagogic leader works. Anyone who has looked at the commentary on Brexit, the campaign and early months of the Trump administration, or the recent French election will have noted this.
Consider, to take but one example, how often the word “anger” and its cognates are deployed to evoke the psychological and moral failings of both the populist multitude and its putative leaders. In a remarkable, apocalyptic effusion published in the early hours of November 9, 2016, David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, warned that the Trump presidency represented “a rebellion against liberalism itself,” an “angry assault” on the civil rights of women, blacks, immigrants, homosexuals, and countless others. Later commentators warned about our “angry, cynical times,” the “raw, angry and aggrieved” tone of Trump’s rhetoric, the unchaperoned “anger” of Americans who felt they “had been left behind.” “Trump’s Anger Could Lead Down a Dangerous Road,” quoth cnn. “Inside Trump’s Anger and Impatience—and His Sudden Decision to Fire Comey,” The Washington Post. “How Festering Anger at Comey Ended in His Firing,” The New York Times.
There are occasional acknowledgments that the diagnosed “anger” may be understandable, even justified. But we are left with the unmistakeable impression that the phenomenon as a whole is something vicious and irrational. Anger “festers.” It leads to “sudden,” i.e., impulsive decisions. The road it steers us toward could be “dangerous.” (Ah, how cheap is possibility: when we read that “could be” dangerous, do we also think, as we should, that it might just as well not be?)
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness. Like the foul-smelling wounds of Philoctetes, the stench is apparently incurable. Granted, there are plenty of historical reasons for the association between demagoguery and populism, as such names as the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Father Coughlin, and Huey Long remind us.
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness.
Still, I suspect that in the present context the apparently unbreakable association between populism and demagoguery has less to do with any natural affinity than with cunning rhetorical weaponization. “Populism,” that is to say, is wielded less as a descriptive than as a delegitimizing term. Successfully charge someone with populist sympathies and you get, free and for nothing, both the imputation of demagoguery and what was famously derided as a “deplorable” and “irredeemable” cohort. The element of existential depreciation is almost palpable.
So is the element of condescension. Inseparable from the diagnosis of populism is the implication not just of incompetence but also of a crudity that is part aesthetic and part moral. Hence the curiously visceral distaste expressed by elite opinion for signs of populist sympathy. When Hillary Clinton charged that half of Donald Trump’s supporters were an “irredeemable” “basket of deplorables,” when Barack Obama castigated small-town Republican voters as “bitter” folk who “cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment,” what they expressed was not disagreement but condescending revulsion.
Ithink I first became aware that the charge of populist sympathies could have a powerful political, moral, and class delegitimizing effect when I was in London last June to cover the Brexit vote. Nearly everyone I met, from Tory ministers to taxi drivers, from tourists to tradesmen, was a Remainer. The higher up the income and class scale you went, the more likely it was that your interlocutor would be in favor of Britain’s remaining in the European Union. And the more pointed would be his disparagement of those arguing in favor of Brexit. The Brexiteers were said to be “angry,” yes, but also ignorant, fearful, xenophobic, and racist.
Except that they weren’t, not the ones I met, anyway. For them, Brexit turned on a simple question: “Who rules?” Is the ultimate source of British sovereignty Parliament, as had been the case for centuries? Or is it Brussels, seat of the European Union?
The question of sovereignty, I believe, takes us to the heart of what in recent years has been touted and tarred as the populist project.
Consider Britain. Parliament answers to the British voters. The European Union answers to—well, to itself. Indeed, it is worth pausing to remind ourselves how profoundly undemocratic is the European Union. Its commissioners are appointed, not elected. They cannot be turned out of office by voters. If the public votes contrary to the wishes of the E.U.’s commissars in a referendum, they are simply presented with another referendum until they vote the “right” way. The E.U.’s financial books have never been subject to a public audit. The corruption is just too widespread. Yet the E.U.’s agents wield extraordinary power over the everyday lives of their charges. A commissioner in Brussels can tell a property owner in Wales what sort of potatoes he may plant on his farm, how he must calculate the weight of the products he sells, and whom he must allow into his country. He can outlaw “racism” and “xenophobia”—defined as harboring “an aversion” to people based on “race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin” and specify a penalty of “at least” two years’ imprisonment for infractions. He can “lawfully suppress,” as the London Telegraph reported, “political criticism of its institutions and of leading figures,” thus rendering the commissars of the E.U. not only beyond the vote but also beyond criticism.
It’s a little different in the United States. I’ll come to that below. At the moment, it is worth noting to what extent the metabolism of this political dispensation was anticipated by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous passages about “democratic despotism” in Democracy in America. Unlike despotism of yore, Tocqueville noted, this modern allotrope does not tyrannize over man—it infantilizes him. And it does this by promulgating ever more cumbersome rules and regulations that reach into the interstices of everyday life to hamper initiative, stymie independence, stifle originality, homogenize individuality. This power, said Tocqueville, “extends its arms over society as a whole.”
It does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one’s acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.
Tocqueville’s analysis has led many observers to conclude that the villain in this drama is the state. But the political philosopher James Burnham, writing in the early 1940s in The Managerial Revolution, saw that the real villain was not the state as such but the bureaucracy that maintained and managed it. It is easy to mock the apparatchiks who populate the machinery of government. Thus James H. Boren writes wickedly that “the noblest of all of man’s struggles are those in which dedicated bureaucrats, armed with the spirit of dynamic inaction, have fought to protect the ramparts of creative nonresponsiveness from the onslaughts of mere citizens who have demanded action in their behalf.” But the comic potential of the morass should not blind us to the minatory nature of the phenomenon. Indeed, it presents a specimen case of the general truth that the preposterous and the malevolent often co-mingle. The shepherd of which Tocqueville wrote was really a flock of shepherds, a coterie of managers who, in the guise of doing the state’s business, prosecuted their own advantage and gradually became a self-perpetuating elite that arrogated to itself power over the levers of society.
Anatomizing this sleight-of-hand is at the center of “James Burnham’s Managerial Elite,” Julius Krein’s essay in the inaugural issue of American Affairs. “Although the managerial elite uses the state as an instrument to acquire power,” Krein notes, “the real enemy is not the state but rather the managerial separation of political and economic power from the liberal social contract.”
This separation of the real power of society from the economy and political life renders the managerial elite all but untouchable. And this, as Burnham saw, was the property neither of liberalism nor of conservatism but rather of anterior forces that engulfed both. “The contradiction of contemporary conservatism,” Krein writes,
is that it is an attempt to restore the culture and politics of bourgeois capitalism while accelerating the economy of managerialism. Because of its failure to recognize this contradiction, “much of conservative doctrine is, if not quite bankrupt, more and more obviously obsolescent,” as Burnham wrote in 1972. Since then it has only evolved from obsolescent to counterproductive. At this point, expanding “free markets” no longer has anything to do with classical American capitalism. It is simply the further emancipation of the managerial elite from any obligations to the political community. Likewise, promoting democracy as an abstract, universalist principle only undermines the sovereignty of the American people by rejecting national interests as a legitimate ground of foreign policy.
Sovereignty, Burnham saw, was shifting from Parliaments to what he called “administrative bureaus,” which increasingly are the seats of real power and, as such, “proclaim the rules, make the laws, issue the decrees.” As far back as the early 1940s, Burnham could write that “ ‘Laws’ today in the United States . . . are not being made any longer by Congress, but by the nlrb, sec, icc, aaa, tva, ftc, fcc, the Office of Production Management (what a revealing title!), and the other leading ‘executive agencies.’ ” And note that Burnham wrote decades before the advent of the epa, hud, cfpb, fsoc, the Department of Education, and the rest of the administrative alphabet soup that governs us in the United States today.
Iam convinced that the issue of sovereignty, of what we might call the location of sovereignty, has played a large role in the rise of the phenomenon we describe as “populism” in the United States as well as Europe. For one thing, the question of sovereignty, of who governs, stands behind the rebellion against the political correctness and moral meddlesomeness that are such conspicuous and disfiguring features of our increasingly bureaucratic society. The smothering, Tocquevillian blanket of regulatory excess has had a wide range of practical and economic effects, stifling entrepreneurship and making any sort of productive innovation difficult.
A reassertion of independence.
But perhaps its deepest effects are spiritual or psychological. The many assaults against free speech on college campuses, the demand for “safe spaces” and “trigger warnings” against verbal or fashion-inspired “micro-aggressions” (Mexican hats, “offensive” Halloween costumes, etc.) are part of this dictatorship of political correctness. In The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek said that one of the “main points” of his argument concerned “the psychological change,” the “alteration of the character of the people,” that extensive government control brought in its wake. The alteration involves a process of softening, enervation, infantilization even: an exchange of the challenges of liberty and self-reliance—the challenges, that is to say, of adulthood—for the coddling pleasures of dependence. Max Weber spoke in this context of “Ordnungsmenschen,” men who had become increasingly dependent on an order imposed upon them from above. Breaking with that drift becomes more and more difficult the more habituated to dependence a people becomes. In this sense, what has been described as a populist upsurge against political correctness is simply a reassertion of independence, a reclamation of what turns out to be a most uncommon virtue, common sense.
The issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debate over immigration: indeed, is any issue more central to the question Who governs? than who gets to decide a nation’s borders and how a country defines its first person plural: the “We” that makes us who we are as a people?
Throughout his campaign, Donald Trump promised to enforce America’s immigration laws, to end so-called “sanctuary cities,” which advertise themselves as safe havens for illegal aliens (though of course they do not call them “illegal aliens”), and to sharpen vetting procedures for people wishing to immigrate to America from countries known as sponsors of terrorism.
The President sometimes overstated and not infrequently misstated his case. Semantic precision is not a Trumpian speciality. But political effectiveness may be. Behind the Sturm und Drang that greeted Trump’s rhetoric on immigration, we can glimpse two very different concepts of the nation state and world order. One view sees the world as a collection of independent sovereign countries that, although interacting with one another, regard the care, safety, and prosperity of their own citizens as their first obligation. This is the traditional view of the nation state. It is also Donald Trump’s view. It is what licenses his talk of putting “America First,” a concept that, pace the anti-Trump media, has nothing to do with Charles Lindbergh’s isolationist movement of the late 1930s and everything to do with fostering a healthy sense of national identity and purpose.
The alternative view regards the nation state with suspicion as an atavistic form of political and social organization. The nation state might still be a practical necessity, but, the argument goes, it is a regrettable necessity inasmuch as it retards mankind’s emancipation from the parochial bonds of place and local allegiance. Ideally, according to this view, we are citizens of the world, not particular countries, and our fundamental obligation is to all mankind.
This is the progressive view. It has many progenitors and antecedents. But none is more influential than “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” a brief essay that Immanuel Kant published in 1795 when he was seventy-one. The burden of the essay is to ask how perpetual peace might be obtained among states. The natural condition of mankind, Kant acknowledges, is war. But with the advent of “enlightened concepts of statecraft,” mankind, he suggests, may be able to transcend that unfortunate habit of making war and live in perpetual (ewigen) comity.
Kant lists various conditions for the initial establishment of peace—the eventual abolition of standing armies, for example—and a few conditions for its perpetuation: the extension of “universal hospitality” by nations was something that caught my eye. Ditto “world citizenship.” “The idea of . . . world citizenship,” he says at the end of the essay, “is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace.”
It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant makes many observations along the way that will be balm to progressive hearts. He is against “the accumulation of treasure,” for example, because wealth is “a hindrance to perpetual peace.” By the same token, he believes that forbidding the system of international credit that the British empire employed “must be a preliminary article of perpetual peace.” Credit can be deployed to increase wealth, ergo it is suspect. Kant says that all states must be “republican” in organization. By that he means not that they must be democracies but only that the executive and legislative functions of the state be distinguished. (Indeed, he says that democracy, “properly speaking,” is “necessarily a despotism” because in it the executive and legislative functions of governments are both vested in one entity, “the people.”) He looks forward to the establishment of a “league of nations” (Völkerbund), all of which would freely embrace a republican form of government.
It would be hard to overstate the influence of Kant’s essay. It stands behind such progressive exfoliations as Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” not least the final point that looked forward to the establishment of a League of Nations. You can feel its pulse beating in the singing phrases of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war. It is worth noting that among the initial fifteen signatories of that noble-sounding pact, along with the United States, France, and England, were Germany, Italy, and Japan. What does that tell us about the folly of trusting paper proclamations not backed up by the authority of physical force? It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant’s essay also directly inspired the architects of the United Nations and, in our own day, the architects of the European Union and the battalions of transnational progressives who jettison democracy for the sake of a more-or-less nebulous (but not therefore un-coercive) ideal of world citizenship.
I would not care to wager on how many of the hysterics who congregated at airports across the country to protest Donald Trump’s effort to make the citizens of this country safer were students of Kant. Doubtless very few. But all were his unwitting heirs. “Universal hospitality”: how the protestors would have liked that! (Though to be fair to Kant, he did note that such hospitality “is not the right to be a permanent visitor.”) I have no doubt that the motivation of the protestors had many sources. But to the extent that it was based on a political ideal (and not just partisan posturing or a grubby bid for notoriety and power), the spirit of Kant was hovering there in the background.
Kant was not without a sense of humor. He begins his essay by noting that he took his title from a sign outside a Dutch pub. “Pax Perpetua” read the sign, and below the lettering was the image of a graveyard. Perhaps the universal perpetuity of death is the only peace that mankind may really look forward to. Kant clearly wouldn’t agree, but it was charming of him to acknowledge that the idea of a genuine perpetual peace for mankind might be regarded by many as nothing more than a “sweet dream” of philosophers.
What has been called the populist spirit aims to rouse us from that “sweet dream”—what James Madison might have called the “theoretic” reverie of the meddling class whose designs for our salvation always seem to involve the extension of their own power and prerogative. In this sense, the issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debates over the relative advantages and moral weather of “globalism” vs. “nationalism”—a pair of terms almost as fraught as “democracy” and “populism”—as well as the correlative economic issues of underemployment and wage stagnation. “Theoretic” politicians may advocate “globalism” as a necessary condition for free trade. But the spirit of local control tempers the cosmopolitan project of a borderless world with a recognition that the nation state has been the best guarantor not only of sovereignty but also of broadly shared prosperity. What we might call the ideology of free trade—the globalist aspiration to transcend the impediments of national identity and control—is an abstraction that principally benefits its architects. As R. R. Reno, the editor of First Things, pointed out in a recent Op-Ed for The New York Times, “Globalism poses a threat to the future of democracy because it disenfranchises the vast majority and empowers a technocratic elite.”
In the end, what James Burnham described as the “managerial revolution” is part of a larger progressive project. The aim of this project is partly to emancipate mankind from such traditional sources of self-definition as national identity, religious affiliation, and specific cultural rootedness, partly to perpetuate and aggrandize the apparatus that oversees the resulting dissolution. Burnham castigates this hypertrophied form of liberalism (what we might call “illiberal liberalism”) as “an ideology of suicide” that has insinuated itself into the center of Western culture. He acknowledges that the proposition may sound hyperbolic. “Suicide,” he notes, may seem “too emotive a term, too negative and ‘bad.’ ” But it is part of the pathology that Burnham describes that such objections are “most often made most hotly by Westerners who hate their own civilization, readily excuse or even praise blows struck against it, and themselves lend a willing hand, frequently enough, to pulling it down.” The issue, Burnham saw, is that modern liberalism has equipped us with an ethic too abstract and empty to inspire real commitment. Modern liberalism, he writes,
does not offer ordinary men compelling motives for personal suffering, sacrifice, and death. There is no tragic dimension in its picture of the good life. Men become willing to endure, sacrifice, and die for God, for family, king, honor, country, from a sense of absolute duty or an exalted vision of the meaning of history. . . . And it is precisely these ideas and institutions that liberalism has criticized, attacked, and in part overthrown as superstitious, archaic, reactionary, and irrational. In their place liberalism proposes a set of pale and bloodless abstractions—pale and bloodless for the very reason that they have no roots in the past, in deep feeling and in suffering. Except for mercenaries, saints, and neurotics, no one is willing to sacrifice and die for progressive education, medicare, humanity in the abstract, the United Nations, and a ten percent rise in Social Security payments.
In his view, the primary function of liberalism was to “permit Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolution,” to view weakness, failure, even collapse not as a defeat but “as the transition to a new and higher order in which Mankind as a whole joins in a universal civilization that has risen above the parochial distinctions, divisions, and discriminations of the past.”
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against these forces of dissolution.
Around the time that Donald Trump took office, his chief strategist Steve Bannon said that his goal was to “deconstruct the administrative state.” The phrase “administrative state”—also called “the regulatory state” or “the deep state”—has lately floated into common parlance. In The Administrative Threat, the legal scholar Philip Hamburger describes it as “a state within a state,” a sort of parallel legal and political structure populated by unelected bureaucrats. This amorphous congeries of agencies and regulations has become, Hamburger argues, “the dominant reality of American governance,” intruding everywhere into economic and social life.
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against forces of dissolution.
Article I of the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, just as Article III vests all judicial authority in the Court. The administrative state is a mechanism for circumventing both. As such, Hamburger argues, the administrative state operates outside the Constitution.
When the Constitution places all legislative powers in Congress, it gives Congress not only the power to make law but also the power to unmake it. And it thereby bars the executive from suspending or dispensing with the law. When the Constitution, moreover, places the judicial power in the courts and guarantees the due process of law, it precludes the executive from telling the courts not to apply the law, and prevents the courts from abandoning their own judgment about what the law requires.
Binding citizens not through Congressionally enacted statutes but through the edicts of the managerial bureaucracy, the administrative state is “all about the evasion of governance through law, including an evasion of constitutional processes and procedural rights.” Accordingly, Hamburger concludes, the encroaching activity of the administrative state represents “the nation’s preeminent threat to civil liberties.”
Hamburger draws an analogy between the behavior of the administrative state and the behavior of such despotic monarchs as James I, Charles I, and James II. Instead of persuading Parliament to repeal or revise a statute, the British king simply evaded its force by decreeing that some or all of his subjects were not subject to its strictures. His power was absolute not merely in the sense that it was all but unlimited but also in the sense that it was independent or outside of the law. Students of Latin will recall the Ablative Absolute, a construction in which an ablative phrase is absolutum, “loosened” from or independent of the main clause of a sentence. Hamburger shows how the growth of the administrative state represents an extralegal “revival of absolute power” in this sense, one that threatens to transform Constitutional rights and guarantees into mere “options” that the government bestows or withholds at its pleasure. “The evasion,” he notes, “thereby changes the very nature of procedural rights. Such rights traditionally were assurances against the government. Now they are but one of the choices for government in its exercise of power. Though the government must respect these rights when it proceeds against Americans in court, it has the freedom to escape them by taking an administrative path.”
Just as British kings in the seventeenth century evaded Parliament through such expedients as the Star Chamber and the exercise of royal prerogatives and royal waivers—what John Adams castigated as “those badges of domination called prerogatives”—so the administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution and beyond the authority of Congress. Barack Obama decreed that certain politically unpalatable provisions of the Affordable Care Act not be enforced, and presto, they were not enforced, even though they were the law of the land. He instructed his Department of Justice to intervene to prevent Arizona and other states from enforcing certain aspects of immigration law. He even forced public institutions to accommodate self-declared “transgender” persons in the toilets of their choice; he connived with lawsuits punishing bakers and Catholic hospitals and hobby shops who chose not to join this week’s politically correct campaign for the sexually exotic. The Constitution may have vested all legislative power in Congress and entrusted all judicial power to the courts, but the administrative state sidesteps those requirements by erecting a parallel bureaucratic structure of enforcement and control.
The administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution.
“Eighteenth-century Americans,” Hamburger notes, “assumed that a rule could have the obligation of law only if it came from the constitutionally established legislature elected by the people.” Today, Americans find their lives directed by a jumble of agencies far removed from the legislature and staffed by bureaucrats who make and enforce a vast network of rules that govern nearly every aspect of our lives.
One of the most disturbing aspects of Hamburger’s analysis is the historical connection he exposes between the expansion of the franchise in the early twentieth century and the growth of administrative, that is to say, extra-legal, power. For the people in charge, equality of voting rights was one thing. They could live with that. But the tendency of newly enfranchised groups—the “bitter clingers” and “deplorables” of yore—to reject progressive initiatives was something else again. As Woodrow Wilson noted sadly, “The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.” What to do?
The solution was to shift real power out of elected bodies and into the hands of the right sort of people, enlightened people, progressive people, people, that is to say, like Woodrow Wilson. Thus Wilson welcomed the advent of administrative power as a counterweight to encroaching democratization. And thus it was, as Hamburger points out, that we have seen a transfer of legislative power to the “knowledge class,” the managerial elite that James Burnham anatomized.
A closer look at the so-called “knowledge class” shows that what it knows best is how to preserve and extend its own privileges. Its activities are swaddled in do-gooder rhetoric about serving the public, looking after “the environment,” helping the disadvantaged, etc., but what they chiefly excel at is consolidating their own power.
In Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Edmund Burke criticized the Court of George III for circumventing Parliament and establishing by stealth what amounted to a new regime of royal prerogative and influence-peddling. It was not as patent as the swaggering courts of James I or Charles I. George and his courtiers maintained the appearance of parliamentary supremacy. But a closer look showed that the system was corrupt. “It was soon discovered,” Burke wrote with sly understatement, “that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible.” That discovery stands behind the growth of the administrative state. Under the cloak of democratic institutions, its essentially undemocratic activities pursue an expansionist agenda that threatens liberty in the most comprehensive way, by circumventing the law.
At the same time, however, a growing recognition of the totalitarian goals of the administrative state has fed what many have called a populist uprising here and in Europe. “Populist” is one word for the phenomenon. An affirmation of sovereignty, underwritten by a passion for freedom, is another, possibly more accurate, phrase.
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Russiagate Was Worse than We Thought

The question is, are there mechanisms in place to remedy these egregious violations of the spirit of the law?
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Saintly Succor

Since you’ll likely be reading this with what Wallace Stevens called “a mind of winter” (needful “to regard the frost and the boughs of the pine trees crusted with snow;… to behold the junipers shagged with ice, the spruces rough in the distant glitter of the January sun”), I thought I would provide something warming to conjure with.
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SCOTUS Wakes Up

The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) hasn’t given conservatives a straight flush.
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh broke ranks with their conservative confrères in the so-called voter rights case in Alabama.
I say “so-called voter rights case” because, in fact, it had nothing to do with the law, which stipulates that everyone, black or white, be granted free access to the ballot.
No, that was a mere cover for the real purpose of the case, which was to find a way to create more Democratic districts.
The court stated that there had to be more black districts constructed.
But a black district is, as a matter of fact, a Democratic one. QED.
Let’s draw a veil over that unfortunate decision and celebrate two more recent ones: the (pardon) “so-called” affirmative action case and the student loan case.
Let’s take the second one first.
The easiest way to understand what just happened is to begin by understanding what the word “loan” means.
To do that, you also have to understand what the word “debt” means.
This is a harder one for Americans because it has been some years since they have had to come face to face with a real, live debt.
What I mean is this: In the real world, when someone lends you money, you incur a debt.
The cheerful, pink-unicorn aspect of that event comes at the beginning.
The money you snag looks exactly like unencumbered cash.
You can do whatever you like with it: buy a car, take a trip, go to college.
There’s one important difference between debt and cash, however.
If you happen to have a sock full of cash, you can spend it however you like and that’s the end of the story.
Loans come with a concluding chapter, which is often more melancholy than the opening chapters.
Because with a loan, in the end, you have to pay it back.
This used to be widely understood.
At some point along the way to utopia, general appreciation of this unpleasant fact failed.
There are doubtless deep cultural reasons for this failure, but in the present context, the relevant issue is that thousands upon thousands of young people incurred debts that they didn’t want to pay.
They wanted you, the taxpayer, to pay instead.
President Joe Biden thought this was a good idea.
Free money is always a vote-getter, even if it unfairly penalizes taxpayers.
But SCOTUS didn’t think that the president had the authority to shift the burden of $1 trillion in indebtedness from one part of the population to another.
(You keep hearing about debt “cancellation” and “student loan forgiveness,” but the burden of debt isn’t canceled, it’s merely shifted.)
This decision is good in about 57 different ways.
It’s fair to all those who took out student loans and acted like responsible adults by paying them back.
More generally, it’s a small nudge in the direction of fiscal responsibility.
Perhaps it’ll even prompt more people to ask why the federal government should be in the business of providing or subsidizing student loans at all.
That last thought is a big one that we can leave for another day.
For now, let’s return to my second “so-called,” “so-called affirmative action.”
What it really is, as any honest observer will admit, is racial and sexual discrimination proceeding under the cover of a merely rhetorical anti-discrimination.
Indeed, the history of affirmative action is a history of great ingenuity expended to evade the announced purpose of the practice: fostering equality.
Time and again, the rhetoric of equality is deployed as a smokescreen to pursue ends that are patently inequitable.
In the beginning, affirmative action was undertaken in the name of equality.
But, as always seems to happen, it soon fell prey to the Orwellian logic by which the principle that “all animals are equal” gives birth to the transformative if contradictory codicil: “but some animals are more equal than others.”
Affirmative action is Orwellian in a linguistic sense, too, since what announces itself as an initiative to promote equality winds up enforcing discrimination precisely on the grounds that it was meant to overcome.
Thus, we’re treated to the delicious, although alarming, contradiction of college applications that declare their commitment to evaluate candidates “without regard to race, gender, religion, ethnicity, or national origin” on page one and then helpfully inform you on page two that it’s to your advantage to mention if you belong to any of the following designated victim groups.
The whole history of affirmative action is instinct with that irony.
The original effort to redress legitimate grievances—grievances embodied, for instance, in the discriminatory practices of Jim Crow—has mutated into new forms of discrimination.
In 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt established the Fair Employment Practice Committee because blacks were openly barred from wartime factory jobs.
But what began as President John F. Kennedy’s executive order in 1961 directing government contractors to take “affirmative action” to assure that people be hired “without regard” for sex, race, creed, color, and so forth has resulted in the creation of vast bureaucracies dedicated to discovering, hiring, and advancing people chiefly on the basis of those qualities.
White is black, freedom is slavery, “without regard” comes to mean “with regard for little else.”
Moreover, it’s worth stressing, the inequities are double-sided.
Not only are blacks and Hispanics given preferential treatment, but also whites and (especially) Americans of Asian descent are actively discriminated against.
At Harvard, as John Yoo and Wen Fa showed in a recent essay, “Asian American applicants have lower acceptance rates than white students at nearly every academic decile.”
Think about this: “An Asian American applicant in the fourth-lowest decile has less than a 1 percent chance of being admitted. But an African American applicant in the fourth-lowest decile has a 12.8 percent chance of being admitted.”
Why? Because they’re Asian American. There’s no other reason.
In this respect, Asians are the new Jews, excluded on account of their ethnicity and subject to unofficial quotas wherever official quotas are banned.
In some ways, our situation is a cautionary tale about the dangers of ingenious legal hermeneutics fueled by progressive sentimentality and expansionist government bureaucracy (is there any other kind?).
After all, the Leviathan of affirmative action and what has been aptly called the “racial spoils system” and the diversity conglomerate it supports have emerged from a small cluster of legal imperatives.
The 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution provide for “due process” and “equal protection” and stipulate that one is equal under the law and entitled to vote regardless of one’s skin color.
The Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts from the 1960s are essentially glosses or restatements or extensions of those amendments.
The road from those noble and straightforward desiderata—don’t discriminate against people because of their race or national origin—to such monstrosities as the smorgasbord of “Minority-Serving Institutions” programs is clear and direct.
The covert, or semi-covert, political agenda is only too obvious.
Blacks vote overwhelmingly—more than 90 percent—for Democrats.
Hence, as I mentioned above, the effort to gerrymander on the basis of race is simply to use the imperatives of the Voting Rights Act as a cover for creating Democrat-controlled fiefdoms.
The Supreme Court just knocked a hole in this.
Naturally, the left is screaming, vowing that it’ll find ways around the law.
I have no doubt that they’ll be at least partly successful.
But people keep telling me that the pendulum of racial grievance-mongering must eventually start to swing back toward normality. The Court has just given it a big push in that direction.
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Shots fired at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner

Donald and Melania Trump entered the hall at 8:16 to cheers and applause. “Hail to the Chief” was followed by presentation of the colors and the National Anthem. We had a brief introduction from Weijia Jiang, this year’s president of the White House Correspondents Association, followed by dinner.
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Should Conservatives Be Cheerful?

Some time ago, I began keeping a file marked “Conservative Gloominess.”
It’s full of articles and animadversions by various hands: dire prognostications about who the next occupant of the White House will be, harrowing descriptions of disarray among conservatives, and despairing portraits of U.S. or European society.
What’s odd, or at least uncharacteristic, about these bulletins from the abyss isn’t their substance—to be candid, I’ve written plenty of items that could justly be filed there—but their tone and what we might call their existential orientation.
From time immemorial, conservatives have delighted in writing works with titles such as “Leviathan,” “The Decline of the West,” and “The Waste Land.”
There’s a reason that Jeremiah is a founding member of Conservatives Anonymous.
Nevertheless, by habit and disposition, conservatives tend, as a species, to be less gloomy than—than what?
What shall we call those who occupy a position opposite that of conservatives?
Not liberals, surely, since they’re so often conspicuously illiberal, i.e., opposed to freedom and all its works.
The outcry by the left over Elon Musk’s efforts to restore the spirit of liberalism and its indispensable handmaiden, free speech, is a case in point.
Indeed, when it comes to the word “liberal,” Russell Kirk came close to the truth when he observed that he was conservative because he was a liberal.
In any event, whatever the opposite of conservatives should be called—perhaps John Fonte’s marvelous coinage “transnational progressives” is best—they tend to be gloomy, partly, I suspect, because of disappointed utopian ambitions.
Conservatives also tend to enjoy a more active and enabling sense of humor than their counterparts.
The 19th-century English essayist Walter Bagehot once observed that “the essence of Toryism is enjoyment.”
What he meant, I think, was summed up by the author of Genesis, when that sage observed that “God made the world and saw that it was good.”
Conservatives differ from progressives in many ways, but one important way is in the quota of cheerfulness and humor they deploy.
Not that their assessment of their fellows is more sanguine.
On the contrary, conservatives tend to be cheerful because they don’t regard imperfection as a personal moral affront.
Being realistic about mankind’s susceptibility to improvement (between us, it’s tentative and notoriously spotty), they’re as suspicious of utopian schemes as they are appreciative of present blessings.
This is why the miasmic gloominess emanating from many conservative circles today is so dispiriting.
It goes against the grain of what it means to be conservative.
It’s dampening, and I for one hope it will prove to be a quickly passing phenomenon.
Among other things, this recent access of personal gloominess makes the practice of professional gloominess—the robust deployment of satire, ridicule, and so on—much more difficult and less satisfying.
This brings me to the issue of truth.
Conservatives are realists.
They like to call things by their proper names.
Like Oscar Wilde’s Cecily Cardew, when they see a spade, they call it a spade, unless doing so is explicitly outlawed, just as they prefer to call “affirmative action” “discrimination according to race or sex,” taxation “government-mandated income redistribution,” and “Islamophobia” a piece of Orwellian Newspeak foisted upon an unsuspecting public by irresponsible “multiculturalists” colluding more or less openly with Islamofascists.
Some years ago, I was taken aback when a supposedly conservative pundit advised the world that “the fact of change is the great fact of human life.”
Accordingly, he wrote, conservatives ought to “adapt” to change and retake the intellectual and political initiative.
Some such rhetoric might be required on the hustings.
But I confess to having mixed feelings about that exhortation, if for no other reason than that I believe change to be not the but a great fact of human life.
An equally great fact is continuity, and it may well be that one “adapts” more successfully to certain realities by resisting them than by capitulating to them.
“When it is not necessary to change,” Lord Falkland said some centuries ago, “it is necessary not to change.”
I recognize that “change,” like its conceptual cousin “innovation,” is one of the great watchwords of the modern age.
But William F. Buckley Jr. was on to something important when he wrote, in the inaugural issue of National Reviewin November 1955, that a large part of the magazine’s mission was to “stand athwart history, yelling, ‘Stop.’”
It’s rare that you hear someone quote that famous line without a smile, the smile meaning “he wasn’t against change, innovation, etc., etc.”
But I believe that Buckley was in earnest.
It was one of the things that made the early National Review “unzeitgemasse,” “untimely” in the highest, Nietzschean sense of the word.
National Review, Buckley wrote, “is out of place, in the sense that the United Nations and the League of Women Voters and The New York Times and Henry Steele Commager are in place.”
Australian philosopher David Stove saw deeply into this aspect of the metabolism of conservatism.
In “Why You Should Be a Conservative,” which deserves to be better known than it is, he rehearses the familiar scenario.
“A primitive society is being devastated by a disease, so you bring modern medicine to bear, and wipe out the disease, only to find that by doing so you have brought on a population explosion,” Stove wrote.
“You introduce contraception to control population, and find that you have dismantled a whole culture.
“At home you legislate to relieve the distress of unmarried mothers, and find you have given a cash incentive to the production of illegitimate children.
“You guarantee a minimum wage, and find that you have extinguished, not only specific industries, but industry itself as a personal trait.”
This, he wrote, “is the oldest and the best argument for conservatism: the argument from the fact that our actions almost always have unforeseen and unwelcome consequences.”
Progressives can’t wrap their minds (or, more to the point, their hearts) around this irony: that “reform” so regularly exacerbates either the evil it was meant to cure or another evil it had hardly glimpsed.
The great Victorian Matthew Arnold was no enemy of reform.
But he understood that “the melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” of faith had left culture dangerously exposed and unprotected.
In cultures of the past, Arnold thought, the invigorating “saving remnant” of those willing and able to energize culture was often too small to succeed.
As societies grew, so did the forces of anarchy that threatened them—but so also did that enabling remnant. Arnold believed that modern societies possessed within themselves a “saving remnant” large and vital enough to become “an actual” power that could stem the tide of anarchy. I hope that he was right.
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Snapshots from the Counterrevolution

On Trump’s first months in office.
Is April, as T. S. Eliot said in The Waste Land, the “cruellest month”? For most people, we suspect, the jury is still out on that question. For many academic bureaucrats and other recipients of government largesse, however, April is shaping up to be pretty rocky. Dr. Johnson famously noted that “when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” The prospect of a personal encounter with the gallows in the near future is not the only goad to mental distillation. Impending bankruptcy is also an effective expedient.
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Socialism, Dead or Alive?

Who says there isn’t life after death?
The death of socialism in the United States (except on college campuses) had been solemnly pronounced many times during the 1980s and 1990s.
But for the past several years, we have seen multiple sightings of the beast.
Back in 2018, for example, the actor Jim Carrey told Bill Maher: “We have to say yes to socialism—to the word and everything. We have to stop apologizing.”
I’m pretty sure that no one told this poor fellow that, were socialism to be instituted in the United States, one of the first things that would happen is that people like Mr. Carrey would be instantly pauperized.
Did I say “poor” fellow?
As of 2023, Mr. Carrey had an estimated net worth of $180 million.
But what are the two fundamental pillars of socialism?
One: The abolition of private property.
Two: The equalization of wealth.
I can’t forbear to point out that Mr. Carrey actually starred in a movie called “Dumb and Dumber,” which is about “two unintelligent but well-meaning friends from Providence, Rhode Island.”
Talk about art imitating life.
Mr. Carrey’s self-congratulatory naïveté is repeated everywhere these days.
It’s an attitude that’s especially prevalent among historically innocent beneficiaries of the free market whose lives have been blissfully untouched by the blunt and unforgiving imperatives of socialist domination.
Given the prevalence among the tender-hearted of socialist fantasy, on the one hand, and animus toward the free market, on the other, I thought it might be useful to say a few words in defense of the latter.
In “The Wealth of Nations,” Adam Smith noted the paradox, or seeming paradox, of capitalism: that the more individuals were left free to follow their own ends, the more their activities were “led by an invisible hand to promote” ends that aided the common good.
Private pursuits conduced to public goods—that is the beneficent alchemy of capitalism.
In “The Road to Serfdom” and other works, Friedrich Hayek expanded on Smith’s fundamental insight, pointing out that the spontaneous order created and maintained by competitive market forces leads to greater prosperity than a planned economy.
The sentimentalist can’t wrap his mind, or his heart, around that datum.
He (or she) can’t understand why “society” shouldn’t favor “cooperation” (a pleasing-sounding arrangement) over “competition” (much harsher), since in any competition there are losers, which is bad, and winners, which may be even worse.
Socialism is a version of sentimentality.
Even so hard-headed an observer as George Orwell was susceptible.
In “The Road to Wigan Pier,” Orwell argued that since the world “potentially at least, is immensely rich,” if we developed it “as it might be developed … we could all live like princes, supposing that we wanted to.”
Never mind that part of what it means to be a prince is that others, most others, aren’t royalty. (Or, as that admirable logician W. S. Gilbert put it: “When everyone is somebody, then no one’s anybody!”)
As Hayek observed, the socialist, the sentimentalist, can’t understand why, if people have been able to “generate some system of rules coordinating their efforts,” they can’t also consciously “design an even better and more gratifying system.”
Central to Hayek’s teaching is the unyielding fact that human ingenuity is limited, that the elasticity of freedom requires the agency of forces beyond our supervision, and that, finally, the ambitions of socialism are an expression of rationalistic hubris.
A spontaneous order generated by market forces may be as beneficial to humanity as you like; it may have greatly extended life and produced wealth so staggering that, only a few generations ago, it was unimaginable.
Still, it isn’t perfect.
The poor are still with us.
Not every social problem has been solved.
In the end, though, the really galling thing about the spontaneous order that free markets produce isn’t its imperfection but its spontaneity: the fact that it’s a creation not our own.
It transcends the conscious direction of human will and is therefore an affront to human pride.
The urgency with which Hayek condemns socialism is a function of the importance of the stakes involved.
As he put it in his last book, “The Fatal Conceit,” the “dispute between the market order and socialism is no less than a matter of survival” because “to follow socialist morality would destroy much of present humankind and impoverish much of the rest.”
We get a foretaste of what Hayek meant whenever the forces of socialism triumph.
There follows, as the night the day, an increase in poverty and a diminution of individual freedom.
The curious thing is that this fact has had so little effect on the attitudes of intellectuals and the politicians who appeal to them.
No merely empirical development, it seems—let it be repeated innumerable times—can spoil the pleasures of socialist sentimentality.
This unworldliness is tied to another common trait of intellectuals: their contempt for money and the world of commerce.
The socialist intellectual, especially the well-heeled one, eschews the “profit motive” and recommends increased government control of the economy.
He feels, Hayek notes, that “to employ a hundred people is … exploitation but to command the same number [is] honorable.”
Not that intellectuals, as a class, don’t like possessing money as much as the rest of us.
But they look upon the whole machinery of commerce as something separate from, something indescribably less worthy than, their innermost hearts’ desires.
Of course, there’s a sense in which this is true.
However, many intellectuals fail to appreciate two things.
First, the extent to which money, as Hayek put it, is “one of the greatest instruments of freedom ever invented,” opening “an astounding range of choice to the poor man—a range greater than that which not many generations ago was open to the wealthy.”
Second, intellectuals tend to ignore the extent to which the organization of commerce affects the organization of our aspirations.
As Hilaire Belloc put it in “The Servile State,” “The control of the production of wealth is the control of human life itself.”
The really frightening question wholesale economic planning raises isn’t whether we’re free to pursue our most important ends but who determines what those “most important ends” are to be.
“Whoever,” Hayek notes, “has sole control of the means must also determine which ends are to be served, which values are to be rated higher and which lower—in short, what men should believe and strive for.”
There has been a great deal of agitation over inflation, rising interest rates, and troubling news from the banking industry lately.
Probably, there’s more agitation to follow.
We’ve been there, done that.
Do we have to go through it again?
There’s some irony in the fact that Hayek’s great opponent, John Maynard Keynes, provided a most penetrating criticism of the top-down rationalism that he himself propounded in economic matters.
Writing about Bertrand Russell and his Bloomsbury friends, Keynes tartly observed: “Bertie in particular sustained simultaneously a pair of opinions ludicrously incompatible. He held that in fact human affairs were carried on after a most irrational fashion, but that the remedy was quite simple and easy, since all we had to do was to carry them on rationally.”
What prodigies of existential legerdemain lay compacted in that phrase “all we had to do”!
To my ears, anyway, it’s redolent of one of the most nauseating epithets in recent memory: “It takes a village.”
We all know that more government intervention and control means high taxes, greater inefficiency, and economic stagnation.
We’ve seen it happen dozens of times. We remember the past. Are we still condemned to repeat it?
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Some Modest Proposals for President Trump

President-elect Trump hit the ground running following his election a month ago. He has already nominated his cabinet and several ambassadors, selected members of his White House staff, and heads of various agencies well in advance of Inauguration Day. In addition, he has fired off warnings to Canada and Mexico and to terrorists in the Middle East. He has appointed Vivek Ramaswamy and Elon Musk to ferret out waste and abuse in the federal budget. He has a list of executive orders he will issue directly after taking office on January 20. He has ambitious plans. He also has inherited a mess to clean up.
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Sorry, but America still holds all the cards

“Negotiations.” Are you heartened or dismayed by that word? Those who remember or who have read up on the seemingly interminable Paris Peace Talks designed to bring an end to the Vietnam War have reason to be dubious. A negotiation, if it is to be successful, requires that both sides be candid and in earnest. The Vietnamese were not candid participants. They stalled. They prevaricated. They acted out.











