Today On The Eric Metaxas Show, Eric talks with Roger Kimball about New York City, Islam, and why they argue the West is losing civilizational confidence. They discuss whether the Islam vs Islamism distinction holds up, why assimilation and shared values matter for a free society, and what is happening in Europe and England right now. Then they pivot to Iran, regime change predictions, and why they believe Trump is reshaping the global order from the border to energy to foreign policy.
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How Political Correctness Hijacked the Arts | Roger Kimball and Heather MacDonald


What gets to be called art — and who decides? In this wide-ranging Socrates Dialogues conversation, New York–based thinkers, writers, and art admirers Heather Mac Donald and Roger Kimball explore the definition of art and the history of the unmaking of beauty in modern contemporary art. Drawing on examples from Duchamp, Warhol, Serrano, Hirst, and others, the two discuss how the banal, the transgressive, and the political have reshaped the aesthetic experience of art, often robbing it of spiritual resonance.
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Populism, X: The Imperative of Freedom

It is curious how certain words accumulate a nimbus of positive associations while others, semantically just as innocuous, wind up shouldering a portfolio of bad feelings.
Consider the different careers of the terms “democracy” and “populism.”
Do you know any responsible person who would admit to being opposed to democracy? No one who does not enjoy a large private income would risk it. But lots of people are willing to declare themselves anti-populist. The discrepancy is curious for several reasons.
It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
For one thing, it is a testament to the almost Darwinian hardiness of the word “democracy.” In the fierce struggle among ideas for survival, “democracy” has not only survived but thrived. This is despite the fact that political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle through Cicero and down to modern times have been deeply suspicious of democracy. Aristotle thought democracy the worst form of government, all but inevitably leading to ochlocracy or mob rule, which is no rule.
In Federalist 10, James Madison famously warned that history had shown that democratic regimes have “in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” “Theoretic politicians,” he wrote—and it would be hard to find a more contemptuous deployment of the word “theoretic”—such politicians may have advocated democracy, but that is only because of their dangerous and utopian ignorance of human nature. It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
Nevertheless, nearly everyone wants to associate himself with the word “democracy.” Totalitarian regimes like to describe themselves as the “Democratic Republic” of wherever. Conservatives champion the advantages of “democratic capitalism.” Central planners of all stripes eagerly deploy programs advertised as enhancing or extending “democracy.” Even James Madison came down on the side of a subspecies of democracy, one filtered through the modulating influence of a large, diverse population and an elaborate scheme of representation that softened (Madison said “excluded”) the influence of “the people in their collective capacity.”
“Democracy,” in short, is a eulogistic word, what the practical philosopher Stephen Potter in another context apostrophized as an “OK word.” And it is worth noting, as Potter would have been quick to remind us, that the people pronouncing those eulogies delight in advertising themselves as, and are generally accepted as, “OK people.” Indeed, the class element and the element of moral approbation—of what some genius has summarized as “virtue signaling”—are key.
It is quite otherwise with “populism.” At first blush, this seems odd because the word “populism” occupies a semantic space closely adjacent to “democracy.” “Democracy” means “rule by the demos,” the people. “Populism,” according to The American Heritage Dictionary, describes “A political philosophy directed to the needs of the common people and advancing a more equitable distribution of wealth and power”— that is, just the sorts of things that the people, were they to rule, would seek.
But the fact is that “populism” is ambivalent at best. Sometimes, it is true, a charismatic figure can survive and even illuminate the label “populist” like a personal halo. Bernie Sanders managed this trick among the eco-conscious, racially omnivorous, non-gender-stereotyping, anti-capitalist beneficiaries of capitalism who made up his core constituency.
But it was always my impression that in this case the term “populist” was fielded less by Sanders or his followers than by his rivals and the media in an effort to fix him in the public’s mind as one of the many lamentable examples of not-Hillary, who herself was presumed to be popular though not populist.
There are at least two sides to the negative association under which the term “populist” struggles. On the one hand, there is the issue of demagoguery. Some commentators tell us that “populist” and “demagogue” are essentially synonyms (though they rarely point out that demagogos simply meant “a popular leader,” e.g., Pericles). The association of demagoguery and populism describes what we might call the command-and-control aspect of populism. The populist leader is said to forsake reason and moderation in order to stir the dark, chthonic passions of a semi-literate and spiritually unelevated populace.
On the other hand, there is the issue of the fertile but unedifying soil of that populace upon which the demagogic leader works. Anyone who has looked at the commentary on Brexit, the campaign and early months of the Trump administration, or the recent French election will have noted this.
Consider, to take but one example, how often the word “anger” and its cognates are deployed to evoke the psychological and moral failings of both the populist multitude and its putative leaders. In a remarkable, apocalyptic effusion published in the early hours of November 9, 2016, David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, warned that the Trump presidency represented “a rebellion against liberalism itself,” an “angry assault” on the civil rights of women, blacks, immigrants, homosexuals, and countless others. Later commentators warned about our “angry, cynical times,” the “raw, angry and aggrieved” tone of Trump’s rhetoric, the unchaperoned “anger” of Americans who felt they “had been left behind.” “Trump’s Anger Could Lead Down a Dangerous Road,” quoth cnn. “Inside Trump’s Anger and Impatience—and His Sudden Decision to Fire Comey,” The Washington Post. “How Festering Anger at Comey Ended in His Firing,” The New York Times.
There are occasional acknowledgments that the diagnosed “anger” may be understandable, even justified. But we are left with the unmistakeable impression that the phenomenon as a whole is something vicious and irrational. Anger “festers.” It leads to “sudden,” i.e., impulsive decisions. The road it steers us toward could be “dangerous.” (Ah, how cheap is possibility: when we read that “could be” dangerous, do we also think, as we should, that it might just as well not be?)
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness. Like the foul-smelling wounds of Philoctetes, the stench is apparently incurable. Granted, there are plenty of historical reasons for the association between demagoguery and populism, as such names as the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Father Coughlin, and Huey Long remind us.
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness.
Still, I suspect that in the present context the apparently unbreakable association between populism and demagoguery has less to do with any natural affinity than with cunning rhetorical weaponization. “Populism,” that is to say, is wielded less as a descriptive than as a delegitimizing term. Successfully charge someone with populist sympathies and you get, free and for nothing, both the imputation of demagoguery and what was famously derided as a “deplorable” and “irredeemable” cohort. The element of existential depreciation is almost palpable.
So is the element of condescension. Inseparable from the diagnosis of populism is the implication not just of incompetence but also of a crudity that is part aesthetic and part moral. Hence the curiously visceral distaste expressed by elite opinion for signs of populist sympathy. When Hillary Clinton charged that half of Donald Trump’s supporters were an “irredeemable” “basket of deplorables,” when Barack Obama castigated small-town Republican voters as “bitter” folk who “cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment,” what they expressed was not disagreement but condescending revulsion.
Ithink I first became aware that the charge of populist sympathies could have a powerful political, moral, and class delegitimizing effect when I was in London last June to cover the Brexit vote. Nearly everyone I met, from Tory ministers to taxi drivers, from tourists to tradesmen, was a Remainer. The higher up the income and class scale you went, the more likely it was that your interlocutor would be in favor of Britain’s remaining in the European Union. And the more pointed would be his disparagement of those arguing in favor of Brexit. The Brexiteers were said to be “angry,” yes, but also ignorant, fearful, xenophobic, and racist.
Except that they weren’t, not the ones I met, anyway. For them, Brexit turned on a simple question: “Who rules?” Is the ultimate source of British sovereignty Parliament, as had been the case for centuries? Or is it Brussels, seat of the European Union?
The question of sovereignty, I believe, takes us to the heart of what in recent years has been touted and tarred as the populist project.
Consider Britain. Parliament answers to the British voters. The European Union answers to—well, to itself. Indeed, it is worth pausing to remind ourselves how profoundly undemocratic is the European Union. Its commissioners are appointed, not elected. They cannot be turned out of office by voters. If the public votes contrary to the wishes of the E.U.’s commissars in a referendum, they are simply presented with another referendum until they vote the “right” way. The E.U.’s financial books have never been subject to a public audit. The corruption is just too widespread. Yet the E.U.’s agents wield extraordinary power over the everyday lives of their charges. A commissioner in Brussels can tell a property owner in Wales what sort of potatoes he may plant on his farm, how he must calculate the weight of the products he sells, and whom he must allow into his country. He can outlaw “racism” and “xenophobia”—defined as harboring “an aversion” to people based on “race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin” and specify a penalty of “at least” two years’ imprisonment for infractions. He can “lawfully suppress,” as the London Telegraph reported, “political criticism of its institutions and of leading figures,” thus rendering the commissars of the E.U. not only beyond the vote but also beyond criticism.
It’s a little different in the United States. I’ll come to that below. At the moment, it is worth noting to what extent the metabolism of this political dispensation was anticipated by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous passages about “democratic despotism” in Democracy in America. Unlike despotism of yore, Tocqueville noted, this modern allotrope does not tyrannize over man—it infantilizes him. And it does this by promulgating ever more cumbersome rules and regulations that reach into the interstices of everyday life to hamper initiative, stymie independence, stifle originality, homogenize individuality. This power, said Tocqueville, “extends its arms over society as a whole.”
It does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one’s acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.
Tocqueville’s analysis has led many observers to conclude that the villain in this drama is the state. But the political philosopher James Burnham, writing in the early 1940s in The Managerial Revolution, saw that the real villain was not the state as such but the bureaucracy that maintained and managed it. It is easy to mock the apparatchiks who populate the machinery of government. Thus James H. Boren writes wickedly that “the noblest of all of man’s struggles are those in which dedicated bureaucrats, armed with the spirit of dynamic inaction, have fought to protect the ramparts of creative nonresponsiveness from the onslaughts of mere citizens who have demanded action in their behalf.” But the comic potential of the morass should not blind us to the minatory nature of the phenomenon. Indeed, it presents a specimen case of the general truth that the preposterous and the malevolent often co-mingle. The shepherd of which Tocqueville wrote was really a flock of shepherds, a coterie of managers who, in the guise of doing the state’s business, prosecuted their own advantage and gradually became a self-perpetuating elite that arrogated to itself power over the levers of society.
Anatomizing this sleight-of-hand is at the center of “James Burnham’s Managerial Elite,” Julius Krein’s essay in the inaugural issue of American Affairs. “Although the managerial elite uses the state as an instrument to acquire power,” Krein notes, “the real enemy is not the state but rather the managerial separation of political and economic power from the liberal social contract.”
This separation of the real power of society from the economy and political life renders the managerial elite all but untouchable. And this, as Burnham saw, was the property neither of liberalism nor of conservatism but rather of anterior forces that engulfed both. “The contradiction of contemporary conservatism,” Krein writes,
is that it is an attempt to restore the culture and politics of bourgeois capitalism while accelerating the economy of managerialism. Because of its failure to recognize this contradiction, “much of conservative doctrine is, if not quite bankrupt, more and more obviously obsolescent,” as Burnham wrote in 1972. Since then it has only evolved from obsolescent to counterproductive. At this point, expanding “free markets” no longer has anything to do with classical American capitalism. It is simply the further emancipation of the managerial elite from any obligations to the political community. Likewise, promoting democracy as an abstract, universalist principle only undermines the sovereignty of the American people by rejecting national interests as a legitimate ground of foreign policy.
Sovereignty, Burnham saw, was shifting from Parliaments to what he called “administrative bureaus,” which increasingly are the seats of real power and, as such, “proclaim the rules, make the laws, issue the decrees.” As far back as the early 1940s, Burnham could write that “ ‘Laws’ today in the United States . . . are not being made any longer by Congress, but by the nlrb, sec, icc, aaa, tva, ftc, fcc, the Office of Production Management (what a revealing title!), and the other leading ‘executive agencies.’ ” And note that Burnham wrote decades before the advent of the epa, hud, cfpb, fsoc, the Department of Education, and the rest of the administrative alphabet soup that governs us in the United States today.
Iam convinced that the issue of sovereignty, of what we might call the location of sovereignty, has played a large role in the rise of the phenomenon we describe as “populism” in the United States as well as Europe. For one thing, the question of sovereignty, of who governs, stands behind the rebellion against the political correctness and moral meddlesomeness that are such conspicuous and disfiguring features of our increasingly bureaucratic society. The smothering, Tocquevillian blanket of regulatory excess has had a wide range of practical and economic effects, stifling entrepreneurship and making any sort of productive innovation difficult.
A reassertion of independence.
But perhaps its deepest effects are spiritual or psychological. The many assaults against free speech on college campuses, the demand for “safe spaces” and “trigger warnings” against verbal or fashion-inspired “micro-aggressions” (Mexican hats, “offensive” Halloween costumes, etc.) are part of this dictatorship of political correctness. In The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek said that one of the “main points” of his argument concerned “the psychological change,” the “alteration of the character of the people,” that extensive government control brought in its wake. The alteration involves a process of softening, enervation, infantilization even: an exchange of the challenges of liberty and self-reliance—the challenges, that is to say, of adulthood—for the coddling pleasures of dependence. Max Weber spoke in this context of “Ordnungsmenschen,” men who had become increasingly dependent on an order imposed upon them from above. Breaking with that drift becomes more and more difficult the more habituated to dependence a people becomes. In this sense, what has been described as a populist upsurge against political correctness is simply a reassertion of independence, a reclamation of what turns out to be a most uncommon virtue, common sense.
The issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debate over immigration: indeed, is any issue more central to the question Who governs? than who gets to decide a nation’s borders and how a country defines its first person plural: the “We” that makes us who we are as a people?
Throughout his campaign, Donald Trump promised to enforce America’s immigration laws, to end so-called “sanctuary cities,” which advertise themselves as safe havens for illegal aliens (though of course they do not call them “illegal aliens”), and to sharpen vetting procedures for people wishing to immigrate to America from countries known as sponsors of terrorism.
The President sometimes overstated and not infrequently misstated his case. Semantic precision is not a Trumpian speciality. But political effectiveness may be. Behind the Sturm und Drang that greeted Trump’s rhetoric on immigration, we can glimpse two very different concepts of the nation state and world order. One view sees the world as a collection of independent sovereign countries that, although interacting with one another, regard the care, safety, and prosperity of their own citizens as their first obligation. This is the traditional view of the nation state. It is also Donald Trump’s view. It is what licenses his talk of putting “America First,” a concept that, pace the anti-Trump media, has nothing to do with Charles Lindbergh’s isolationist movement of the late 1930s and everything to do with fostering a healthy sense of national identity and purpose.
The alternative view regards the nation state with suspicion as an atavistic form of political and social organization. The nation state might still be a practical necessity, but, the argument goes, it is a regrettable necessity inasmuch as it retards mankind’s emancipation from the parochial bonds of place and local allegiance. Ideally, according to this view, we are citizens of the world, not particular countries, and our fundamental obligation is to all mankind.
This is the progressive view. It has many progenitors and antecedents. But none is more influential than “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” a brief essay that Immanuel Kant published in 1795 when he was seventy-one. The burden of the essay is to ask how perpetual peace might be obtained among states. The natural condition of mankind, Kant acknowledges, is war. But with the advent of “enlightened concepts of statecraft,” mankind, he suggests, may be able to transcend that unfortunate habit of making war and live in perpetual (ewigen) comity.
Kant lists various conditions for the initial establishment of peace—the eventual abolition of standing armies, for example—and a few conditions for its perpetuation: the extension of “universal hospitality” by nations was something that caught my eye. Ditto “world citizenship.” “The idea of . . . world citizenship,” he says at the end of the essay, “is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace.”
It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant makes many observations along the way that will be balm to progressive hearts. He is against “the accumulation of treasure,” for example, because wealth is “a hindrance to perpetual peace.” By the same token, he believes that forbidding the system of international credit that the British empire employed “must be a preliminary article of perpetual peace.” Credit can be deployed to increase wealth, ergo it is suspect. Kant says that all states must be “republican” in organization. By that he means not that they must be democracies but only that the executive and legislative functions of the state be distinguished. (Indeed, he says that democracy, “properly speaking,” is “necessarily a despotism” because in it the executive and legislative functions of governments are both vested in one entity, “the people.”) He looks forward to the establishment of a “league of nations” (Völkerbund), all of which would freely embrace a republican form of government.
It would be hard to overstate the influence of Kant’s essay. It stands behind such progressive exfoliations as Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” not least the final point that looked forward to the establishment of a League of Nations. You can feel its pulse beating in the singing phrases of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war. It is worth noting that among the initial fifteen signatories of that noble-sounding pact, along with the United States, France, and England, were Germany, Italy, and Japan. What does that tell us about the folly of trusting paper proclamations not backed up by the authority of physical force? It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant’s essay also directly inspired the architects of the United Nations and, in our own day, the architects of the European Union and the battalions of transnational progressives who jettison democracy for the sake of a more-or-less nebulous (but not therefore un-coercive) ideal of world citizenship.
I would not care to wager on how many of the hysterics who congregated at airports across the country to protest Donald Trump’s effort to make the citizens of this country safer were students of Kant. Doubtless very few. But all were his unwitting heirs. “Universal hospitality”: how the protestors would have liked that! (Though to be fair to Kant, he did note that such hospitality “is not the right to be a permanent visitor.”) I have no doubt that the motivation of the protestors had many sources. But to the extent that it was based on a political ideal (and not just partisan posturing or a grubby bid for notoriety and power), the spirit of Kant was hovering there in the background.
Kant was not without a sense of humor. He begins his essay by noting that he took his title from a sign outside a Dutch pub. “Pax Perpetua” read the sign, and below the lettering was the image of a graveyard. Perhaps the universal perpetuity of death is the only peace that mankind may really look forward to. Kant clearly wouldn’t agree, but it was charming of him to acknowledge that the idea of a genuine perpetual peace for mankind might be regarded by many as nothing more than a “sweet dream” of philosophers.
What has been called the populist spirit aims to rouse us from that “sweet dream”—what James Madison might have called the “theoretic” reverie of the meddling class whose designs for our salvation always seem to involve the extension of their own power and prerogative. In this sense, the issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debates over the relative advantages and moral weather of “globalism” vs. “nationalism”—a pair of terms almost as fraught as “democracy” and “populism”—as well as the correlative economic issues of underemployment and wage stagnation. “Theoretic” politicians may advocate “globalism” as a necessary condition for free trade. But the spirit of local control tempers the cosmopolitan project of a borderless world with a recognition that the nation state has been the best guarantor not only of sovereignty but also of broadly shared prosperity. What we might call the ideology of free trade—the globalist aspiration to transcend the impediments of national identity and control—is an abstraction that principally benefits its architects. As R. R. Reno, the editor of First Things, pointed out in a recent Op-Ed for The New York Times, “Globalism poses a threat to the future of democracy because it disenfranchises the vast majority and empowers a technocratic elite.”
In the end, what James Burnham described as the “managerial revolution” is part of a larger progressive project. The aim of this project is partly to emancipate mankind from such traditional sources of self-definition as national identity, religious affiliation, and specific cultural rootedness, partly to perpetuate and aggrandize the apparatus that oversees the resulting dissolution. Burnham castigates this hypertrophied form of liberalism (what we might call “illiberal liberalism”) as “an ideology of suicide” that has insinuated itself into the center of Western culture. He acknowledges that the proposition may sound hyperbolic. “Suicide,” he notes, may seem “too emotive a term, too negative and ‘bad.’ ” But it is part of the pathology that Burnham describes that such objections are “most often made most hotly by Westerners who hate their own civilization, readily excuse or even praise blows struck against it, and themselves lend a willing hand, frequently enough, to pulling it down.” The issue, Burnham saw, is that modern liberalism has equipped us with an ethic too abstract and empty to inspire real commitment. Modern liberalism, he writes,
does not offer ordinary men compelling motives for personal suffering, sacrifice, and death. There is no tragic dimension in its picture of the good life. Men become willing to endure, sacrifice, and die for God, for family, king, honor, country, from a sense of absolute duty or an exalted vision of the meaning of history. . . . And it is precisely these ideas and institutions that liberalism has criticized, attacked, and in part overthrown as superstitious, archaic, reactionary, and irrational. In their place liberalism proposes a set of pale and bloodless abstractions—pale and bloodless for the very reason that they have no roots in the past, in deep feeling and in suffering. Except for mercenaries, saints, and neurotics, no one is willing to sacrifice and die for progressive education, medicare, humanity in the abstract, the United Nations, and a ten percent rise in Social Security payments.
In his view, the primary function of liberalism was to “permit Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolution,” to view weakness, failure, even collapse not as a defeat but “as the transition to a new and higher order in which Mankind as a whole joins in a universal civilization that has risen above the parochial distinctions, divisions, and discriminations of the past.”
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against these forces of dissolution.
Around the time that Donald Trump took office, his chief strategist Steve Bannon said that his goal was to “deconstruct the administrative state.” The phrase “administrative state”—also called “the regulatory state” or “the deep state”—has lately floated into common parlance. In The Administrative Threat, the legal scholar Philip Hamburger describes it as “a state within a state,” a sort of parallel legal and political structure populated by unelected bureaucrats. This amorphous congeries of agencies and regulations has become, Hamburger argues, “the dominant reality of American governance,” intruding everywhere into economic and social life.
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against forces of dissolution.
Article I of the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, just as Article III vests all judicial authority in the Court. The administrative state is a mechanism for circumventing both. As such, Hamburger argues, the administrative state operates outside the Constitution.
When the Constitution places all legislative powers in Congress, it gives Congress not only the power to make law but also the power to unmake it. And it thereby bars the executive from suspending or dispensing with the law. When the Constitution, moreover, places the judicial power in the courts and guarantees the due process of law, it precludes the executive from telling the courts not to apply the law, and prevents the courts from abandoning their own judgment about what the law requires.
Binding citizens not through Congressionally enacted statutes but through the edicts of the managerial bureaucracy, the administrative state is “all about the evasion of governance through law, including an evasion of constitutional processes and procedural rights.” Accordingly, Hamburger concludes, the encroaching activity of the administrative state represents “the nation’s preeminent threat to civil liberties.”
Hamburger draws an analogy between the behavior of the administrative state and the behavior of such despotic monarchs as James I, Charles I, and James II. Instead of persuading Parliament to repeal or revise a statute, the British king simply evaded its force by decreeing that some or all of his subjects were not subject to its strictures. His power was absolute not merely in the sense that it was all but unlimited but also in the sense that it was independent or outside of the law. Students of Latin will recall the Ablative Absolute, a construction in which an ablative phrase is absolutum, “loosened” from or independent of the main clause of a sentence. Hamburger shows how the growth of the administrative state represents an extralegal “revival of absolute power” in this sense, one that threatens to transform Constitutional rights and guarantees into mere “options” that the government bestows or withholds at its pleasure. “The evasion,” he notes, “thereby changes the very nature of procedural rights. Such rights traditionally were assurances against the government. Now they are but one of the choices for government in its exercise of power. Though the government must respect these rights when it proceeds against Americans in court, it has the freedom to escape them by taking an administrative path.”
Just as British kings in the seventeenth century evaded Parliament through such expedients as the Star Chamber and the exercise of royal prerogatives and royal waivers—what John Adams castigated as “those badges of domination called prerogatives”—so the administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution and beyond the authority of Congress. Barack Obama decreed that certain politically unpalatable provisions of the Affordable Care Act not be enforced, and presto, they were not enforced, even though they were the law of the land. He instructed his Department of Justice to intervene to prevent Arizona and other states from enforcing certain aspects of immigration law. He even forced public institutions to accommodate self-declared “transgender” persons in the toilets of their choice; he connived with lawsuits punishing bakers and Catholic hospitals and hobby shops who chose not to join this week’s politically correct campaign for the sexually exotic. The Constitution may have vested all legislative power in Congress and entrusted all judicial power to the courts, but the administrative state sidesteps those requirements by erecting a parallel bureaucratic structure of enforcement and control.
The administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution.
“Eighteenth-century Americans,” Hamburger notes, “assumed that a rule could have the obligation of law only if it came from the constitutionally established legislature elected by the people.” Today, Americans find their lives directed by a jumble of agencies far removed from the legislature and staffed by bureaucrats who make and enforce a vast network of rules that govern nearly every aspect of our lives.
One of the most disturbing aspects of Hamburger’s analysis is the historical connection he exposes between the expansion of the franchise in the early twentieth century and the growth of administrative, that is to say, extra-legal, power. For the people in charge, equality of voting rights was one thing. They could live with that. But the tendency of newly enfranchised groups—the “bitter clingers” and “deplorables” of yore—to reject progressive initiatives was something else again. As Woodrow Wilson noted sadly, “The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.” What to do?
The solution was to shift real power out of elected bodies and into the hands of the right sort of people, enlightened people, progressive people, people, that is to say, like Woodrow Wilson. Thus Wilson welcomed the advent of administrative power as a counterweight to encroaching democratization. And thus it was, as Hamburger points out, that we have seen a transfer of legislative power to the “knowledge class,” the managerial elite that James Burnham anatomized.
A closer look at the so-called “knowledge class” shows that what it knows best is how to preserve and extend its own privileges. Its activities are swaddled in do-gooder rhetoric about serving the public, looking after “the environment,” helping the disadvantaged, etc., but what they chiefly excel at is consolidating their own power.
In Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Edmund Burke criticized the Court of George III for circumventing Parliament and establishing by stealth what amounted to a new regime of royal prerogative and influence-peddling. It was not as patent as the swaggering courts of James I or Charles I. George and his courtiers maintained the appearance of parliamentary supremacy. But a closer look showed that the system was corrupt. “It was soon discovered,” Burke wrote with sly understatement, “that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible.” That discovery stands behind the growth of the administrative state. Under the cloak of democratic institutions, its essentially undemocratic activities pursue an expansionist agenda that threatens liberty in the most comprehensive way, by circumventing the law.
At the same time, however, a growing recognition of the totalitarian goals of the administrative state has fed what many have called a populist uprising here and in Europe. “Populist” is one word for the phenomenon. An affirmation of sovereignty, underwritten by a passion for freedom, is another, possibly more accurate, phrase.
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Democracy in America: An Introduction

Almost all the rulers who have tried to destroy freedom have at first attempted to preserve its forms. This has been seen from Augustus down to our own day.
—Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution (1856)
Democracy in America: what is it? Whatever it is, we know that it is under siege. Barely a moment goes by these days without tocsins sounding about various threats to “our democracy” (I’ll come back to that plural possessive below). It used to be that the biggest, baddest threat to “our democracy” was Donald Trump (I’ll come back to that, too). Then a curious thing happened. Trump still gets prominent billing, ex officio, as it were, but when it comes to “threats to our democracy,” he seems to have been overshadowed somewhat by a curious new threat: the Constitution.
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Democracy in Name Only: How Kamala Harris Became Democratic Nominee

Like many commentators, I have described the sudden, almost magical elevation of Kamala Harris to the status of presumptive Democratic nominee for president as a “coup.” “What just happened,” I wrote on July 23, “is essentially an anti-democratic coup. Kamala Harris, who got no delegates—zero—when she ran for president in 2020 and was only chosen as Biden’s running mate because he had promised to pick a black woman, is on the cusp of being handed the Democratic nomination for president of the United States.”
How did that happen? If you said, “It happened because of the machinations of the deep state,” go to the head of the class. Even Donald Trump has called what just happened a “coup by the Democrats.”
But Mark Steyn makes a good point when he observes that, in many ways, what just happened to Joe Biden was not a “coup” in any ordinary sense. A “coup” (from the French “strike, blow”) suggests an abrupt intervention that brings about a change at the top. The element change is a major part of what a “coup” in this sense means.
Yet what change has the Biden-Harris pas-de-deux brought about? Until the very morning of the day he announced his withdrawal, Joe Biden and his team were insisting he was in the race till the end. His debate performance against Trump was a disaster, true, and his poll numbers were in free fall. No matter. He was going to tough it out.
There are a few things to remember, though. For one thing, Biden’s poll numbers had been in free fall for months. For another, the idea that the debate revealed for the first time how cognitively challenged Biden was is ridiculous. It had been obvious for years that he was slipping in and out of senility. Back in 2020, I described Biden as “an empty cipher . . . a drowsy Howdy Doody puppet, manipulated by a committee of ‘woke’ ventriloquists.”
At the time, I noted, Biden’s “painfully obvious flirtation with senility was as much an asset as a liability, because, though it made for some cringeworthy displays of incompetence, it conspired with COVID-19 to allow his handlers to keep him tucked safely away in his basement for most of the campaign.” Indeed, I had even earlier compared Biden to the aged Achon, a character in Evelyn Waugh’s novel Black Mischief. The legitimate but inconvenient emperor of the fictional kingdom of Azania, Achon, had been safely confined to a cave for 50 years. After some elaborate negotiations among the real powers of state, Achon is set free and is carried to the capital to be invested as emperor. Alas, his long captivity left him bent and senile. He dies upon his coronation.
Biden lasted a bit longer. But the point is that the Council of Elders that manages The Narrative knew from the start that Biden was past it. Nevertheless, aided by the propaganda press, they worked assiduously to cover up the truth. “Oh, Joe is sharp as a tack,” they told us ad nauseam. “He’s intensely probing,” etc.
Nevertheless, the appalling truth was leaking out like dark, malodorous scum from a ripped bag of garbage. Indeed, I speculated that the reason the Democratic establishment scheduled the debate between Trump and Biden so early—remember, Trump hadn’t even clinched the nomination yet—was to give Biden one last chance to prove himself.
Obviously, he failed. But that apparently had no bearing on Biden’s commitment to stay in the race. That was the state of play when I got on a plane from London to New York last Sunday morning. “I’m in it till the end.” By the time I landed, however, Biden’s bizarre announcement that he was dropping out of the race—on his personal, not his official POTUS X account, with no mention of endorsing Kamala—was lighting up the internet.
I have no idea who finally prevailed upon Biden to drop out or what threats or inducements they dangled before him. But it is clear that the action disenfranchised voters. The existential Muzak that had been filling the corridors and elevators of our lives was full of encomia to “democracy.” Here at last, we saw up close and personal what the Dems meant by “democracy.” They meant, as I have been fond of pointing out, rule by Democrats. That’s what “democracy” means in their lexicon. It has nothing to do with voting, rules, or process. It has everything to do with maintaining power for oneself and denying it to the other side.
This was the point of Mark Steyn’s curious quibble about whether what we have just witnessed with the cashiering of Biden and the elevation of Kamala was really a “coup.” In a deep sense, Steyn argues, “The operation was the inversion of a coup: it was to prevent the possibility of any change.”
Just before his election in 2008, Barack Obama famously (or infamously) said that we were on the threshold of “fundamentally transforming the United States of America.” He was right about that. But the irony was that the transformation entailed the establishment of political stasis. Throughout his first term, Donald Trump endeavored to change some important things, to roll back that “fundamental transformation” that Obama had overseen. The FBI and other agencies of the regulatory state, abetted by the propaganda press, intervened to stymie him at every turn. He was investigated, indicted, impeached, nearly bankrupted, and, just a week or so ago, shot.
The Dems love the rhetoric of “change,” just as they cherish the word “democracy.” Their actions show that they are hostile to both. Change is incompatible with the maintenance of their perquisites and privileges, just as genuine democracy is fraught with peril for the establishment. Take democracy seriously and who knows? You might wind up with someone like Donald Trump. As I have often observed, that was Trump’s original, unforgivable sin: being elected. Above all, his democratic election was an affront to democracy, or at least to “Our Democracy™.”
What happens now? I do not know. I think Mark Steyn is right: “The goal of the Permanent State remains the same: nothing will be permitted to change.” Once again, Donald Trump has the temerity to challenge that dispensation. He is much better organized this time around, and he seems more determined than ever. The fact that the Democrats have settled, at least for the moment, on someone as preposterous as Kamala Harris as their candidate is probably a sign of desperation, at least in part. But it is also a sign of their contempt for the American people, and contempt is an attitude that is, in the metabolism of political life, never far from hubris.
Traditionally, nemesis is the regular concomitant of hubris. I know that Dems—and, indeed, many Republicans—disbelieve in the operation of such quaint, antique moral processes. That very fact may be another sign of their hubris.
In any event, I like to think that the movement Trump represents may finally dissolve the iceberg of greedy woke sentimentality that holds America hostage.
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Despite Defeat, Le Pen’s Party Has Made Steady Progress

I have been in Paris the last few days and by coincidence am staying cheek by jowl (joue contre joue?) with the Eiffel Tower, site of France’s version of those “mostly peaceful” and of course eminently wonderful protests against “the far right” last week in the aftermath of Marine Le Pen’s strong showing in the first round of voting for seats in the National Assembly.
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Dinner in Tehran, anyone?

Who wants to join me for dinner in Tehran or Havana? I suspect that both will be open for business very soon. I suppose we could even go to Caracas. As I write, the American flag has been raised at the American Embassy there for the first time in seven years. Amazing, isn’t it?
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Diversions and Animadversions

Routledge, 2017
This volume contains nearly all the criticism that Alexander Coleman wrote for The New Criterion between 1994 and 2003. A specialist in Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin American literature, Coleman was also a superb essayist on music, and his wide erudition, as revealed in these writings, demonstrates an easy mastery of the entire modernist tradition. Diversions and Animadversions are divided into three parts. The first contains Coleman’s literary essays including a lengthy piece on Eba de Quieros, the great master of Portuguese realism, and shorter pieces on the Argentinian writer and Borges disciple, Adolfo Bioy Casares, as well as a review of the most recent translation of the poetry of Federico Garcia Lorca. Coleman’s greatest passion, however, was for music, and part two contains essays, concert and book reviews, and reports on the cultural situation of music. Among the subjects examined here are the operas of Schoenberg, Berg, Richard Strauss, the recently published letters of Toscanini, the music criticism of Virgil Thomson, the fluctuating critical reputation of Jean Sibelius, and the authentic performance practice movement, along with considerations of such instrumentalists as Sviatoslav Richter and Alicia de Larrocha. The book concludes with Coleman’s travel writings, which are both evocative mood pieces and incisive social and political commentary. Graced with personal appreciations by Roger Kimball and Denis Donoghue, this volume encapsulates the work of a writer of rare wit, capacious learning, and eager, if gently ironical, curiosity.
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Doctored Footage Fallout: Trump vs. the BBC

Trump’s lawsuit over the BBC’s doctored Jan. 6 clip now threatens to turn the broadcaster’s license-fee crisis into a full-blown reckoning over trust, bias, and billions.
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Does the Constitution Matter?

The U.S. Constitution, formally adopted in 1789, is one of the oldest written constitutions in the world still in place.
At about 4,400 words for its original seven articles, it is also the shortest. (The 27 amendments to the original Constitution add only another 3,000 words.)
The English text EU Constitution, by contrast, is some 60,000 words: 265 pages of bureaucratese and regulatory gobbledegook.
Anyone who has spent time with the U.S. Constitution and pondered the immense labor that went into its drafting has to be impressed.
The Framers scoured the past for models and inspiration, negative as well as positive.
There were examples aplenty of what not to do.
Exactly how to articulate the rules of a republican government in which the people were sovereign and individual liberty was paramount turned out to be a tricky proposition.
As an aside, I note that the Framers would have been astounded by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s recent observation (in a case about the government’s forcing social media companies to censor speech) that “the First Amendment [was] hamstringing the government in significant ways.”
Indeed. That was the very point of the First Amendment’s speech clause: to impede (“hamstring”) the government’s ability to suppress free speech.
More generally, the U.S. Constitution aimed to protect citizens from the arbitrary or meddlesome exercise of state power.
As the “supreme Law of the Land” (Article VI), the U.S. Constitution was a magnificent brief for liberty and the rule of law.
From the very beginning, however, it was recognized that the efficacy of the Constitution ultimately rested not upon its arguments, stipulations, and provisions but upon a background of shared if largely unspoken commitment to the form of government it articulated.
In “Federalist 48,” for example, James Madison wondered whether it would be “sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power.”
Madison appreciated the flimsiness of “parchment barriers”—fine words inscribed on hallowed tablets—when faced with “the encroaching spirit of power.”
Catherine the Great demonstrated her understanding of this point when she told Diderot that human skin is more ticklish than paper.
Madison, surveying the various state constitutions that had been put forward, noted that such “parchment barriers” were the primary security that “the compilers of most of the American constitutions” relied upon.
“Experience assures us,” he wrote, “that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more powerful members of the government.”
Why? Because human nature was (as Hobbes observed) addicted to the “perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.”
Madison put it in terms of governmental acquisitiveness.
“The legislative department,” he wrote, “is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
“Drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”
Noted.
So, for example, in Article 1, Section 9, we read that “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”
But ask former President Donald Trump about that.
Congress hasn’t explicitly passed any Bills of Attainder. But the Executive Branch, operating through the Department of Justice, has in effect enacted one against the former president.
It has also, with the connivance of a New York pol, subjected him to an ex post facto law in his battle against E. Jean Carroll.
Then there is the “parchment barrier” of the Eighth Amendment, which, in addition to prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishments” says that “excessive fines” shall not be imposed.
President Trump has been fined more than half a billion dollars (the bond for which was just reduced as I write to $175 million) for supposedly inflating the value of his assets when applying for bank loans, loans that he paid back in full, on time, with interest.
Loans that, moreover, the issuing bank said it was happy to have made with President Trump.
So this was a crime with no victims, a “fraud” in which no one was defrauded, i.e., no harm was done, and yet a vindictive attorney general who campaigned for her job on the promise to “get Trump” and a rogue judge imposed an almost comical judgment against a man they despise.
The U.S. Constitution is a noble—indeed, a visionary—document.
So, as it happens, is the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
It’s much younger than the U.S. Constitution, dating from the post-Soviet dispensation.
But it echoes with many of the fine sentiments of its American cousin.
Russia, you will be pleased to know, “is a democratic federal law-bound State with a republican form of government.”
Moreover, “man, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value“ and ”the recognition, observance and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be the obligation of the State.”
Sounds good, right? And you will be further pleased to know that “in the Russian Federation political diversity and multi-party system shall be recognized.”
Alexei Anatolyevich Navalny was unavailable for comment.
But then, Ashli Babbitt is unavailable for comment, too.
As are the several Jan. 6 hostages who have committed suicide.
Peter Navarro made the mistake of being a close aide to President Trump. So, unlike Eric “Mr. Wingman” Holder, when he brushed off a congressional subpoena, he was put in jail.
The list of victims is long. And if President Joe Biden’s administration has not yet gotten around to putting plutonium in the tea of its opponents, put that down as a local variation.
For the moment, it is finding that lawfare, dawn raids by the FBI, and systematic censorship of opinions it deems unhelpful are sufficient unto the day.
My point is this: You can have as splendid a constitution on paper as it is possible for the ingenuity of man to devise.
That will matter not at all if the rule of law is not fed by the springs of public sentiment.
A constitution is a guarantor of the general welfare only so long as its provisions are publicly acknowledged and adhered to.
They are only publicly acknowledged and adhered to when they are believed in.
And they are only believed in when their provisions are, so far as humanly possible, impartially applied.
That is not the case in the United States circa 2024.
Everyone knows it, although not everyone will yet admit it.
The resulting tension is what psychologists call “cognitive dissonance.”
Political theorists have other, less emollient, words for the phenomenon. Madison, in any event, was right: “A mere demarkation on parchment” of constitutional limits “is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands.”
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Does the Constitution Still Matter?

The planet’s oldest and shortest written constitution, still in force, was signed on Wednesday — 237 years ago. The U.S. Constitution, formally adopted in 1789, sits at about 4,400 words for its original seven articles.
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Don Lemon Gets Away with a Slap on the Wrist

Have you noticed that bullies tend to grovel when threatened? They are cruel when they have the upper hand, but cringe, cower, and whimper whenever confronted with superior force.












