Today On The Eric Metaxas Show, Eric talks with Roger Kimball about New York City, Islam, and why they argue the West is losing civilizational confidence. They discuss whether the Islam vs Islamism distinction holds up, why assimilation and shared values matter for a free society, and what is happening in Europe and England right now. Then they pivot to Iran, regime change predictions, and why they believe Trump is reshaping the global order from the border to energy to foreign policy.
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How Political Correctness Hijacked the Arts | Roger Kimball and Heather MacDonald


What gets to be called art — and who decides? In this wide-ranging Socrates Dialogues conversation, New York–based thinkers, writers, and art admirers Heather Mac Donald and Roger Kimball explore the definition of art and the history of the unmaking of beauty in modern contemporary art. Drawing on examples from Duchamp, Warhol, Serrano, Hirst, and others, the two discuss how the banal, the transgressive, and the political have reshaped the aesthetic experience of art, often robbing it of spiritual resonance.
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Populism, X: The Imperative of Freedom

It is curious how certain words accumulate a nimbus of positive associations while others, semantically just as innocuous, wind up shouldering a portfolio of bad feelings.
Consider the different careers of the terms “democracy” and “populism.”
Do you know any responsible person who would admit to being opposed to democracy? No one who does not enjoy a large private income would risk it. But lots of people are willing to declare themselves anti-populist. The discrepancy is curious for several reasons.
It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
For one thing, it is a testament to the almost Darwinian hardiness of the word “democracy.” In the fierce struggle among ideas for survival, “democracy” has not only survived but thrived. This is despite the fact that political thinkers from Plato and Aristotle through Cicero and down to modern times have been deeply suspicious of democracy. Aristotle thought democracy the worst form of government, all but inevitably leading to ochlocracy or mob rule, which is no rule.
In Federalist 10, James Madison famously warned that history had shown that democratic regimes have “in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” “Theoretic politicians,” he wrote—and it would be hard to find a more contemptuous deployment of the word “theoretic”—such politicians may have advocated democracy, but that is only because of their dangerous and utopian ignorance of human nature. It was not at all clear, Madison thought, that democracy was a reliable custodian of liberty.
Nevertheless, nearly everyone wants to associate himself with the word “democracy.” Totalitarian regimes like to describe themselves as the “Democratic Republic” of wherever. Conservatives champion the advantages of “democratic capitalism.” Central planners of all stripes eagerly deploy programs advertised as enhancing or extending “democracy.” Even James Madison came down on the side of a subspecies of democracy, one filtered through the modulating influence of a large, diverse population and an elaborate scheme of representation that softened (Madison said “excluded”) the influence of “the people in their collective capacity.”
“Democracy,” in short, is a eulogistic word, what the practical philosopher Stephen Potter in another context apostrophized as an “OK word.” And it is worth noting, as Potter would have been quick to remind us, that the people pronouncing those eulogies delight in advertising themselves as, and are generally accepted as, “OK people.” Indeed, the class element and the element of moral approbation—of what some genius has summarized as “virtue signaling”—are key.
It is quite otherwise with “populism.” At first blush, this seems odd because the word “populism” occupies a semantic space closely adjacent to “democracy.” “Democracy” means “rule by the demos,” the people. “Populism,” according to The American Heritage Dictionary, describes “A political philosophy directed to the needs of the common people and advancing a more equitable distribution of wealth and power”— that is, just the sorts of things that the people, were they to rule, would seek.
But the fact is that “populism” is ambivalent at best. Sometimes, it is true, a charismatic figure can survive and even illuminate the label “populist” like a personal halo. Bernie Sanders managed this trick among the eco-conscious, racially omnivorous, non-gender-stereotyping, anti-capitalist beneficiaries of capitalism who made up his core constituency.
But it was always my impression that in this case the term “populist” was fielded less by Sanders or his followers than by his rivals and the media in an effort to fix him in the public’s mind as one of the many lamentable examples of not-Hillary, who herself was presumed to be popular though not populist.
There are at least two sides to the negative association under which the term “populist” struggles. On the one hand, there is the issue of demagoguery. Some commentators tell us that “populist” and “demagogue” are essentially synonyms (though they rarely point out that demagogos simply meant “a popular leader,” e.g., Pericles). The association of demagoguery and populism describes what we might call the command-and-control aspect of populism. The populist leader is said to forsake reason and moderation in order to stir the dark, chthonic passions of a semi-literate and spiritually unelevated populace.
On the other hand, there is the issue of the fertile but unedifying soil of that populace upon which the demagogic leader works. Anyone who has looked at the commentary on Brexit, the campaign and early months of the Trump administration, or the recent French election will have noted this.
Consider, to take but one example, how often the word “anger” and its cognates are deployed to evoke the psychological and moral failings of both the populist multitude and its putative leaders. In a remarkable, apocalyptic effusion published in the early hours of November 9, 2016, David Remnick, the editor of The New Yorker, warned that the Trump presidency represented “a rebellion against liberalism itself,” an “angry assault” on the civil rights of women, blacks, immigrants, homosexuals, and countless others. Later commentators warned about our “angry, cynical times,” the “raw, angry and aggrieved” tone of Trump’s rhetoric, the unchaperoned “anger” of Americans who felt they “had been left behind.” “Trump’s Anger Could Lead Down a Dangerous Road,” quoth cnn. “Inside Trump’s Anger and Impatience—and His Sudden Decision to Fire Comey,” The Washington Post. “How Festering Anger at Comey Ended in His Firing,” The New York Times.
There are occasional acknowledgments that the diagnosed “anger” may be understandable, even justified. But we are left with the unmistakeable impression that the phenomenon as a whole is something vicious and irrational. Anger “festers.” It leads to “sudden,” i.e., impulsive decisions. The road it steers us toward could be “dangerous.” (Ah, how cheap is possibility: when we read that “could be” dangerous, do we also think, as we should, that it might just as well not be?)
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness. Like the foul-smelling wounds of Philoctetes, the stench is apparently incurable. Granted, there are plenty of historical reasons for the association between demagoguery and populism, as such names as the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Father Coughlin, and Huey Long remind us.
Populism seems incapable of escaping the association with demagoguery and moral darkness.
Still, I suspect that in the present context the apparently unbreakable association between populism and demagoguery has less to do with any natural affinity than with cunning rhetorical weaponization. “Populism,” that is to say, is wielded less as a descriptive than as a delegitimizing term. Successfully charge someone with populist sympathies and you get, free and for nothing, both the imputation of demagoguery and what was famously derided as a “deplorable” and “irredeemable” cohort. The element of existential depreciation is almost palpable.
So is the element of condescension. Inseparable from the diagnosis of populism is the implication not just of incompetence but also of a crudity that is part aesthetic and part moral. Hence the curiously visceral distaste expressed by elite opinion for signs of populist sympathy. When Hillary Clinton charged that half of Donald Trump’s supporters were an “irredeemable” “basket of deplorables,” when Barack Obama castigated small-town Republican voters as “bitter” folk who “cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment,” what they expressed was not disagreement but condescending revulsion.
Ithink I first became aware that the charge of populist sympathies could have a powerful political, moral, and class delegitimizing effect when I was in London last June to cover the Brexit vote. Nearly everyone I met, from Tory ministers to taxi drivers, from tourists to tradesmen, was a Remainer. The higher up the income and class scale you went, the more likely it was that your interlocutor would be in favor of Britain’s remaining in the European Union. And the more pointed would be his disparagement of those arguing in favor of Brexit. The Brexiteers were said to be “angry,” yes, but also ignorant, fearful, xenophobic, and racist.
Except that they weren’t, not the ones I met, anyway. For them, Brexit turned on a simple question: “Who rules?” Is the ultimate source of British sovereignty Parliament, as had been the case for centuries? Or is it Brussels, seat of the European Union?
The question of sovereignty, I believe, takes us to the heart of what in recent years has been touted and tarred as the populist project.
Consider Britain. Parliament answers to the British voters. The European Union answers to—well, to itself. Indeed, it is worth pausing to remind ourselves how profoundly undemocratic is the European Union. Its commissioners are appointed, not elected. They cannot be turned out of office by voters. If the public votes contrary to the wishes of the E.U.’s commissars in a referendum, they are simply presented with another referendum until they vote the “right” way. The E.U.’s financial books have never been subject to a public audit. The corruption is just too widespread. Yet the E.U.’s agents wield extraordinary power over the everyday lives of their charges. A commissioner in Brussels can tell a property owner in Wales what sort of potatoes he may plant on his farm, how he must calculate the weight of the products he sells, and whom he must allow into his country. He can outlaw “racism” and “xenophobia”—defined as harboring “an aversion” to people based on “race, colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin” and specify a penalty of “at least” two years’ imprisonment for infractions. He can “lawfully suppress,” as the London Telegraph reported, “political criticism of its institutions and of leading figures,” thus rendering the commissars of the E.U. not only beyond the vote but also beyond criticism.
It’s a little different in the United States. I’ll come to that below. At the moment, it is worth noting to what extent the metabolism of this political dispensation was anticipated by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famous passages about “democratic despotism” in Democracy in America. Unlike despotism of yore, Tocqueville noted, this modern allotrope does not tyrannize over man—it infantilizes him. And it does this by promulgating ever more cumbersome rules and regulations that reach into the interstices of everyday life to hamper initiative, stymie independence, stifle originality, homogenize individuality. This power, said Tocqueville, “extends its arms over society as a whole.”
It does not break wills, but it softens them, bends them, and directs them; it rarely forces one to act, but it constantly opposes itself to one’s acting; it does not destroy, it prevents things from being born; it does not tyrannize, it hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and industrious animals of which the government is the shepherd.
Tocqueville’s analysis has led many observers to conclude that the villain in this drama is the state. But the political philosopher James Burnham, writing in the early 1940s in The Managerial Revolution, saw that the real villain was not the state as such but the bureaucracy that maintained and managed it. It is easy to mock the apparatchiks who populate the machinery of government. Thus James H. Boren writes wickedly that “the noblest of all of man’s struggles are those in which dedicated bureaucrats, armed with the spirit of dynamic inaction, have fought to protect the ramparts of creative nonresponsiveness from the onslaughts of mere citizens who have demanded action in their behalf.” But the comic potential of the morass should not blind us to the minatory nature of the phenomenon. Indeed, it presents a specimen case of the general truth that the preposterous and the malevolent often co-mingle. The shepherd of which Tocqueville wrote was really a flock of shepherds, a coterie of managers who, in the guise of doing the state’s business, prosecuted their own advantage and gradually became a self-perpetuating elite that arrogated to itself power over the levers of society.
Anatomizing this sleight-of-hand is at the center of “James Burnham’s Managerial Elite,” Julius Krein’s essay in the inaugural issue of American Affairs. “Although the managerial elite uses the state as an instrument to acquire power,” Krein notes, “the real enemy is not the state but rather the managerial separation of political and economic power from the liberal social contract.”
This separation of the real power of society from the economy and political life renders the managerial elite all but untouchable. And this, as Burnham saw, was the property neither of liberalism nor of conservatism but rather of anterior forces that engulfed both. “The contradiction of contemporary conservatism,” Krein writes,
is that it is an attempt to restore the culture and politics of bourgeois capitalism while accelerating the economy of managerialism. Because of its failure to recognize this contradiction, “much of conservative doctrine is, if not quite bankrupt, more and more obviously obsolescent,” as Burnham wrote in 1972. Since then it has only evolved from obsolescent to counterproductive. At this point, expanding “free markets” no longer has anything to do with classical American capitalism. It is simply the further emancipation of the managerial elite from any obligations to the political community. Likewise, promoting democracy as an abstract, universalist principle only undermines the sovereignty of the American people by rejecting national interests as a legitimate ground of foreign policy.
Sovereignty, Burnham saw, was shifting from Parliaments to what he called “administrative bureaus,” which increasingly are the seats of real power and, as such, “proclaim the rules, make the laws, issue the decrees.” As far back as the early 1940s, Burnham could write that “ ‘Laws’ today in the United States . . . are not being made any longer by Congress, but by the nlrb, sec, icc, aaa, tva, ftc, fcc, the Office of Production Management (what a revealing title!), and the other leading ‘executive agencies.’ ” And note that Burnham wrote decades before the advent of the epa, hud, cfpb, fsoc, the Department of Education, and the rest of the administrative alphabet soup that governs us in the United States today.
Iam convinced that the issue of sovereignty, of what we might call the location of sovereignty, has played a large role in the rise of the phenomenon we describe as “populism” in the United States as well as Europe. For one thing, the question of sovereignty, of who governs, stands behind the rebellion against the political correctness and moral meddlesomeness that are such conspicuous and disfiguring features of our increasingly bureaucratic society. The smothering, Tocquevillian blanket of regulatory excess has had a wide range of practical and economic effects, stifling entrepreneurship and making any sort of productive innovation difficult.
A reassertion of independence.
But perhaps its deepest effects are spiritual or psychological. The many assaults against free speech on college campuses, the demand for “safe spaces” and “trigger warnings” against verbal or fashion-inspired “micro-aggressions” (Mexican hats, “offensive” Halloween costumes, etc.) are part of this dictatorship of political correctness. In The Road to Serfdom, Friedrich Hayek said that one of the “main points” of his argument concerned “the psychological change,” the “alteration of the character of the people,” that extensive government control brought in its wake. The alteration involves a process of softening, enervation, infantilization even: an exchange of the challenges of liberty and self-reliance—the challenges, that is to say, of adulthood—for the coddling pleasures of dependence. Max Weber spoke in this context of “Ordnungsmenschen,” men who had become increasingly dependent on an order imposed upon them from above. Breaking with that drift becomes more and more difficult the more habituated to dependence a people becomes. In this sense, what has been described as a populist upsurge against political correctness is simply a reassertion of independence, a reclamation of what turns out to be a most uncommon virtue, common sense.
The issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debate over immigration: indeed, is any issue more central to the question Who governs? than who gets to decide a nation’s borders and how a country defines its first person plural: the “We” that makes us who we are as a people?
Throughout his campaign, Donald Trump promised to enforce America’s immigration laws, to end so-called “sanctuary cities,” which advertise themselves as safe havens for illegal aliens (though of course they do not call them “illegal aliens”), and to sharpen vetting procedures for people wishing to immigrate to America from countries known as sponsors of terrorism.
The President sometimes overstated and not infrequently misstated his case. Semantic precision is not a Trumpian speciality. But political effectiveness may be. Behind the Sturm und Drang that greeted Trump’s rhetoric on immigration, we can glimpse two very different concepts of the nation state and world order. One view sees the world as a collection of independent sovereign countries that, although interacting with one another, regard the care, safety, and prosperity of their own citizens as their first obligation. This is the traditional view of the nation state. It is also Donald Trump’s view. It is what licenses his talk of putting “America First,” a concept that, pace the anti-Trump media, has nothing to do with Charles Lindbergh’s isolationist movement of the late 1930s and everything to do with fostering a healthy sense of national identity and purpose.
The alternative view regards the nation state with suspicion as an atavistic form of political and social organization. The nation state might still be a practical necessity, but, the argument goes, it is a regrettable necessity inasmuch as it retards mankind’s emancipation from the parochial bonds of place and local allegiance. Ideally, according to this view, we are citizens of the world, not particular countries, and our fundamental obligation is to all mankind.
This is the progressive view. It has many progenitors and antecedents. But none is more influential than “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” a brief essay that Immanuel Kant published in 1795 when he was seventy-one. The burden of the essay is to ask how perpetual peace might be obtained among states. The natural condition of mankind, Kant acknowledges, is war. But with the advent of “enlightened concepts of statecraft,” mankind, he suggests, may be able to transcend that unfortunate habit of making war and live in perpetual (ewigen) comity.
Kant lists various conditions for the initial establishment of peace—the eventual abolition of standing armies, for example—and a few conditions for its perpetuation: the extension of “universal hospitality” by nations was something that caught my eye. Ditto “world citizenship.” “The idea of . . . world citizenship,” he says at the end of the essay, “is no high-flown or exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence also of perpetual peace.”
It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant makes many observations along the way that will be balm to progressive hearts. He is against “the accumulation of treasure,” for example, because wealth is “a hindrance to perpetual peace.” By the same token, he believes that forbidding the system of international credit that the British empire employed “must be a preliminary article of perpetual peace.” Credit can be deployed to increase wealth, ergo it is suspect. Kant says that all states must be “republican” in organization. By that he means not that they must be democracies but only that the executive and legislative functions of the state be distinguished. (Indeed, he says that democracy, “properly speaking,” is “necessarily a despotism” because in it the executive and legislative functions of governments are both vested in one entity, “the people.”) He looks forward to the establishment of a “league of nations” (Völkerbund), all of which would freely embrace a republican form of government.
It would be hard to overstate the influence of Kant’s essay. It stands behind such progressive exfoliations as Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” not least the final point that looked forward to the establishment of a League of Nations. You can feel its pulse beating in the singing phrases of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which outlawed war. It is worth noting that among the initial fifteen signatories of that noble-sounding pact, along with the United States, France, and England, were Germany, Italy, and Japan. What does that tell us about the folly of trusting paper proclamations not backed up by the authority of physical force? It is one thing to declare war illegal; it is quite another to enforce that edict.
Kant’s essay also directly inspired the architects of the United Nations and, in our own day, the architects of the European Union and the battalions of transnational progressives who jettison democracy for the sake of a more-or-less nebulous (but not therefore un-coercive) ideal of world citizenship.
I would not care to wager on how many of the hysterics who congregated at airports across the country to protest Donald Trump’s effort to make the citizens of this country safer were students of Kant. Doubtless very few. But all were his unwitting heirs. “Universal hospitality”: how the protestors would have liked that! (Though to be fair to Kant, he did note that such hospitality “is not the right to be a permanent visitor.”) I have no doubt that the motivation of the protestors had many sources. But to the extent that it was based on a political ideal (and not just partisan posturing or a grubby bid for notoriety and power), the spirit of Kant was hovering there in the background.
Kant was not without a sense of humor. He begins his essay by noting that he took his title from a sign outside a Dutch pub. “Pax Perpetua” read the sign, and below the lettering was the image of a graveyard. Perhaps the universal perpetuity of death is the only peace that mankind may really look forward to. Kant clearly wouldn’t agree, but it was charming of him to acknowledge that the idea of a genuine perpetual peace for mankind might be regarded by many as nothing more than a “sweet dream” of philosophers.
What has been called the populist spirit aims to rouse us from that “sweet dream”—what James Madison might have called the “theoretic” reverie of the meddling class whose designs for our salvation always seem to involve the extension of their own power and prerogative. In this sense, the issue of sovereignty also stands behind the debates over the relative advantages and moral weather of “globalism” vs. “nationalism”—a pair of terms almost as fraught as “democracy” and “populism”—as well as the correlative economic issues of underemployment and wage stagnation. “Theoretic” politicians may advocate “globalism” as a necessary condition for free trade. But the spirit of local control tempers the cosmopolitan project of a borderless world with a recognition that the nation state has been the best guarantor not only of sovereignty but also of broadly shared prosperity. What we might call the ideology of free trade—the globalist aspiration to transcend the impediments of national identity and control—is an abstraction that principally benefits its architects. As R. R. Reno, the editor of First Things, pointed out in a recent Op-Ed for The New York Times, “Globalism poses a threat to the future of democracy because it disenfranchises the vast majority and empowers a technocratic elite.”
In the end, what James Burnham described as the “managerial revolution” is part of a larger progressive project. The aim of this project is partly to emancipate mankind from such traditional sources of self-definition as national identity, religious affiliation, and specific cultural rootedness, partly to perpetuate and aggrandize the apparatus that oversees the resulting dissolution. Burnham castigates this hypertrophied form of liberalism (what we might call “illiberal liberalism”) as “an ideology of suicide” that has insinuated itself into the center of Western culture. He acknowledges that the proposition may sound hyperbolic. “Suicide,” he notes, may seem “too emotive a term, too negative and ‘bad.’ ” But it is part of the pathology that Burnham describes that such objections are “most often made most hotly by Westerners who hate their own civilization, readily excuse or even praise blows struck against it, and themselves lend a willing hand, frequently enough, to pulling it down.” The issue, Burnham saw, is that modern liberalism has equipped us with an ethic too abstract and empty to inspire real commitment. Modern liberalism, he writes,
does not offer ordinary men compelling motives for personal suffering, sacrifice, and death. There is no tragic dimension in its picture of the good life. Men become willing to endure, sacrifice, and die for God, for family, king, honor, country, from a sense of absolute duty or an exalted vision of the meaning of history. . . . And it is precisely these ideas and institutions that liberalism has criticized, attacked, and in part overthrown as superstitious, archaic, reactionary, and irrational. In their place liberalism proposes a set of pale and bloodless abstractions—pale and bloodless for the very reason that they have no roots in the past, in deep feeling and in suffering. Except for mercenaries, saints, and neurotics, no one is willing to sacrifice and die for progressive education, medicare, humanity in the abstract, the United Nations, and a ten percent rise in Social Security payments.
In his view, the primary function of liberalism was to “permit Western civilization to be reconciled to dissolution,” to view weakness, failure, even collapse not as a defeat but “as the transition to a new and higher order in which Mankind as a whole joins in a universal civilization that has risen above the parochial distinctions, divisions, and discriminations of the past.”
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against these forces of dissolution.
Around the time that Donald Trump took office, his chief strategist Steve Bannon said that his goal was to “deconstruct the administrative state.” The phrase “administrative state”—also called “the regulatory state” or “the deep state”—has lately floated into common parlance. In The Administrative Threat, the legal scholar Philip Hamburger describes it as “a state within a state,” a sort of parallel legal and political structure populated by unelected bureaucrats. This amorphous congeries of agencies and regulations has become, Hamburger argues, “the dominant reality of American governance,” intruding everywhere into economic and social life.
What has been called “populism” is a visceral reaction against forces of dissolution.
Article I of the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, just as Article III vests all judicial authority in the Court. The administrative state is a mechanism for circumventing both. As such, Hamburger argues, the administrative state operates outside the Constitution.
When the Constitution places all legislative powers in Congress, it gives Congress not only the power to make law but also the power to unmake it. And it thereby bars the executive from suspending or dispensing with the law. When the Constitution, moreover, places the judicial power in the courts and guarantees the due process of law, it precludes the executive from telling the courts not to apply the law, and prevents the courts from abandoning their own judgment about what the law requires.
Binding citizens not through Congressionally enacted statutes but through the edicts of the managerial bureaucracy, the administrative state is “all about the evasion of governance through law, including an evasion of constitutional processes and procedural rights.” Accordingly, Hamburger concludes, the encroaching activity of the administrative state represents “the nation’s preeminent threat to civil liberties.”
Hamburger draws an analogy between the behavior of the administrative state and the behavior of such despotic monarchs as James I, Charles I, and James II. Instead of persuading Parliament to repeal or revise a statute, the British king simply evaded its force by decreeing that some or all of his subjects were not subject to its strictures. His power was absolute not merely in the sense that it was all but unlimited but also in the sense that it was independent or outside of the law. Students of Latin will recall the Ablative Absolute, a construction in which an ablative phrase is absolutum, “loosened” from or independent of the main clause of a sentence. Hamburger shows how the growth of the administrative state represents an extralegal “revival of absolute power” in this sense, one that threatens to transform Constitutional rights and guarantees into mere “options” that the government bestows or withholds at its pleasure. “The evasion,” he notes, “thereby changes the very nature of procedural rights. Such rights traditionally were assurances against the government. Now they are but one of the choices for government in its exercise of power. Though the government must respect these rights when it proceeds against Americans in court, it has the freedom to escape them by taking an administrative path.”
Just as British kings in the seventeenth century evaded Parliament through such expedients as the Star Chamber and the exercise of royal prerogatives and royal waivers—what John Adams castigated as “those badges of domination called prerogatives”—so the administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution and beyond the authority of Congress. Barack Obama decreed that certain politically unpalatable provisions of the Affordable Care Act not be enforced, and presto, they were not enforced, even though they were the law of the land. He instructed his Department of Justice to intervene to prevent Arizona and other states from enforcing certain aspects of immigration law. He even forced public institutions to accommodate self-declared “transgender” persons in the toilets of their choice; he connived with lawsuits punishing bakers and Catholic hospitals and hobby shops who chose not to join this week’s politically correct campaign for the sexually exotic. The Constitution may have vested all legislative power in Congress and entrusted all judicial power to the courts, but the administrative state sidesteps those requirements by erecting a parallel bureaucratic structure of enforcement and control.
The administrative state today operates in violation of the Constitution.
“Eighteenth-century Americans,” Hamburger notes, “assumed that a rule could have the obligation of law only if it came from the constitutionally established legislature elected by the people.” Today, Americans find their lives directed by a jumble of agencies far removed from the legislature and staffed by bureaucrats who make and enforce a vast network of rules that govern nearly every aspect of our lives.
One of the most disturbing aspects of Hamburger’s analysis is the historical connection he exposes between the expansion of the franchise in the early twentieth century and the growth of administrative, that is to say, extra-legal, power. For the people in charge, equality of voting rights was one thing. They could live with that. But the tendency of newly enfranchised groups—the “bitter clingers” and “deplorables” of yore—to reject progressive initiatives was something else again. As Woodrow Wilson noted sadly, “The bulk of mankind is rigidly unphilosophical, and nowadays the bulk of mankind votes.” What to do?
The solution was to shift real power out of elected bodies and into the hands of the right sort of people, enlightened people, progressive people, people, that is to say, like Woodrow Wilson. Thus Wilson welcomed the advent of administrative power as a counterweight to encroaching democratization. And thus it was, as Hamburger points out, that we have seen a transfer of legislative power to the “knowledge class,” the managerial elite that James Burnham anatomized.
A closer look at the so-called “knowledge class” shows that what it knows best is how to preserve and extend its own privileges. Its activities are swaddled in do-gooder rhetoric about serving the public, looking after “the environment,” helping the disadvantaged, etc., but what they chiefly excel at is consolidating their own power.
In Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Edmund Burke criticized the Court of George III for circumventing Parliament and establishing by stealth what amounted to a new regime of royal prerogative and influence-peddling. It was not as patent as the swaggering courts of James I or Charles I. George and his courtiers maintained the appearance of parliamentary supremacy. But a closer look showed that the system was corrupt. “It was soon discovered,” Burke wrote with sly understatement, “that the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary Government, were things not altogether incompatible.” That discovery stands behind the growth of the administrative state. Under the cloak of democratic institutions, its essentially undemocratic activities pursue an expansionist agenda that threatens liberty in the most comprehensive way, by circumventing the law.
At the same time, however, a growing recognition of the totalitarian goals of the administrative state has fed what many have called a populist uprising here and in Europe. “Populist” is one word for the phenomenon. An affirmation of sovereignty, underwritten by a passion for freedom, is another, possibly more accurate, phrase.
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Sovereignty or Submission? Poland’s Battle Against the Eurocrats

What is a stake in this ongoing confrontation? Writ large, it is the choice between Polish sovereignty and Polish submission to the globalist agenda of the EU.
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Spreading the Wealth Around

The news that Samuel Joseph Wurzelbacher, known the world over as “Joe the Plumber,” had died at age 49 brought me back to the bad old days of 2008.
It was in October 2008, during Barack Obama’s meteoric rise to the presidency, that the 30-something aspiring plumber asked about then-Sen. Obama’s tax plan.
The bottom line, naturally, was that he wanted to raise taxes.
“I think,” Mr. Obama said in one of his most famous observations, that “when you spread the wealth around, it’s good for everybody.”
How much is in the eye of the observer.
Mr. Obama said it was “spreading the wealth around.”
Joe the Plumber said it was penalizing success and moving “one step closer to socialism.”
The exchange, which took place smack dab in the middle of the presidential race between Mr. Obama and John McCain, transformed Mr. Wurzelbacher into an overnight sensation.
He was mentioned no fewer than 26 times during the final presidential debate.
The left-wing media was furious and went into attack mode.
The main result was to cement his reputation as a spokesman for economic freedom.
The episode seems almost quaint today, when we’ve taken many more steps down the road to full-fledged socialism and governmental control of, well, everything.
But just as it’s often a good strategy when one has lost one’s way to retrace one’s steps, so it’s worth revisiting the exchange between Joe the Plumber and Mr. Obama.
Like many on the left, Mr. Obama said the chief issue in formulating tax policy wasn’t raising revenue, but “fairness.”
That’s where the ambition to “spread the wealth around” comes in, never mind that the wealth in question isn’t his to spread.
Mr. Obama’s use of the word “fairness” brings me to a subject that may at first blush seem only distantly related to my theme but that I’m convinced is absolutely central.
I mean rhetoric—what Aristotle, who devoted an entire book to the subject, described as the “art of persuasion.”
Today, we tend to regard rhetoric, to the extent that we think about it at all, as something superficial.
A “rhetorical question” is one that expects no answer, while to describe something as “merely rhetorical” is to say that it’s concerned only with style or emotional effect, not substance.
Yet Aristotle was right, I believe, in thinking that rhetoric was par excellence the political art—the art, I mean, that helps us negotiate our shared lives as intermittently rational actors with competing visions of the good.
And here’s a question of rhetoric that isn’t a rhetorical question: Why do liberals enjoy a virtual monopoly on all the nice words, beginning with the word “liberal”?
A full answer to that question would detain us for quite some time and take us back at least to the smarmy meditations of that primordial faux-liberal, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
But for now, I wish merely to observe the curious irony that there are few more illiberal ideologies abroad in polite society than the agglomeration of attitudes and assumptions that currently goes under the rubric “liberal.”
I forget the name of the wit who observed that today’s liberal dreams of a society in which everything that isn’t prohibited is mandatory, but he was clearly on to something deep.
It’s the same with other aspects of illiberal liberalism.
Its partisans command the heady rhetoric of virtue, but the results of their campaigns are reliably disappointing.
Your mother doubtless warned you about the unprofitable destination of the road that’s paved with good intentions.
And the fatuousness of good intentions unanchored by the realities of human nature is part of the tragi-comedy that is modern liberalism.
But let’s not overstate the purity motivating our liberal masters.
In pursuing their agenda of abstract benevolence, they make us all collaborators in an agenda of dependency.
Consider Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs.
It was deployed with all the rhetorical blandishments liberal sanctimony could summon.
But what was its issue? As the late, great James Q. Wilson put it, the war on poverty didn’t abolish poverty, it institutionalized it.
This melancholy spectacle has repeated itself time and again in Western societies, and yet we hitherto have seemed incapable of profiting from the lesson.
I think of that old liquor ad one saw on the sides of buses: “In life,” it read, “experience is the great teacher. In Scotch, Teacher’s is the great experience.”
Those who cherish the former, alas, have found themselves repeatedly disappointed.
“Fairness.” “Liberal.” “Compassion.” “Benevolence.”
They’re all such comforting words. But what do they really portend?
President Obama was a type of benevolent ruler. Not the most thoroughgoing type—the United States has thus far been spared that—but a recognizable specimen nonetheless.
It isn’t that benevolence is a bad thing per se. It’s just that, like charity, it works best the more local are its aims.
Enlarged, it becomes like that “telescopic philanthropy” that Charles Dickens, in “Bleak House,” attributes to Mrs. Jellyby, “a lady of very remarkable strength of character who devotes herself entirely to the public.”
Like other such benefactors, Mrs. Jellyby’s philanthropy is more ardent the more abstract and distant in its objects. Africa excites her munificence. When it comes to her own family, however, she’s hopeless.
The sad truth is that theoretical benevolence is compatible with any amount of practical indifference or even cruelty.
You feel kindly toward others. That’s what matters: your feelings.
The effects of your benevolent feelings in the real world are secondary.
Rousseau was a philosopher of benevolence. So was Karl Marx.
Yet everywhere that Marx’s ideas have been put into practice, the result has been near universal immiseration. (I say “near” universal, by the way, because the elites entrusted with managing state-sponsored benevolence always tend to escape its depredations.)
But the thing to note is that Marx’s intention was the benevolent one of forging a more equitable society by abolishing private property by, to employ President Obama’s famous phrase again, “spreading the wealth around.”
Every Marxist society has spread it wide and spread it thin.
I think in this context of Ronald Reagan’s observation that the nine most terrifying words in the English language are “I’m from the government and I’m here to help.”
The great 19th-century English essayist Walter Bagehot underscored the point.
It’s a melancholy occupation, observed Bagehot, to ask whether the benevolence of mankind actually does more good than ill.
It makes the purveyor of benevolence feel better—and by “better” I mean “more smug and self-righteous.”
But it’s unclear whether the objects of benevolence are any better off.
Just so with the modern welfare state.
It doesn’t matter that the welfare state actually creates more of the poverty and dependence it was instituted to abolish; the intentions behind it are benevolent.
Which is one of the reasons it’s so seductive.
It flatters the vanity of those who espouse it even as it nourishes the egalitarian ambitions that have always been at the center of Enlightened thought.
T.S. Eliot laid bare the psychological mechanism of process in his play “The Cocktail Party.”
“Half the harm that is done in the world,” he wrote, “is due to people who want to feel important.
“They don’t mean to do harm—but the harm does not interest them./Or they do not see it, or they justify it/Because they are absorbed in the endless struggle/To think well of themselves.
“The endless struggle to think well of themselves.”
From time immemorial, it has been the motor for all manner of socialist schemes.
Joe the Plumber, ordinary working-class chap that he was, understood this far better than the fancy people who went on to ridicule him. Let’s take a moment to remember him with gratitude. R.I.P.
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Standing Athwart Despair: The Case for Cheerful Conservatism

Conservatism is strongest when it rejects despair, embraces reality with confidence, and defends the permanent things with good humor.
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Stepping Out Into Freedom

Given the fire-hose disgorgement of revelations about the behavior of the FBI, the CIA and their infiltration of the mainstream media, there is ample justification for believing that we are living in some dystopian, distinctly unfunny version of The Truman Show.
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Stillbirth of a Meme, with a Brief Cadenza on ‘Lawfare’

The echo of “guilty” had barely subsided from Acting Justice Juan Merchan’s courthouse before a new meme waddled its way toward centerstage.
“Felon.”
That was going to be the new meme of the moment.
The New York Times took up the baton instantly, issuing a stern editorial “Donald Trump, Felon” the very day of the verdict.
The piece itself is mostly rabid anti-Trump boilerplate, but there is one bit that I hope people who still read the former paper of record will take to heart.
It comes at the end: “The jurors have delivered their verdict, as the voters will in November. If the Republic is to survive, all of us—including Mr. Trump—should abide by both, regardless of the outcome.” Let’s see if the NY Times and its readers do, in fact, abide by the high-minded injunction come Nov. 5. Watching the early progress of the new Democrats’ meme, I have grave doubts that the story of the 2024 election will unfold in a manner the NY Times and its readers will find acceptable. Screaming “Felon”—or, for those who like their memes redundant, “convicted felon” (since a “felon” by definition has been convicted)—was supposed to smear, undermine, and cast doubt upon President Trump. We read that many Democrats are pushing President Joe Biden to make the epithet “felon” a prime weapon in his campaign against President Trump.
Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) got on the bandwagon early with a post on X that solemnly informed his audience that “Donald Trump is now a convicted felon.”
Mr. Schumer prefaced that remark with a sentence that contains at least three falsehoods. “The undeniable fact,” quoth the senator, “is Donald Trump went through the same legal process that all Americans go through, he was tried according to the facts and the law, and he was found guilty by a jury of his peers.” Except that (1) the process that President Trump endured was not the same judicial process that other Americans go through when they are tried. On the contrary, everything about that prosecution was tailored for one man: President Trump.
(2) We don’t know that he was tried according to the facts and the law because we still don’t know what his alleged crime was.
(3) He was not found guilty by a jury of his peers but rather, as Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.) put it, a “judge from [his] opponent’s donor file.”
Doubt that? Check out this account of how Justice Merchan was appointed.
I suspect that the effort to weaponize the word “felon” (or “convicted felon”) is going to have a hard time getting traction.
The problem is that the word “felon” has not only lost its sting, it’s quickly being adopted as a badge of honor.
Thus, a sheriff in California recently explained that, although he has spent 30 years putting criminals behind bars to keep them away from the communities he serves, he has decided to “change teams.”
Now, instead of trying to keep felons behind bars, he wants to see one particular felon in the White House.
Everywhere outside the corridors of the NY Times and the hallowed halls of academia, people are rushing to support President Trump.
Far from recoiling from the news that he has been convicted of multiple felonies, they embrace the word.
One sign of the public’s support is the extraordinary outpouring of cash that has flowed into President Trump’s campaign coffers.
I write 2 1/2 days after the verdict. By this morning, he had raised more than $70 million in small donations, more than $200 million including major gifts.
That’s 2 1/2 days.
In fact, I suspect that the Democrats have made a major miscalculation in thinking that calling President Trump a felon is going to hurt him.
At the turn of the last century, the eminent, though now forgotten, French art critic Louis Vauxcelles made a fool of himself not once but twice.
First, he castigated the painters around Henri Matisse as “Les Fauves,” the “wild beasts,” because he thought their paintings lacked refinement.
Then, he disparaged painters such as Georges Braque and Pablo Picasso for filling their work with “little cubes.”
The names stuck, and thus, “Fauvism” and “Cubism” were born.
Unfortunately for Vauxcelles, both the painters and their patrons adopted the intended slurs as honorifics.
When you are dealing with a state that appears to deploy lawfare to destroy its opponents, appeals to the “rule of law” or deploying scare words such as “felon” no longer get any traction.
Remember, the word “lawfare” is patterned on the word “warfare.”
It describes a process of political combat that perverts and distorts the kinetic elements of the law not to enforce the law but to weaponize it.
The public seems to have cottoned on to this subterfuge, which is why I very much doubt that applying the word “felon” to President Trump will do him any damage at the polls.
On the contrary, I suspect it will aid him.
Thus, to adapt Shakespeare, does “the whirligig of time bring in his revenges.”
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Supreme Court Rejects Colorado’s Attempt to Kick Trump off Ballot

In a big victory for democracy, but a big blow to the partisans of “Our Democracy™,” the Supreme Court of the United States just reversed the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, which had determined that Donald Trump could not appear on the ballot for president in that state.
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Surf, Turf, and Another Media Meltdown

A media class addicted to anti-Trump theatrics manufactured a “surf-and-turf scandal,” only to reveal its own irrelevance as Trump’s agenda—and America’s leverage—keeps advancing.
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Swinburne, Rossetti, and the Power of the Erased Line

When Alcibiades defected from Athens to Sparta at the height of the Sicilian Expedition, one of the things that made his treachery so effective was that he knew the Athenian military strategy intimately from within. Having himself been a commander of the Athenian forces, he understood exactly what Sparta should do to inflict maximum damage on Athens’s interests. It would be unfair in all sorts of ways to compare the English writer A. N. Wilson to Alcibiades—“the most complete example,” Sir Edward Creasy remarked in 1851, “of genius without principle that history produces, the Bolingbroke of antiquity”—and I have no intention of doing so. But there is a peculiarity about Wilson’s book, God’s Funeral, that kept reminding me of someone who, feeling betrayed, switches sides and sets out to avenge himself on his former compatriots. Wilson’s announced subject in God’s Funeral is “the demise of faith among the Victorians”—less, he explains, “the end of a phase of human intellectual history” than “the withdrawal of a great Love-object.” And Wilson himself, as one reviewer put it, is “a lapsed orthodox Anglican.” (At one time he even studied for the clergy.) In God’s Funeral, this interesting conjunction of lapsed orthodoxy and lost love yields a species of intellectual history in which arrogance infects the exposition and professed admiration often betrays a current of contempt.
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Taking a Page from Lenin’s Playbook

I have often been struck by the number of pithy observations — revelatory, pointed or simply true — that were not said by the person to whom they are attributed. Vladimir Lenin apparently never said (in Russian or in English) that “the way to crush the bourgeoisie is to grind them between the millstones of taxation and inflation.”
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Tenured Radicals

Ivan R. Dee, 2008
Since Tenured Radicals first appeared in 1990, it has achieved a stature as the leading critique of the ways in which the humanities are now taught and studied at American universities. Trenchant and witty, it lays bare the sham of what now passes for serious academic pursuit in too many circles. In this new edition, completely reset, Roger Kimball has brought the text up to date and has added a new Introduction. Those who have never read Tenured Radicals are in for a treat; others may find a second reading worth their while.












